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PREFACE
This study is being carried out in an era when the 
underdeveloped areas of the world are in a constant state of 
flux. Thus, while the conclusions reached in any study of 
this nature may only be considered tentative, the approach 
must be a dynamic one which would take into purview the 
nature as well as the direction of such change.
The topic of this study concerns Southwest Asia, a region 
whose limits are, on the East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, on 
the West, the continents of Africa and Europe and the Medi­
terranean Sea, on the North, the Soviet Union and the Caspian 
and Black Seas, and on the South, the Indian Ocean. In 
Western countries the term'Middle East' or 'Near East' is 
often used synonymously to refer roughtly to the same area.
But the latter terms, aside from being from a Western pers­
pective, are at times used to include North and East Africa 
as well as certain areas of South and Central Asia. Thus, 
the terms 'Middle East' or 'Near East' are used sparingly in 
this study— and only in reference to the larger Islamic 
cultural milieu.
Aside from the personal interest, the region was chosen 
for study because of its strategic location in respect to the
ii
three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe, and the volatile 
state of its politics which deserves closer examination. In 
order to make this topic more manageable, the study primarily 
concentrates on Iran, Iraq and Turkey— with the focus being 
on Iran. The choice of the latter three polities, particu­
larly Iran, was governed by the familiarity of the writer 
with their culture, history and traditions, in addition to 
the availability of comparable data in the various aspects 
of political modernization. However, wherever possible, 
comparisons are also made with other polities within and out­
side the region.
The fact that Afro-Asian countries are often compared 
with the European and North American models is disturbing 
to some since such comparisons entail comparisons of polities 
with totally different historical as well as socio-political 
settings. Here, although we make occasional references to 
Western countries, we have primarily chosen Japan as a highly 
advanced polity for comparison. Although the Japanese socio­
cultural environment also differs markedly from that of 
Southwest Asia, Japan by virtue of being an Asian polity 
gives us another point of reference in placing the regional 
patterns in perspective.
The subject of this study is brought into focus at 
various ranges, from the regional to the national, hoping 
that this would give a clearer view of the general as well as 
the particular. Consequently, the opening and the concluding
iii
chapters are devoted to general conceptual and methodological 
questions and an overall appraisal of the dynamics of the 
region. Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six— which deal with 
the geo-demography, the human resources, the integrative pro­
cesses, and economic growth respectively— are primarily 
devoted to a comparative study of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, 
Chapters Two and Seven, on the other hand, focus on Iran and 
are respectively concerned with the socio-political struc­
ture and the role of the government in modernization.
I am deeply grateful to Professor Oliver E. Benson, 
my dissertation advisor, whose keen interest and intellect­
ual endeavors in the area of comparative politics has been a 
source of inspiration in this study. I would also like to 
express my appreciation to Professors Hugh MacNiven, Fred 
Silberstein, Donald Secrest, and Stephen Sloan, members of 
the dissertation committee who patiently read and criti­
cized the preliminary draft of the present dissertation.
My growing interest and concern with the political 
during the past seventeen years of my life I particularly owe 
to a prime minister, an engineer, a worker, and a university 
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PATTERNS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA 
I. A CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
Some Problems Of Contemporary Comparative Politics
In recent years, much has been written in the area of 
political change— especially with regard to the processes going 
on in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Most of these works 
have been theoretical in nature, dealing primarily with modes 
of description and analysis in a systematic context. Among 
the contributors to this movement are Gabriel Almond, Karl 
Deutsch, Harold Lasswell, Manfred Halpern, David Apter,
Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, as well as many others."'
^Amongst the works in this area are: Gabriel Almond &
Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton University Press, 
1963)5 Almond & Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics : A 
Developmental Approach (Little Brown, 1967)5 Harold D. Lasswell, 
The Comparative Studv of Elites (Stanford University Press, 
1952)5 Karl Deutsch, National and Social Communication (New 
York: Wiley, 1953)5 "Social Mobilization and Political Deve­
lopment," American Political Science Review. Vol. 55 
(September, 196l), pp. 493-514; "Towards an Inventory of Basic 
Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," 
American Political Science Review. Vol. 5̂ , (March, I960), 
pp. 34-57; Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development 
(Little Brown, 1966); (ed.). Communication and Political 
Development (Princeton University Press, 1963)5 Daniel Lerner, 
The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press,
1958)5 Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Princeton University Press,
1963)5 David Apter, The Gold Coast (Princeton, 1956; The 
Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton, 1961); and
Comparative politics may ultimately prove to be the most 
trying and challenging area of politics as a discipline. If 
the 'scientific' contentions of political science to universal 
truths are to be proved, its most meaningful and significant 
crucible is here. Because it is here that political science 
must shed all its parochial ambitions and colourings.
In fact, the most revolutionary discovery of the poli­
tical scientists in the West, since the Second World War, has 
been some degree of realization of the parochial self: In
their study of the Afro-Asian societies, they have discovered 
environments in which the formal political structures, as 
found in the West, are either non-existent, or if they do exist 
they fulfill different functions. Thus, the need for a less 
rigid and less parochial mind in the study of formal and in­
formal political structures, as well as functions, has begun 
to be felt. The recognition of the significance of political 
functions and the diversity of political structures, coupled 
with a more interdisciplinary approach in comparative politics 
constitute the most dynamic leap in the discipline.
It is too early to expect a highly disciplined and forma­
lized approach with quantitative sophistication from any of the 
general theories of comparative politics. The field is still
Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing
Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).
barren. Much work remains to be done. Most of the theories 
developed are the result of country studies (Apter’s based on 
Ghana, Pye's based on Malaya and Burma, etc.). There are only 
a few who have ventured to take a large number of countries 
and attempt to study the process of social and political change 
in depth. Amongst the latter two are particularly worthy of
2note : Daniel Lerner's The Passing of the Traditional Society
and Manfred Halpern's The Politics of Social Change in the 
Middle East and North Africa.̂  They are both based on study 
of several polities in the Middle East. The former is impor­
tant for its attempt to relate the process of modernization 
to an increase in one's sense of empathy with a larger number 
of roles. The more roles, and the more distant roles, that 
an individual can have a sense of empathy with the more modern 
he is. Of course, by 'a sense of empathy' here we mean a 
sense of general familiarity with roles rather than profes­
sional expertise which certain roles might require in actual 
performance. Along the same line, ones perception of oneself 
is changed from a subjective one to an objective one. Profes­




Professor Halpern, on the other hand, devotes most of 
his efforts to in-depth analysis of political and social struc­
tures- His focus of the study of modernization is on 
traditional and modern political structures, especially as 
they relate to social stratification of the old and its crumb­
ling before the forces of modernization. The latter study 
particularly focuses on the rise of the new middle class as 
the most revolutionary force in the underdeveloped societies.
The impact of the structural-functionalist approach is 
readily apparent in the works of Professor Almond and his 
students. They have in turn borrowed somewhat heavily from 
people like Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, and Malinowski. 
However, Parsons seems to be much more 'action' oriented than 
his political science following. Nevertheless, the works of 
Almond and Easton, particularly in defining and analysing the 
various political 'functions', are very useful for understand­
ing the political processes.
^Parsons and Merton are both sociologists, Malinowski 
is an anthropologist. For their contribution to functionalism 
see: Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.) Toward a General
Theorv of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951);
Talcott Parsons, Essavs in Sociolosical Theorv Pure and Annlied 
(New York : The Free Press. 19'5'9) and The Social System (New
York: The Free Press, 1951); Robert K. Merton, Social. Theorv
and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1957);
Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic. Science and Religion and Other 
Essavs (Garden City; Doubleday and Co., 195^)•
Despite all the theoretical work done in comparative 
politics, most of the area studies have not followed the theo­
retical modes of analysis. Modern comparative studies have 
mainly been concerned with comparing only certain aspects of 
one polity with that of another, Almond and Verba's The 
Civic Culture is a good example in that the focus of the book 
is on the cognitive and affective orientation of mass popula­
tion of Mexico, the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and West Germany, towards their politics.^
Although any evaluation concerning the overall level of 
advancement of any society would not be adequate pursuant to 
a one factor analysis, the means for multi-factor analysis 
are not yet at hand. It may be possible to develop mathema­
tical schemes for multi-factor analysis— and much effort has 
been expended in this direction.^ However, the problems in 
this respect are manifold : All the factors are not quantitative
in hatufe and consequently not reduceable to hümerical:nvalue§. 
Also, not much is known about the inter-relationship between 
and amongst the variety of factors at hand. Thus, it is not
^Almond and Verba, op,, cit.
%or reference on the factor analysis approach see: 
Harry H. Harman, The Modern Factor Analvsis (Chicago; 
University of Chicago Press, I960); and 0. Stanley Eitzen, 
"The Use of Bank and Textor's "A Cross-Polity Survey" for 
the Ranking of Nations: A Methodological Note, "Social and
Economic Studies. 16, 3, (September, 196?) pp. 326-329
always possible to enter each of the factors into mathematical 
operations. Further, even with regard to the readily quanti­
fiable data (such as birth rates, death rates, automobiles per 
capita, etc.), the main problem, in the area of comparative 
politics, remains the lack of availability of reliable data.
The argument, here, is not that political and social 
scientists will never be able to arrive at a meaningful and 
valid means of over-all quantitative analysis of polities.
The point is rather that within the present limitations of the 
discipline such studies would not produce definitive results. 
Thus-, -the more modest and less ambitious studies would be more 
successful in achieving their goals.
The Total and Cataclysmic Nature 
of Social and Political Change 
The main task in devising a comparative study of modern­
ization would be to move away from the traditionally hardened 
boundaries in the social sciences and adopt an interdiscipli­
nary approach which would attempt to take into consideration, 
as far as possible, the variety of natural and human environ­
mental factors. Of course, this does not mean that such a 
study would not have any political focus. Any study of 
political modernization must be firmly anchored in a compre­
hension of the political structures, functions, culture, etc., 
of the given polity.
However, a single discipline approach is still very pre­
valent. Many social scientists, who are also men of political 
influence, such as Gunnar Myrdal, Raul Prebisch, Walt Rostow, 
Hirschman, e t c . i n  writing about the process of moderniza­
tion have placed almost exclusive emphasis on economic growth. 
Although economic growth is a major aspect of the process of 
modernization, it ought to be remembered that modernization is 
a multi-faceted process, with each aspect having an influence 
on, as well as interacting with, every other aspect. In fact, 
if the process of modernization is ever to be understood, it 
can only be understood as a whole. The major shortcoming of 
the purely economic development approach, as well as any other 
single discipline approach, has been its narrowness and lack 
of concern with other aspects of human life, such as the 
political, which have a tremendous impact upon how and what 
kind of decision are made and how they are enforced.
The single disciplinarians are not the only ones who are 
bewildered by the enormity of social change. The revolutionary 
changes occurring in the underdeveloped areas of the world are 
so complex and cataclysmic that even the leaders of such revo­
lutionary movements don't have any clear notion of where the
^See: W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cam­
bridge University Press, 1966); Gunnar Myrdal, Development and 
Underdevelopment (National Bank of Egypt Fiftieth Anniversary 
Commemoration Lectures (Cairo, 1956); Albert 0. Hirschman, The 
Strategv of Economic Development (Yale University Press, 1950); 
and Raul Prebisch, "The Economic Development of Latin America 
and Its Principle Problems," Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America. (February, 1962)
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events are leading them. They are so impressed hy the forces
of history that all they can chart are general directions.
Gamal Ahd al-Nasser expressed this feeling when he wrote:
I feel that I stand before a boundless 
world, a bottomless sea - and a trepi­
dation restrains me from plringing into 
it since, from my point of vantage, I 
see no other shore to head for."
Julius Nyrere, expressed a similar feeling when he stated:
We in Tanganyika do not believe that 
mankind has yet discovered ultimate truth - 
in any field. We“do not wish to act as if 
we did have such a belief. We wish to con­
tribute to man's development if we can-but 
we do not claim to have a solution; our 
only claim is that we intend to grope 
forward in the dark toward a goal so 
distant that even the real understanding 
of it is beyond us - toward, in other words, 
the best that man can b e c o m e .9
What Is Modernization?
Sooner or later in the study of this kind, one must come 
to grips with the question of the meaning of the term 'modern­
ization, ' The process of political modernization (or 
development) has been described in a variety of lights, such 
as: the political prerequisites of economic development ; the
politics typical in industrial societies ; political moderniza­
tion; the operation of a nation state; administrative and
^Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy
of Revolution (Washington, 1955) P» 7«
^Julius Nyrere, from an address on the opening of 
Kivukoni College, Dar es Salam, July 29, 1961»
legal development; mass mobilization and participation; build­
ing of democracy; stability and orderly change; mobilization 
and power; and finally one aspect of a multi-dimensional pro­
cess of social change The variety of possible approaches 
.indicated above are sufficient to point out the context within 
which political forces are at work.
However, every researcher and student of politics must 
attempt to narrow-down, in conceptual terms, this multi-faceted 
phenomenon called modernization. He must develop definitions 
of modernization which, tentative as they may be, would show, 
at least, general directions. In this respect, we must clarify 
here some of the assumptions which underly this study's concept 
of modernization.
From a purely political point of view modernization means 
the democratization of the basis of political power. By demo­
cracy, here, we don't mean any particular brand, but rather a 
widespread sharing of political power--which must consequently 
be reflected in a broad distribution of economic resources and 
the equality of opportunity for all members of the polity.
This general definition of democracy is best understood when 
contrasted to polities where political decisions are made by, 
and in the interests of, an elite or ruling class at the 
expense of the rest of the populace. The particular procedure
^®See Lucian Pye's Aspect;-, of Political Development,
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through which political participation on a large scale takes 
place may vary. It may be through regular elections, through 
a party apparatus, via cooperative type organizations, or plu­
ralist structures.
Also, what is important about the modern man in his 
participant character— i.e. his orientation towards input
structures and processes, and actual or potential engagement
11in the articulation of demands and making of decisions.
Here again, the participant character of the modern man can 
be understood better when juxtaposed to the character of the 
traditional man whose relationship vis a vis the political  ̂
is that of a subject rather than an active participant.
Viewing the process from a juristic vantage, moderni­
zation would be a movement away from a society where human 
relations are based on familial or status grounds, and towards 
a society where human relations are governed by contract. Sir 
Henry Maine was one of the first people to develop this concept 
as a measure of political modernization, late in the nineteenth 
century, in his book Ancient Law, he presented in detail the 
characteristics of a contract, as opposed to a status, 
s o c i e t y . I n  a society where relationships are contractual 
not only family, cast, clan, class considerations do not
^^The term 'participant' is used in somewhat of a dif­
ferent and more individualistic sense by Almond and Verba, 
oĵ . cit.
^^Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London, 1884)
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govern institutions, but every man is free to affect the formu­
lation of such laws which govern his life.
So far as the socio-economic structure is concerned, 
modernization means the development of a predominantly middle- 
class society. This is bound to occur with a more just 
distribution of resources and the gradual disappearance of the 
very rich and the very poor. By 'middle class' here, we don't 
mean a duplication of the middle classes, as they exist in the 
West, in the less developed areas of the world. The nature, 
traditions and values of the new middle class in the develop­
ing areas differs from that of the West by the virtue of the 
fact that they come out of different cultural and historical 
settings. In the final chapter we shall examine more closely 
the role of the new middle class in the modernization process.
However, in the traditional societies the bulk of the 
population is composed of peasants who are engaged in techno­
logically primitive (by modern standards) forms of agriculture. 
With increased economic development and the democratization of 
the allocation of resources, a modern middle class--initially 
composed of professional personnel, white collar workers and 
intelligentsia— begins to develop which ultimately will 
embrace the bulk of the population, including the proletariat 
and the peasantry. This tendency seems to have been the rule 
in the economically more advanced societies, regardless of the 
ideological contexts within which such developments have
12
occurredo Of course, the initial states of industrialization 
and capital investment have required much sacrifice, in the 
form of lower consumption levels, on the bulk of the population 
both under capitalism and' socialism- However, after the neces­
sary period of austerity has elapsed and industrialization has 
taken root, the economy becomes increasingly consumer consciouso
Thus, another necessary step in the direction of moderni­
zation is industrial growth. Without industrialization, it 
would be impossible for a polity to modernize, since a primi­
tive technology would not permit any degree of differentiation 
to develop and the majority of the population is involved in 
agriculture producing just enough to keep itself alive.
The human resources are the most dynamic measure of 
modernization. A society whose population is healthy, literate 
and skilled is naturally more advanced than one which has 
neglected the improvement of its human resources. Literacy 
is the most popular indicator in evaluating the human resources 
since it reflects the level and nature of human involvement 
with communication flows. In the study of human resources 
formal education assumes varying significance. While the for­
mal primary education pattern is a fairly reliable measure of 
sustained literacy, the extent of the secondary and higher 
education systems have more to do with the development of 
specialized roles. The quality of the labour force— i.e., the 
age pattern, level of skill, sex, etc.,— tells much about the
13
level of human development. What is also important is human 
mental and physical fitness and the degree to which other 
resources are mobilized to serve this end. The mode and the 
level of differentiation in occupations within the polity 
tells about the pace of increasing complexity in social rela­
tions, which seems to be an unavoidable by-product of the 
process of m o d e r n i z a t i o n .^3 in order to understand the 
significance of such differentiation one must pay equal 
attention to its impact upon the human personality, the chang­
ing nature of values, the mobilization patterns, and the 
uncertainties that all such changes entail.
In fact, much of the work in the area of revolutionary 
change has something to do with the concept of alienation; 
which briefly means the old political structures are incapable 
of relating meaningfully to the increased number of roles 
created by the forces of modernization. The term 'alienation' 
is used in the West to refer to the feeling of estrangement 
that an individual in a modern society has towards the imper­
sonal industrial society and-its institutions which encompass 
him. In this study we use the term in its broadest sense to 
also include such individuals within the more traditional 
societies who, by virtue of their education, skills and
^3por notes on differentiation see S. N. Eisenstadt, 
"Social Change, Differentiation, and Evolution," American 
Sociological Review. (June, 1964). pp. 375-387; and Talcott 
Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American 
Sociological Review (June, 1964) pp. 339-357»
IM-
values, find themselves estranged from the highly personal­
ized traditional structures. It is often such alienatedi 
individuals who play the key role in :transforming the socio­
political struture. In the concluding chapter we shall deal 
in more depth with the dynamic nature of human resources and 
its functional and dysfunctional character in the process of 
modernization.
Demographically, modernization has often been identified 
with urbanization. Though there is no inevitability about 
this, historically city life has been identified with civil 
life. The process of industrialization in the last two cen­
turies has created the large urban proletariat, which has been 
vital to the modern life. With increased automation, presum­
ably the need for a large manual labour force, and with it the 
large population clusters, may be reduced. But that is yet to 
be seen.
Integration is also a hallmark of modernization. An 
increase in transportations and communications would not only 
bring people together physically, but also psychically. An 
indication of integration is the increased level of empathy 
exhibited by the population in the sense that the modern man 
is capabla of performing, or imagining himself perform, a 
much larger number of roles than his more traditional counter­
part.
1^Bee Daniel Lerner, op.- cit.,
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A further consequence of Integration has to do with a
common way of life and the acceptance of common values by the
members of the polity. This is what some have called the deve-
1 ̂lopment of 'a secular ethic' or a 'secular culture.'  ̂ The 
major impact of political integration would be to diminish 
dualism by involving all the population, urban and rural 
alike, in the political processes.
A Dynamic View of Modernization 
Since modernization in a traditional setting means 
change, and often revolutionary change, equally dynamic 
approaches and contexts are necessary for its comprehension.
The danger with the more rigid and static view of moderniza­
tion is its too simplistic and binary vision of the world.
Some authors have even gone as far as suggesting stability 
and order, the very antithesis of revolutionary change, as 
being the hallmark of modernization.^^ By this yardstick, 
every despotic state like Haiti, Saudi Arabia, or Ethiopia 
would be a modern state; as opposed to France and the United 
States which might be classified as traditional or transitional 
due to the prevailing social and political upheavals. Thus, 
while lack of chaos and stability is essential to implementing
1 ?̂For a detailed discussion of 'secularism' see S. P. 
Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World 
Politics (April, 1965)
16See Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development. op.
cit-.
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the progressive policies of a modern leadership, in polities 
whose leadership remains traditional stability can only mean 
the stability of the traditional order.
A dynamic view of modernization would see the process 
as a perpetually unfolding one. In this sense, there is no 
finality about political development or modernization.
Polities may be more or less developed but they are all 
developing  ̂ and change is a part and parcel of this ever 
unfolding process.
What political science, more than any other discipline, 
can contribute to the understanding of modernization is to 
study the changes in the nature and the mode of political 
power: Who holds the monopoly of coercive powers? How is
the power distributed? How is it used? What or who constitute 
the power elite? What are the challenges to the power elite? 
What are the new sources of political power? How does revolu­
tionary social change affect the distribution of political 
power and the allocation of economic resources? The asking 
of these and many similar questions is vital to the under­
standing of the process of.modernization.
Since we are dealing with change, one important variable 
of a dynamic approach must be the time factor--i.e., change
^^the terms 'modernization’ and 'development' are used 
synonymously in this study.
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over time» In case of most, if not all, underdeveloped 
polities this aspect is so crucial that change is often de­
fined in terms of a race ’with’ or ’against’ time» Thus, in 
any study of political development, one must pay particular 
attention to the change, as well as the rate of change, which 
has occurred over time» It is in this respect that the rate 
of growth in different sectors of a polity becomes such an 
important indicator of modernization»
In a similar vein, any of these changes are meaningful 
only in perspective» This can be done by comparing such 
changes in one polity with those in other polities» The com­
parative approach is not only useful in interpolity analysis, 
but also in trying to comprehend the nature and manner of 
intra-polity differentiations. This approach could be a 
major key to explaining the style as well as the level of per­
formance of various sectors within the system.
Significance of Dualism in the Process 
of Modernization 
After all is said and done, the most significant aspect 
of the study of political and cultural change is dualism» 
Dualism basically means that in every society, regardless of 
the level of modernization, there are two sectors: the modern
and the traditional» Of course, the size of each sector with 
respect to the other sector varies from society to society, 
depending on the overall level of development» A dualistic
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approach to the study of comparative politics makes the discip­
line much more dynamic and much less parochial.
From a dualistic vantage point all societies are develop­
ing constantly. Thus, it is not proper to use the term 
'developed' with regard to the industrial nations of the world, 
since it implies a finality about the process. In the United 
States as well as the Western Europe and the Soviet Union, 
there are certain sectors or regions which are traditional 
from a political, a legal, a social, or even an economic 
point of view. Thus, overall affluence, though important, 
does not warrant wholesale labels. A familiar development is 
the movement of the poor and black people in America, The 
awakening on the part of the poor and the underprivileged 
has brought the United States face to face with one of its 
most critical crisis in recent times. An understanding of 
this problem is only possible when the dynamics of the dualis­
tic nature of the problem is closely studied. If the civil 
rights movement in the United States was focusing on the juris­
tic aspect of dualism, the black power movement is dealing 
with the economic and political implications of dualism.
A purely static view of the polity on the basis of per 
capita statistics (income, consumption, education, health, 
etc,) would leave the total dynamics of society wholly un­
explained, In the same vein, one could not apply such purely 
statistical analysis (on the basis of per capita) to the less
19
developed parts of the world since such areas also exhibit a 
dualistic nature. For instance, Kuwait, on the basis of her 
per capita income is the most affluent in the world. Yet from 
a dynamic dualistic approach the crisis of modernization in 
Kuwait has hardly begun in the sense that the human resources 
still remain predominantly underdeveloped and political 
structures strictly authoritarian and traditional.
Another lesson of political dualism is to move away from 
certain prevalent chronological limitations. Many authors tend 
to naturally think of the past as traditional and future as 
modern. This automatic assumption would rob history of much 
possible insight and contribution in understanding the dyna­
mics of the process of modernization. If we consider 
political modernization as the acceptance of certain modern 
political values. then any study of history would show that 
in the past there have also been individuals, as well as insti­
tutions, espousing modern values concerning the legal, the 
social, the economic, and the political relations. Similarly, 
one may expect that traditionalism not be merely a prisoner 
of the past or present, but rather to continue in the foresee­
able future, in the sense that there may still be individuals 
or institutions which may continue to uphold the traditional 
values and structural patterns.
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Hedging Against Parochialism
In recent years much has been written about the necessity 
of a ’value free’ political science. Whether such a thing is 
ever possible is open to debate. What is obvious is that the 
meanings which a political scientist, as any other human being, 
attributes to the various phenomena are partially determined 
by his socialization— i.e., the kind of values he has learned 
to associate with the said phenomena. No man is completely 
free of such biases. Even if he were totally free, he would 
not be of much use as a social scientist since the internal­
ization of a large portion of these values is essential in 
order for one man to be able to relate his understandings to 
another.
Cultural biases are only harmful if they block one's view 
in grasping the social and political reality. One such kind 
of a bias, which we have mentioned before, is parochialism in 
the traditional approach to comparative politics, where politi­
cal processes were only seen as emanating from certain formal 
political structures as they had developed in the West.
Another form of parochialism is to identify modernization 
with the acceptance of certain specified ideologies, institu­
tions, or ways of life such as 'Democracy' or 'Communism.'
This kind of parochialism is oblivious of the world which 
includes people from a distinct variety of cultures, religions, 
traditions, and histories.
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One means of avoiding the pitfalls of parochialism, in 
one's study of political modernization, would he to become 
thoroughly familiar with the culture and traditions of the 
polity or polities under study- In this, sense, the investiga­
tor does not only need to be a political scientist; but he 
must also be an area specialist nar excellence, thoroughly 
familiar with the history, the geography, the economy, and the 
culture of the region. Such demanding qualifications perhaps 
explains the absence of really comprehensive and outstanding 
works in the area of comparative politics. Manfred Halpern's 
The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North 
Africa  ̂̂  perhaps comes closest to such a work. In the final
chapter we shall examine Halpern's approach in contrast to
19that of escalating expectations used by Oliver Benson-
Finally, stating one's biases and value orientations at 
the outset of any study, in the form of definitions, is a good 
way of informing oneself as well as other readers about the 
general orientation of the work, and thus hedging against 
parochialism.
In this chapter, aside from pointing out certain problems 
of comparative politics and the study of social and political
18' Halpern, 0£.. cit.
19oiiver Benson, "Escalating Expectations," Symposium on 
Great World Problems of the Next Decade, Department of State, 
April 25-27, 1966. Unpublished.
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change, we have attempted to present certain broad characteris­
tics of the process of 'modernization.' We have briefly 
identified 'modernization' with the democratization of the 
basis of political power, appearance of a participant person­
ality, development of contractual relationships, rise of a 
predominantly new middle class society, economic and industrial 
growth, improvement of the human resources and their mobili­
zation, urbanization, and integration. Of course, the above 
characteristics are not exhaustive of the..process of moderni­
zation. However, they provide a general direction and the 
guidelines so far as this study is concerned. What we have 
attempted to do here is to move away from a single definition 
of modernization by indicating a variety of the manifestations 
of the process. Aside from pointing out the significance of 
dualism, we have further suggested that modernization could be 
better understood if it is observed as a whole and from a 
dynamic universalistic vantage point. ^
II. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE
From a political point of view, in Iran status and 
wealth have traditionally been a function of power rather than 
vice versa. In Western Europe and North America traditionally 
it has been the propertied classes who controlled the bulk of 
the political power. Even the right to vote has been depen­
dent on ownership. However, in Southwest Asia in general, 
and in Iran in particular, it has been the military which has 
played the crucial role in shaping the socio-political struc­
ture. Prior to the twentieth century the tribal elements 
constituted the bulk of the military power. Even if we consi­
der the most recent dynasties in the Iranian history— such as 
the Safavid, the Afshar, and the Qajar— they were all based 
on tribal power.^ It is only in the twentieth century that 
we observe the challenge of the tribal power by the rise of 
the modern military.
In the Iranian context, the ownership of land, as well 
as the exercise of local power, is very much dependent upon 
who governs. Thus, to try to generalize from the traditional 
socio-political patterns in Europe, and to extrapolate into
^Exceptions from the Safavid to the present century were 
like' the Zand dynasty which rules Shiraz. But such dominions 
were local rather than national and very short lived.
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the Iranian situation would he a serious, nonetheless common, 
mistake. Neither Marxist patterns nor other stereotypes in 
the West seem totally adequate in explaining the traditional 
power patterns, or the kind of change which is taking place 
in this part of the world. Although not much has been written 
about the structures of social power in Iran, among the work 
which has been published there are at least two extremely
2valuable contributions by Ann Lambton and Manfred Halpern.
The problem in utilizing only socio-economic structures 
as the basic tool of analysis is its rigidity and lack of 
dynamism. It is when one introduces the concept of power that 
the picture becomes clearer and exhibits its proper dynamic 
qualities, explaining the shifts and changes in relations of 
influence as well as modifications in structures. Since those 
who have had power have been historically those high in the 
socio-political structure, changes in the patterns of influence 
can historically be seen through a study of shifting alliances 
among the upper classes. This, of course, is the traditional 
pattern. The major crisis in twentieth century Iran has been
pSee A. K, S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia 
(London, 1953); and Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social 
Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963) pp. k-1-1l8. Also
worthwhile are: Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development
in a Changing Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1962), pp. 150-226; and James A. Bill, 
"The Social and Economic Foundations of Power in Contemporary 
Iran." The Middle East Journal, Vol. 17. No. k-. (Autumn.
1963Î, pFT4ÔÔ3n?.
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an unprecedented shift in potential power relations result­
ing from the rise of the new middle and working classes.
Although the middle classes, and to some degree the 
working classes, have risen to challenge the power of the upper 
classes, the challenge, as we shall see, has not been completely 
successful as yet. The rise of modern armies and the advent 
of bureaucratic organizations have complicated the process.
These institutions, which are basically modern in structure 
and composition, have ironically helped to bolster, at least 
temporarily, the control of the socio-political relations by 
the upper classes.
The Lower Classes
The Tribal Population 
Nomadic tribes constituted about 22 per cent of the total 
population of Iran at the beginning of this century.^ By 1962 
the proportion of the tribal population of the country had 
declined to about 15 per cent.^ A large-"proportion of the 
tribal population are Kurds (just over a million according to 
the 1966 national census, or about 4 per cent of the total 
population). Other major tribes are the Lora of Western and
^Comprehensive works are lacking with reference to the 
Iranian tribes. References to the available sources are given 
in L, P. Elwell-Sutton's A Guide to Iranian Area Study (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, 1962).
^See Iran Almanac. 196^ (Tehran, 1965) p. 5̂ 8.
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Central Iran, the Baluchis of the Southeast, as well as Turk­
oman and Afshar tribes.
The tribesmen have traditionally owed their allegiance 
to their tribal khan. Thus, the pattern of allegiances of a 
modern state is something quite new to them. Politically, 
the tribes played a very important role before the advent of 
modern armies, since they supplied much of men and weapons 
which were used for or against the central government.
In this century the power of the tribal elements has 
gradually declined. This has come about because of two fac­
tors: First, the weapons and the military capabilities of the
tribal forces have proved not to be a match to that of the 
modern army. Second, the tribal leaders, and others high in 
their ranks, have mostly left the tribes and settled in urban 
centres--especially the capital. Their sons and daughters 
have studied abroad and they themselves have often accepted 
positions in the government.
To be sure, either for personal reasons or questions of 
public policy, some tribal leaders are not in agreement with 
the government. During the last fifty years there have been 
several uprisings especially by the Kurds, the Lors, the 
Bakhtiaris, and the Qashqa'i, the tribes in the Province of 
Pars whose leaders are in exile and are generally pro- 
Mossadegh.^ In 1963 the number of the tribesmen participating
^Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh was the leader of the National
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in one such uprising was estimated at 30,000.^ However, in 
general the tribesman is out of modern political life. With 
a few exceptions, his leaders have acquired new interests and 
ways of life. The traditional pastoral life of the tribe has 
no place in the new society. Thus, many of the tribal elements, 
with their customary rights of migration dwindling due to new 
government regulations, are turning into landless peasants.
This is particularly true since their main source of income 
which is livestock has been undermined through the limitation 
of grazing rights. Their recourse would be either to turn 
into agricultural workers or to migrate into the cities as 
unskilled 'lumpen proletariat.'
The Peasants
It is generally popular in the West to use the term 
'feudalism' to refer to the peasant-landlord relations in the 
underdeveloped areas. However, at least in the case of Iran
Front and the Prime-Minis ter of Iran during 1951-53» -He led 
the struggle for the nationalization of Iranian oil industries. 
He is probably the most important figure in the twentieth 
century Iran in that he symbolized the spirit of political 
modernization: i.e., the democratization of the basis of
political power. Elwell-Sutton writes that the basis of 
Mossadegh's popular admiration was "his refusal to compromise 
with Reza Shah's dictatorship, his longstanding campaign 
against inherited privilege, and his resolute determination to 
rid Persia of corrupting foreign influence." Elwell-Sutton 
gives a detailed account of Mossadegh's background and career 
from his birth in 1879» See Persian Oil : A Study in Power 
Politics (London, 1955), PP* 191-19^* Dr. Mossadegh died in 
March, 1967*
See Tehran Mossavar (February, 1963)»
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as well as most North African and Middle Eastern countries, 
feudalism never existed as it did in Europe. The institution 
of landlordism developed out of the custom of the rulers to 
give certain areas of the country to their adjutants or 
friends for the purpose of overseeing and the collection of 
taxes. Since the rulers often changed, the landlords also 
changed. Even if the rulers persisted for some time, they 
preferred to shift the landlords, many of whom were military 
leaders. These shifts were made fairly often in order to pre­
vent the development of any kind of hase which might be used 
against them. The point is not that the peasantry in Iran has 
faired better under this form of 'shifting feudalism' than the 
European peasant did under the 'established' form of feudalism. 
So far as the peasant in Iran is concerned, the pressures from 
the above are very real. However, there are fundamental dif­
ferences, in the social structure and the value system, 
between the traditional patterns in Iran and those in Europe 
which are reflected, among other things, in attitudes towards 
the ownership of land, property, as well as socio-economic 
mobility.
The peasants were also different from those in Europe ' 
since they were not tied to the land and could move freely, 
so far as, their aspiration or economic condition permitted. 
Thus, the kind of feudalism which developed in Europe never
7came about in Iran.
^For more, see Lambton, op. cit.
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In Iran the landless peasants are in the same predica­
ment as the tribal forces. Their number is large. The 1956 
National Census lists over 1 ,4-00,000 of the population as agri­
cultural workers. However, since a large proportion of them 
are unemployed, the number of landless peasants must in fact 
be much larger.
The main form of farming is share-cropping. This is
not only true for Iran, but also of all Southwest Asia and 
8North Africa. The division of crops differs from area to 
area and the share of the tenant oscillates between one-third 
to one-tenth depending on a variety of factors including the 
mercy of the landlord.
Most of the peasants, unless they can supplement their 
income by the produce of a garden, a small flock of sheep, or 
other live-stocks, cannot subsist. The landlords have trad­
itionally feared these supplemental efforts since prosperity 
makes the peasant independent.9
The condition of the peasant in Iran is that of "grind­
ing poverty; the landowner, although he enjoys a comparative 
influence, is in constant fear of being despoiled of his 
wealth by intrigue, or of being cheated of it by a discon­
tented peasantry; and the government official, often 
inadequately paid, finds it difficult to support himself
^See Halpern, 0£. cit.. p. 8l. 
^See Lambton, op. cit., p. 302.
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and his family unless he has some source of income other than 
his pay. Distrust, insecurity, and intrigue prevails on all 
sides.
The tribal masses have only recently come to share the 
lot of the landless peasantry. Thus, psychologically, even 
they are better off than the peasantry. The following com­
ment concerning the lot of the agricultural worker in Iraq 
is also expressive of the condition of the Iranian peasantry:
It is net exagerating to state that the 
average agricultural worker (fellah) is 
a living pathological specimen, as he is 
probably a victim of anklylostomiasis 
(hookworm, leading to abdominal pain, 
intermittant fever, progressive anemia, 
and emaciation), ascariasis (an intestinal 
parasite causing diarrhea), malaria, bilhar- 
zia (blood flukes producing urinal discharge 
of blood and dysentery) trachoma (an infec­
tious disease of the eye), hejel (a non- 
venereal form of syphilis) and possibly 
tuberculosis also.'"
Under such conditions of exploitation and ill-health it is. not
surprising that the Middle Eastern peasant is often described
as fatalistic and passive.
Of the whole population of the peasantry in Iran only 
very few own land. The 1956 National Census put the number 
of the small peasant proprietors at 1,786,075» It is very
lOhambton, o£.. cit.. pp. 39*+-395
A. Michael Critchley, "The Health of the Industrial 
Worker in Iraq," British Journal of Industrial Medicine. 
Vol. 12, 1955* As quoted by Halpern, op,, cit.. n. 85»
31
popular to refer to the peasantry in the underdeveloped areas 
as politically conservative. But as can be seen from the 
above figures, only the very few, who are.in some sense pro­
perty owners, have any kind of a share in the status-quo 
which they might want to conserve. The only way to describe 
the political attitude of the Iranian peasantry, under such 
conditions of life described previously, is apathy, fatalism, 
insecurity and mistrust.
With such a small number of peasants as property owners, 
if the masses of the landless peasants were to overcome their 
sense of fatalism and aspire to land ownership, they could be 
potentially a revolutionary force. In the early 1960's with 
all the propaganda that the government put out, to bring over 
the peasants as a supporting element, and the fiery anti­
landlord speeches of Dr. Hassan Arsanjani, Minister of 
Agriculture, there seems to be a gradual inroad in erradica- 
ting the fatalistic outlook of the peasants. The introduction 
of the Literacy Corps in recent years, which sends high school 
and college graduates into the villages, small as it is, has 
also helped to combat fatalism and raise the aspiration of the 
peasants. Of course, the most revolutionary occurrence has 
been the transistor radio and its impact on peasant life, 
which we shall take up in the fifth chapter.
The purpose of the government is to gain allies among 
the peasants, as well as to destroy the economic base of some
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landlords who could be potential adversaries. The propaganda 
campaign of the government against landlordism has undoubtedly  ̂
increased the aspiration level of the peasantry in the sense 
that they expect to own their land and cooperatives, which 
would in turn bring them a better life. However, indications 
are that as yet the government has fallen far short of deliver­
ing its p r o m i s e s . 12 The increased level of frustrations due 
to unfulfilled promises could backfire and become a potential 
threat to the government.
The Working Classes
As we shall see in the forthcoming discussion of the 
demographic setting, urban life is the centre and focus of
I^Such indications have been plentiful in the past few 
years: The Christian Science Monitor (May 28, 1963) stated:
"In March, H. Arsanjani, Minister in charge of land reform 
resigned. Reportedly he had come to the conclusion that the 
reform would be a flop because the Shah vetoed the planning 
and expenditure needed to make it effective."
The New Statesman (September 20, 1963) wrote: "Some -̂3,000
Iranian villages are owned by absentee landlords and less 
than a fifth of them have been taken over by the government 
and distributed to the peasants. In fact, less than 10^ of 
the country’s total rural population have benefited directly 
from land reform."
The Christian Science Monitor (March 16, 1964) again states: 
"Land reform from which so much had been hoped, has bogged 
down. Funds are not at hand to press forward with it. A 
correspondent of the French newspaper Le Monde estimated that 
of the 10,000 cooperatives needed to make land reform a suc­
cess, only 2,000 had been set up— and only a few of them were 
working well."
Also see Hossein Mahdavi, "The Coming Crisis in Iran," Foreign 
Affairs (January, 1966).
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modernization. The modern elements are basically political as 
opposed to the predominantly apolitical mentality existing in 
the rural hinterlands. Thus, generally, as one moves from 
rural sectors into the larger and larger urban population 
centres, there is a parallel rise in political awareness.
The basic change brought forth by the forces of modernization 
in the social structure of the developing areas is the crea­
tion of a new working class and a new middle class.
By far the largest group of urban workers-are the 
unemployed and the unskilled. At the bottom of the working 
classes are the new immigrants from the countryside, or what 
Leonard Binder calls "a kind of Eastern urban 'lumpen-prole- 
t a r i a t ' . " 1 3  They are basically landless peasants, who-sometimes 
move into the edge of the city with their whole family living 
in small shabby rooms or cave-like huts dug in the ground and 
covered with boards and tin cans. However, mostly it is only 
the male member of the family who comes into the city to earn 
some money to send or take home. This move into the city is 
sometimes temporary. Nevertheless, the destruction of the 
rural life and economy has created more attraction for the 
rural immigrant to stay permanently in the cities, despite the 
dim chances of employment.
13See Leonard Binder, op.. cit.. p. 170
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However, workers are much more plentiful than are the 
14available jobs, and what little the worker earns (between 
50 and 80 cents per day) he may spend due to the high cost of 
living in the city. City life also has a tremendous destruc­
tive impact on the value system of the peasant.^^ The 
destruction of moral controls coupled with low income and 
heightened material expectation, resulting from urban life, 
have been generally responsible for an increased rate of crime 
and frustrations amongst the peasant-workers. The urban pea­
sant is at present still basically a-polltical. But due to 
his heightened expectations and status as 'would-be-skilled- 
worker,' he might be susceptible to attempts in the future for 
political organization.
Above this lowest category are the workers who are in­
volved in unskilled service jobs such as in transportation, 
peddling, or as house servants, etc. These workers are about 
half or one generation away from the farm. Their level of 
political awareness is somewhat higher than the previous group.
1 Although there are no definite figures available, the 
unemployment figures are expected to be fairly high in the 
urban centres. A conservative estimate was that of the New 
York Times on December 4, 1961, which wrote: "...unemployment
in Tehran is believed to be about 50,000 to 60,000 now. It 
runs much higher this winter when peasants drift in from the 
fields seeking work not knowing that work is not to be had."
 ̂̂ Among those who have been interested in the impact of 
technology and urban life on rural mentality, the keenest 
observer is Jalal Aleahmad in his Gharb Zadeei (Tehran, 1961).
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But in general their attitude is basically 'lumpen.' A good 
illustration of this is the fact that during the last decade 
or two they have often been too ready to play the role of a 
mob for little pay, on behalf of a declining elite whose 
ultimate ends were contrary to the interest of the working
n 16classes.
A higher group in the working classes is composed of the 
unskilled workers in oil and manufacturing who have learned to 
do just one thing, such as pressing a lever, or filling oil 
cans, etc.. This category's level of political awareness, as 
well as income, is much higher than the previous categories.
The aspirations of this group are also higher. Since 19^0 
there have been attempts to organize the workers both by 
Communists and Nationalists. Although the Communists produced 
isolated hard core cells amongst the workers in some small 
industries in the North, the bulk of the unskilled and semi­
skilled workers in major oil industries of the South remained 
with Mossadegh during crucial days of the nationalization of 
oil industries.
However, despite attempts to win over the workers psycho­
logically, the government has not been very successful in the 
last decade since the realities of economic and social life of
1&See David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible 
Government (New York, Random House, 196>+) pp. 110-11M-. A l s o ,  
Andrew Tully, CIA, The Inside Story (New York, Morrow, 1962), 
especially the chapter entitled "King-Making in Iran," pp. 88-99•
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the worker dictate against such a marriage. During the riots 
of June 5-6, 1963, for instance, in addition to the religious 
groups there were large numbers of workers involved in the 
anti-government'demonstrations. The government alleged that 
the riots were incited by reactionary religious leaders who 
were opposed to government reforms in favor of workers and 
peasants. The New Republic, in an article commenting on this 
allegation, ironically states: "This leaves open the question
of how the religious leaders succeeded in inciting large 
numbers of working class Iranians to take to the streets to 
demonstrate against reforms which are very much in their 
i n t e r e s t s . T o  be sure, some of the lumpen proletariat 
have at times been bought by the upper classes for a variety 
of reactionary causes- Those religious scholars who were 
accused of (or credited with) leading the demonstrations were 
amongst the most progressive.
Somewhat above the previous group in social structure, 
due to their skills, but nevertheless on the decline, are the 
workers for artisans who produce goods which no longer find 
many customers due to the advent of cheaper mass-produced 
commodities. Among these are the basket weavers, the carpet 
weavers, the potters, the glass blowers, etc.. Due to their 
skills which has had traditional utility, they are generally
1?The New Hepublic (June 29, 1963).
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on the retreat from the larger cities. They are basically 
traditional in outlook.
A more dynamic group are the semi-skilled factory workers, 
drivers, apprentices to mechanics, the janitors of schools and 
government offices, apprentices in Bazars, bakers, fruit- 
sellers, etc.. They are more politically conscious due to 
their contacts with the middle classes as well as because of 
their literacy.
Highest in the working classes are those with modern 
skills such as mechanics, truck or bus drivers, low-grade 
civil servants, plumbers, etc.. Members of this category have 
the highest level of aspiration for advancement and many of 
them may be considered among the lower middle classes. Their 
education is often better than the previous groups. Their 
political participation is often hampered by the fears and 
insecurities of possible economic reprisals which might be 
taken against them especially if they champion causes which 
are unpopular with the government.
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The Middle Classes
In Iran, as well as in most less developed areas, the 
middle classes, as a proportion of the total population, are 
much smaller than in the more developed areas. The traditional 
approach to a definition of the middle classes has been based 
on the traditional British and American middle classes as pro­
totypes. However, a look at both Western and Non-Western
historical experience suggests that the American and British
1 8cases were special cases. Manfred Halpern argues convincingly
that the present age is one of bureaucratic organization and
that the majority of the new middle classes are now salaried
19rather than propertied.
At the bottom of the Iranian middle classes are the small
retailers and guild craftsman. This group is basically on the
defensive due to the increasing pressures in society in the
direction of mass production and distribution by the upper
20classes, particularly the industrial aristocracy. The
1 ̂ Halpern, op.. cit., pp. 53-78%
19lbid.. p. 52,
2^1 have borrowed the term 'industrial aristocracy' from 
James A. Bill (op. cit.). In the sense that I use it, it refers 
to the landowners who have transfered some of their capital into 
the cities investing it in restaurants, cafes, pastry shops, 
etc.. Some of them have also gone into partnership with such 
international concerns as Coca Cola, Canada Dry, Firestone, etc.. 
Belonging to the same category are also government officials 
and military officers who come into some cash, by virtue of 
their position, and want to invest it into legitimate business 
with quick returns.
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industrial aristocracy and foreign capitalists, whose invest­
ments have basically been in areas of the production of 
consumer goods, which have quick return, have put this group 
on the defensive by the introduction of modern techniques such 
as standardization of goods, packaging, as well as more effi­
cient distribution networks. Culturally, this group is 
tradition oriented. Politically, however, it is more in 
line with the salaried middle class since its very existence 
is being threatened by the upper classes.
At somewhat of a higher position are the white-collar 
workers and the intelligentsia: government clerks, school
teachers, most of the Ulama (religious scholars), and lower 
rank army officers basically constitute this class. They 
are fundamentally modernist in outlook.
A further example of stereo-typing by some Western 
scholars, Marxist as well as non-Marxist, is to put all of 
the Ulama in the traditionalist and reactionary column. The 
upper-class elements in Iran have also used this Western 
stereotype as a propaganda weapon against the Ulama. Al­
though there are traditionalist elements among the Ulama. those 
who are attacked by the upper classes are the modernists. The 
role played by the modernist Ulama (such as Shirazi, Behbahani, 
Tabataba'i, Khyababi, Moddarress, Kashani, and at present 
Khomeini, Shariatmadari, Milani and others) in defense of 
constitutionalism, popular government and anti-colonialism
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during the last century is of vital significance in Iranian 
history.
However, the level of organization of this class is 
fairly low. Since white-collar workers and intelligentsia 
belong to the lower middle class economically, they are among 
the would-be-middle class, and consequently they constitute 
the most alienated sector of the middle classes. They are 
generally salaried, and barring their considerations of econo­
mic insecurity, are most susceptible to new ideologies and 
political movements.
Of higher economic status are the small wholesalers and 
middle retailers. They have less education than the previous 
group and consequently are more traditional in outlook and 
somewhat passive politically. Since they constitute the small 
businessmen class, their income fluctuates drastically in 
accordance with the general condition of the economy.
A category which is both economically and educationally 
in a higher level is composed of professional and technical 
government employees, those with university degrees, engineers, 
doctors, lawyers, etc.. The level of prestige and influence 
of this category, as in all other categories, varies depend­
ing on their family connections. This class, whose composition 
we shall examine in more detail in the final chapter, is com­
posed of individuals with the highest level of skills necessary 
for modernization. Thus, potentially, they are the hard-core
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modernists whose co-operation is indispensible for the success­
ful operation of a modern or modernizing society.
Close to the above group are the small landowners who 
are basically urban dwellers but have a farm close to town 
which they visit and manage regularly. At certain points the 
members of the previous group are indistinguishable from the
small landowners since many doctors or engineers, in order to
21supplement their regular income, move into agriculture.
Manfred Halpern has developed the concept of the new
middle class as the principle revolutionary and stabilizing
force. His new middle class excludes the property owning
middle class. However, it includes both those who are now
drawing salaries, and a far larger group— a 'would-be new
middle class' which resembles this clasŝ  in every respect
22except that it is unemployed. Thus, from the urban cate­
gories the managers, the administrators, the teachers, the 
engineers, the journalists, the scientists, the lawyers, or 
the army officers belong to the new middle class due to the 
above shared characteristics.
Halpern's approach is consistent with the realities of 
social structure in Iran, which has traditionally underscored 
the importance of power as opposed to ownership. However,
Binder, up. cit.. p. 
22ibid.. pp. 51-78.
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assuming that the new middle class is basically modernist in 
attitude, and that such attitudes are incompatible with tradi­
tional political patterns, the question would be: how is it
that in studying the traditional power structure in Iran (as 
well as in other countries) we often meet with a deluge of 
doctors, engineers, lawyers, and even social scientists who 
act as the defenders of the traditional establishment?
H a l p e r n ' s  a n s w e r s  seem  t o  b e  t w o f o l d :  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  a r e
always opportunists who represent no one but themselves.
"Some s e l l  t h e i r  s k i l l s  a s  p o l i t i c a l  b r o k e r s ;  some come c l o s e
23t o  s e l l i n g  t h e i r  c o u n t r y . "  S e c o n d ,  h e  r a t i o n a l i z e s  t h e
cooperation in the following manner :
In the Middle East (as in other rapidly 
changing, underdeveloped societies) the 
new intelligentsia acts in behalf of the 
older ruling classes only until it is 
strong enough to win control of the govern­
ment. When this occurs, however, the 
intelligentsia no longer remains socially 
unattached but acts in the interests of 
the new middle class of which it is an 
integral part. It cannot preserve the 
privileges of the older ruling classes 
if it hopes to propel any Middle Eastern 
country into the modern a g e .24-
In Professor Halpern’s analysis there seems to be an 
inevitability about all of this. A more cynical and pessi­
mistic outlook would be one from Roberto Michel's point of 
view.^5\ Namely, that the cooperation of certain sectors
23Halpern, op.. c i t . . p. 53*
2^Ibid., p. 57.
^ ^ S ee  R o b e r to  M i c h e l ’ s P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s .
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of the intelligentsia with the older ruling classes can only 
be interpreted as an attempt to utilize modern talents and 
symbols in order to perpetuate the same oligarchical patterns.
The Upper Classes 
Regardless of the degree or the nature of political con­
sciousness, as one rises in the socio-political structure of 
Iran and comes close to the centre of power, political parti­
cipation, in the Machiavellian tradition, sharply increases. 
This pattern is perhaps true of all authoritarian states with 
totalitarian ambitions, Shaykh Mohammad Khyabani, the Iranian 
revolutionary nationalist, on June 15» 1920, described the 
situation well when he said:
There was no unity among the ruling 
classes. This led to constant political 
quarrels among them. The orientation of 
the landed aristocracy was towards the 
imperialist protectors. Part of the 
trading class was seduced by the markets of 
the rich metropolis, while the rest consi­
dered that independence was the only way 
out » 2/
The Iranian upper classes have been described as being 
composed of the large landowners, tribal nobility, the 
wealthy members of the Qajar dynasty and members of the royal 
f a m i l y . T h i s  probably best describes the traditional
26some aspects of this problem are examined by Demorgny 
in his La Question Persane et la Guerre (Paris, 1916).
27uasrullah Saifpour Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 
1917-1921 (New York, 1952), p. 251.
^®See Binder, op., cit., p. 175*
1,5
pattern. The picture has somewhat changed during the last 
fifty years. The tribal nobility has lost much of its power 
due to its long absence from the tribal environment, as well 
as the breakdown of the tribal armed forces which were once a 
potent element in Iranian politics. Thus, although being 
known as a member of tribal nobility still carries with it 
some weight, the power that this group exercises is depen­
dent upon the pattern of its political alliances in the 
capital as well as its position vis \ vis the tribe. The 
very fact that some members of tribal nobility such as the 
Qashqa'is or the Sanjabis are in exile or diminished in in­
fluence, and on the other hand that some others are cabinet 
members or Ambassadors attests to the above mentioned trend.
The wealthy Qajar nobility is also in the same position 
since Qajars are no longer ruling Iran. Consequently, they 
have to play the game of political intrigue in the same manner 
as the rest of the upper classes.
Wealth in Iran is generally in two forms : land and
capital (money, commodity of capital goods). Thus, from an 
economic point of view men of means in the upper classes are 
either large landowners, or capitalists, or both. The latter 
case is fairly often. In fact, the upper classes are so inter­
woven that one person could be an industrial aristocrat, a 
large landowner, a military leader, a member of the tribal 
nobility all at the same time. Thus, although classifications
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are essential to the understanding of the structure, too rigid 
an adherence to them might hinder their dynamic comprehension.
So far as the industrial aristocracy (or native capital­
ists)— who are basically in import-export business, food 
processing, or textiles--are concerned, the Establishment can 
exercise a great deal of influence in deciding which ones get 
import or export licenses, whether they get government contracts, 
or whether their projects get the proper financing. Thus, only 
those who are closely aligned with the power structure are 
permitted to survive.
With the increased concentration of the power at the top, 
there is a perpetual mistrust by the core of the rest of the 
power structure, which manifests itself in constant changes 
and shifts in the position of the senior government officials, 
including the leaders of the military and the security forces. 
This is done in order to prevent any possible coalition by the 
forces in the periphery against the core. The prevalence of 
this element of mistrust in the power structure has created an 
atmosphere of opportunism, where all elements of the power 
structure, in order to prove their loyalty, often attempt to 
discredit, or inform upon, other members of the power struc­
ture. This prevailing atmosphere, which makes survival 
hazardous for the people close to the core, is consistently
1+7
expected and encouraged by the centre of the core for obvious
reasons. 29
Some have included amongst the upper classes the foreign 
capitalist, or the companies or individuals of foreign nation­
ality which have investment, as well as a say, in Iranian 
affairs. The position of this group has become increasingly 
"important in the last decade due to its increased involvement 
in the Iranian economic life. This class is particularly 
important not only because it is not susceptible to the pres­
sures that the power structure can bring to bear upon other 
classes but also because the core is often dependent upon it 
for survival on an international as well as on the domestic
,  30scale.
The high Ulama have also often been included among the 
upper c l a s s e s . 31 However, since the Ulama economically belong 
to the middle classes and at present do not exert much Influence 
within the power structure, they have not been included here
29por more on internal politics of the power elite in 
Iran see James A. Bill, "The Politics of Modernization in Iran- 
A Group-Class Analysis", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Princeton, 1962.
role played by the foreign capitalists in Iranian 
political life is exceedingly important. However, its consid­
eration in the present context would take us too far out in 
the area of international politics. For detailed discussion 
of this topic see Fatemi, op.. cit. & Elwell-Sutton, op. cit.
3  1 ̂ James A. Bill, "The Social and Economic Foundations of 
Power in Contemporary Iran," op, cit.
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among the upper classes. However, the potential power of the 
Ulama upon their following remains in tact and is something 
that the power structure must deal with and attempt to suppress 
fairly often. Ayattollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the foremost 
religious scholar with widest following, has been sent into 
exile in Iraq. Other major figures such as Milani, Shariat- 
maderi, and others are under constant surveillance.
The socio-political structure of Iran reflects the 
particular historical predicament of the polity. On the one 
hand, at the top of the structure is the traditional elite 
determined to preserve its power base. Due to the changing 
nature of political power, the nature of the traditional power 
elite is also changing somewhat, from one based on familial 
ties and traditional landed aristocracy to one which is domi­
nated by the military-capitalist elements. On the other hand, 
this leadership is being challenged by the rise of a new mid­
dle class which in its broadest form would include actual and 
potential (unemployed) salariat: all of those whose modern
skills, in administration, education, science, technology, 
communications, military, etc., are essential for the success­
ful operation of any modern or modernizing society. This new 
middle class is heterogeneous in its origin in that its members 
have their origins and connections in the upper as well as the 
middle and lower middle classes. Also party to the struggle 
are the traditional middle classes, whose influence in society 
is diminishing very rapidly, and in the long run can survive
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as a part of the middle class if they can successfully move 
into the new middle class. The workers and peasants are not 
yet politically conscious enough to form a cohesive force 
and the development of such a force is essential to the out­
come of the crisis of modernization.
III. THE GEO-DEMOGRAPHY
The Political Significance of Geo-Demography 
Aside from the socio-political structure, an important 
factor in the political process as well as the political set­
ting of a region is its geographic characteristics and how 
human beings arrange themselves spatially with respect to each 
other and their environment. This in turn has an impact on 
the administrative structure of the polity since an adminis­
tration must organize itself in order to answer the needs of 
such spatial arrangements of men. Lines of communications 
must also be established to carry messages, goods, and people 
between and among population clusters as well as dispersions. 
Thus, the economy of the region, as well as its polity, become 
significant targets of impact since their potency has a direct 
relationship to the efficiency and availability of channels of 
communication.
Aside from the impact of geo-demography on the manner 
and style of life, it can also be used as a fairly useful indi­
cator to show the level of development and modernization of a 
region. A highly urbanized polity or region must be more 
industrial and of necessity errect minimum social institutions 
and political structures in order to answer the complex demands
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of an -urban environment. Thus, to a certain extent, urbani­
zation has been equated with modernization. On the other hand, 
a population which „is highly rural in character is marked by 
a low level of differentiation, low level of skill, with agri­
culture as the basic means of subsistence. Even in the area 
of agriculture, the traditional method of production is much 
different from that of the highly urban and industrialized 
polity. The former uses mainly primitive tools and methods of 
farming, whereas the latter employs highly efficient and 
scientific ways which makes the process much more profitable.
In understanding political modernization in terms of 
geo-demography one must move away from static analysis. An 
attempt shall be made here to show the pattern of change 
occuring in the geo-demography and the kinds of implications 
the existence of such patterns would have for the polity or 
the region as a whole.
The Land
Southwest Asia is a land of contrasts between rugged 
mountain ranges and broad plains. In Turkey, Iran and 
Afghanistan the mountains are the dominating features of the 
land form; whereas in Syria, Arabia and Iraq the plains com­
pose the overwhelming characteristic.^ The mountain ranges
 ̂Two of the best general surveys of the geography of 
Southwest Asia are: George B. Cressey, Crossroads : Land and
Life in Southwest Asia (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1960)
W. B. Fisher, The Middle East (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.,
1961).
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of the region are comparatively young and thus subject to
2periodic erosion and occasional earthquakes.
This varied panorama of the high mountain ranges, on 
the one hand, and the broad plains, on the other, have been a 
traditional barrier to communication. The geographic setting, 
in this respect, has thus hampered the development of a more 
integrated form of life within the region. This, in turn, has 
imposed upon the political structures and authorities, until 
fairly recently, a decentralized form of government. In this 
setting, the provincial and tribal rulers primarily played the 
role of the tax collectors, so far as the central government 
was concerned. They could otherwise do whatever they wished.
It is only in the twentieth century when the natural geographic 
barriers begin to lose their significance and this traditional 
pattern of political authority starts to breakdown before the 
forces of the central government.
Iran, which is the main focus of this study, is a high 
plateau with higher mountain ranges separating it from sur­
rounding regions. Geographically, Iran can be divided into 
four natural regions. First, the Zagros Mountains which, 
covering west and southern regions, extend in the form of an 
arc from Armenia to Baluchestan. Second, the Northern High­
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link the Caucusus Mountains to the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan. 
Third, the Eastern Uplands of Southern Khorassan and Northern 
Seistan which compose a more varied, broken region. Finally, 
the Central Plateau dominated by deserts and salt marshes 
which amount to about one-half of the total area of the 
country.^
The Climate
Southwest Asia has a modified Mediterranian type climate 
on the Mediterranian as well as the Caspian and the Black Sea 
coastlines. But as one moves east from the Mediterranian, the 
climate becomes increasingly arid with sharp distinct seasons. 
Extreme temperatures in winter, including snowfalls, are the 
rule in every country outside the Arabian Peninsula.
Precipitation is accordingly light everywhere except the 
regions where Mediterranian climate prevails. In fact, clear 
skies are the main factor in developing intense heat and cold. 
It is useful to note the contrast in those regions with , 
areas nearer to the equator, where a summer rainfall and 
extensive vegetation protect the land from direct exposure to 
the sun. An average estimate for the whole region shows 50 
to 70 per cent relative humidity which is well below that of 
Western Europe. Coastal regions, however, are very humid. A
^See Fisher, op.. cit.. pp. 275-28?
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combination of high humidity and high temperatures make living 
conditions unbearable during the summer months in the coastal 
regions of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.
Aside from the variances within the region, there are also 
seasonal variances. For half of the year much of the area is 
a desert and for the other half it ranges from wet to semi- 
arid. Due to low absorptive capacity of the soil and the 
dominance of the mountain slopes, towns and villages which 
are situated on such slopes are often threatened with floods 
during early spring months.
Due to its varied geographic settings, the Iranian 
climate is as varied as that of the whole region. Its main 
features are: extremely high summer temperatures, and unus­
ually cold winters; great contrasts in rainfall, the extreme 
north and west receive considerable precipitation, and the 
remainder of the country little or none; and the existence of 
high winds which intensify the effects of extreme temperatures*^
Water Resources 
Except in the coastal regions. Southwest Asia has a 
strong rhythm of summer drought and winter rain, which in 
higher altitudes fall as snow. Most of the Black Sea and 
Caspian Sea areas have at least one inch of precipitation 
every month throughout the year, whereas each of the mountain
^Fisher, Ibid.
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ranges receive heavy precipitation (between 80 to 100 inches 
a year) on their windward sides. Yet, all of the lowlands 
are dry and large areas average only between 1 to 5 inches a 
year,
While it is relevant to note the amount of precipitation, 
what is significant is whether this amount is sufficient to 
balance evaporation and accumulate enough moisture to support 
vegetation. Part of the highland areas of Iran, Afghanistan 
and Turkey receive almost enough precipitation to balance 
potential evaporation. But in some of the lowlands the evap- 
ortranspiration capacity reaches 75 inches which is more than 
ten times the amount of precipitation.^
Due to the low level of precipitation there are only a 
few rivers that are of major importance in the area and flow 
year around. In Iran the major rivers are the Zayandeh Rud, 
the Karun which flows into the Shatt-al-Arab, and the Aras and 
Atrak on the Irano-Soviet border. In Turkey the major river 
is the Menderes and in Afghanistan, the Hirmand. Further west 
are River Jordan in Jordan and largest of them all, the Shatt- 
al-Arab in Iraq. All of the above rivers flow out of high 
mountain streams which are fed by the stored-up snows of high
^Evaportranspiration is a measure of water in the ground 
or plants in terms of the energy available for its conversion 
into atmospheric moisture. See C. W. Thornthwaite, Three Water 
Balance Mans of Southwest Asia (Centerton, N. J.: Laboratory
of Climatology, 1958).
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altitudes which melt slow enough to allow year around flow.
Due to this origin, all of these rivers are rapid and fast 
flowing, and with the exception of Shatt-al-Arah, are not 
navigable. Consequently, the rivers in this region somewhat 
differ in function from the great rivers of Europe and North 
America which played a significant role, as waterways and 
communication routes, in the developmental process.
These geographic patterns have had a great deal of impact 
on demography. Cities and other population clusters, in order 
to secure sufficient agricultural lands and water, have been 
formed at the foot of the mountain ranges or in the river 
valleys. This pattern has persisted even in recent times 
since the area remains predominantly agrarian in nature with 
fairly traditional methods of farming. Thus, technology has 
not yet begun to reshape the geographic setting. There is 
much talk about land reclaimation and recently in Iran some 
projects have been proposed whereby sea water from the Persian 
Gulf is to be pumped into the central lowlands and salt marshes 
in order to revive vegetation and create precipitation in the 
surrounding areas.^ However, this is still a dream for this 
thirsty region.
^Talash. Vol. 1, No. 8, March 1968, p. k-8.
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The Demographic Tradition
By a n y  measure the population of the region is predomi­
nantly rural. The population centres, in a classic pattern, 
are situated on coastal regions, river valleys, and mountain 
slopes which protect them from the desert.
Yet, urbanism is not something new to the region. In 
fact, the oldest urban areas of the world, such as Eridu,
Assur, Nineveh, Khorsabad, Ur and Babylon, which go back to 
the fourth milenium B.C. were of Southwest Asia.? a question 
which has interested some is why this region, which pioneered 
urban living, has not urbanized as rapidly as Europe and North 
America. The answer seems to lie in the fundamental differences 
between economic and technological basis of the old and new 
cities.
Some have sought to answer this question by exploring 
the cultural routes and the differences which exist in this 
respect between the West and the Middle East.® Culturally, 
the major feature of the region is its Islamic heritage. Thus, 
the culture should have served as an impetus rather than a 
hinderance to urban development since Islam is basically an
?See Gideon Sjoberg, "The Origin and Evolution of Cities," 
Scientific American, Vol. 213, No. 3, (September, 1965), PP* 5?- 
62.
®Paul English, "Urbanites, Peasants and Nomads: The
Middle Eastern Ecological Triology," The Journal of Geography. 
Vol. LXVI, No. 2 (February, 1967), pp. 5^-59.
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urban religion which, from the start, pitted itself against 
tribal tendencies» In fact, the prophet of Islam had to 
migrate from Mecca, which was predominantly under the influ­
ence of the tribes, to Medina, a predominantly commerical 
city, in order to find supporters (Ansar).
The pivotal point in understanding the demographic 
pattern is that in recent times there has occured a major 
revolution in city life and the qualities which are called 
'urban»' The old cities of the region were basically depen­
dent on the agrarian areas surrounding them and could 
survive so long as they effectively controlled the farmlands 
whence most of their primary products came» Traditionally, 
cities were centres of trade for agricultural goods, seats 
of military power, and little artisanship and manufacturing 
which kept the soldiers well armed and the commercial and 
ruling classes well supplied with tradeable and consumer 
products.
Thus, except for the military, the aristocracy, the 
small number of artisans, the tradesmen, and those who were 
house servants to the people of means, few lived in the city. 
Trade within the region was fairly difficult due to natural 
desert and mountain barriers which had to be traversed. Ex­
ternal trade with China, India and Europe had to face similar 
difficulties in communication.
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It is only in the last few centuries that the develop­
ment of the steamship and other means of long distance 
navigation have begun to revolutionize the modes of communica­
tions and trade and the concepts of distance. The developments 
of the compass, and later the steamship, were the consequences 
of the scientific and technological revolution in the West.
The Industrial Revolution created demand for workers who began 
to swell the urban centres to an extent hitherto unprecedented.^ 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, half of the population 
of England and Wales lived in cities of 100,000 or more. In 
1926 those who lived in such areas composed more than three- 
quarters of the whole population. Thus, it is the industrial 
proletariat which begins to comprise the majority of the popu­
lation in the European urban centres. This basic ingredient 
has been, and still is, missing in the urban centres of South­
west Asia. In this revolutionary age modern cities really 
began to become productive rather than consuming centres.
With the increasing demand for raw materials from Asia and 
Africa, communications between these continents and European 
cities increased. However, as European ships began to arrive 
in Istanbul, Beirut, Basra and Mohamareh (Khorramshahr), the 
kind of economic boom that they brought to these ports differed
^See Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Popu­
lation," Scientific American, Vol. 213, No. 3 (September, 1965), 
pp. ^1-53»
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in degree, as well as in kind, from that going on in Europe. 
This trade did not create any industrial base for the region 
since the European traders were mainly interested in raw 
materials and local concessions. In this sense, the urban 
centres continued to lag and what boom came to these areas 
since the Second World War is of a different kind as we shall 
see briefly.
New Modes of Urbanism 
The definition of an ’urban centre' has often been sub­
ject to much debate. The Central Bureau of Statistics of Iran
has designated localities with 5)000 or more inhabitants as 
10urban. This yardstick has also been used in some other
countries. However, insofar as this study is concerned,
centres of 100,000 or more will be designated as urban for 
\ *1the region. This figure has been chosen because what 
interests us here is the urban atmosphere and manner of life. 
It may be possible for the highly mobile and differentiated 
polities like those of Europe and North America to maintain 
urban qualities of life--due to rapid transportations, com­
munication, dispersion of cultural centres, schools, etc.,—  
even in areas of 5)000 population. But this is not the case 
in most underdeveloped areas. Thus, our yardstick must be
See The Preliminary Report on Iranian Population; 
General Census of Aban 13^5 (November, 1966), (Tehran: Central
Bureau of Statistics, January, 1967)»
^^See Map 2.
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different. Since mobility within the region is comparatively 
low and channels of communications not sufficiently developed, 
we have chosen a much larger figure as the criterion of urban­
ism. A figure large enough to guarantee a minimum standard of 
organized urban life.
Using the above criterion of urbanism, in 1966 just over
1 2a quarter of the Iranian population was urban. In Iraq the
urban population of 1966 was comparatively larger than that of
13Iran, comprising 31.75 per cent of the total population,
1 ̂Whereas in Turkey the urban population in 1965 was only 1m-,89,
a figure not only below Iranian and Iraqi level of urbanization
>65:
16
1 5of 196 , but even below that of Iran in 1955 and Iraq in
1957.
^^See Tables 1 and 4.
^^See Tables 3 and 6,
^^See Tables 2 and 5»
^^Taking the rate of urban growth in Iran as «965 (see
Table k-) the urban population of Iran in 1955 would be 15* 55*
^^See Tables 3 and 6.
6̂
TABLE 1
POPULATION OF IRANIAN CITIES OF 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  
AND MORE INHABITANTS (CITY PROPER)
City/Year 1956 Rank 1966 Rank
1. Tehran 1 513 164 1 2 712 944 1
2. Tabriz 290 195 2 468 993 3
3. Esfahan 254 876 3 575 001 2
4. Mashhad 242 165 4 417 171 4
5. Abadan 226 103 5 270 726 6
6. Shiraz 169 088 6 317 086 57. Hermanshah 125 181 7 213 275 7
8 . Ahyaz 119 828 8 206 265 8
9 » Rasht 109 493 9 l4i 756 12
10. Hamedan 100 029 10 161 944 911. Shemiran — — — 156 154 10
12. Yazd 150 531 11
13. Qom — 133 94l 1314. Kerman — — — 133 941 131 5» Rezayieh “ — ~ 110 419 15
16. Dezful * — — 105 381 16
17" Qazyin — “ — 103 791 17
18. Rey ” — “ 102 993 18
TOTAL 3 150 122
TOTAL
POPULATION 19 30 0  000
x=3l5 012 Md. 197 596 8=^04 965
Skew ness  = +0.8698 V = 1.2855
6 466 715
25 500 000
X=359 262 Md.=l59 049 s=586 630 
Skewness = +1.0238 V = 1,6328
SOURCES; U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ' D em o g rap h ic  Y e a rb o o k. 1956 (New Y o rk :
1957)• Preliminary Report on Iranian Population: 
General Census of Aban 1345TNovember, 1966), [Tehran: 
Central Bureau of Statistics, January, 1967)»
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TABLE 2
POPULATION OF CITIES OF 100,000 AND MORE 
INHABITANTS IN TURKEY (CITY PROPER)
1955-1965
City/Year 1955 Rank m i Rank
19* Ankara 453 151 2 902 216 2
20. Istanbul 1 214 616 1 1 750 642 1
21. Izmir 286 310 3 335 510 3
22. Adana 172 465 4 290 515 4
2 3. Bursa 131 336 5 212 518 5
2k. Eskisehir 122 755 6 174 451 6
2 5. Diyarbakir 102 624 14
26. Gaziantep 158 367 7
2 7. Kayseri 126 913 9
2 8. Konya 157 801 8
2 9. Sivas 109 165 10
3 0. Erzurum 106 301 12
3 1. Samsum 106 921 11
3 2. Malatya 105 207 13
TOTAL 2 38O 633 4 639 151
Total
Population 23 860 000 31 150 000
X=396 772 Md.=229 387 X=331 368 Md.=158 084
s=382 93^ Skewness=+1.382 s=442 862 Skewness=+1.17'
V=0.0009 V=1.3364
*Populations of Ankara and Istanbul include the whole urban 
agglomeration.
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbooks 1957 and 1966
iNew York, 195*8 and 196? respectively).
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TABLE 3
POPULATION OF IRAQI CITIES OF 100,000 





3 6, Kirkuk 






















TOTAL 1 000 668
Total













^Estimate comprises Karkh, Rasafah, Adhamiya and Kadhemain 
Qadha centres and Maamoon, Mansour and Karradah-Sharqiya 
Nahiyas.
**NOTE: United Nations' Demographic Yearbooks of 1966 and
1967 differ markedly in listing urban population of Iraq. 
1966 Yearbook lists many more cities with population of 
100,000 or more. But since the figures for both years were 
provisional, the data in the later edition were adopted here,
SOURCE: United Nations Statistical Yearbooks _
(New York: 1950 and 1967 respectivelyT77 & 1966
TABLE h
PATTERNS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN URBAN CENTRES OF IRAN 
(CITIES OF 100,000 AND MORE)
1956-1966
Per Cent of Total Absolute Rate Per Cent Annual Rank in
City Urban Ponulation of Growth Rate of Growth Growth
1956 1966 1956 1966 V
1 . Tehran k-8.03 k-1.9 5 100 179 7 .9 0 4
2. Tabriz 9.21 7 .2 5 100 161 6.10 7 .5
3. Esfahan 8.09 8.89 100 225 12 .5 0 14. Mashhad 7.68 6 .4 5 100 172 7 .2 0 5
5. Ahadan 7.17 1+.18 100 119 1 .9 0 106 . Shiraz 5 .3 6 4 .9 0 100 187 8 .7 0 2
7. Kermanshah 3 .9 7 3 .2 9 100 170 7 .0 0 68. Ahvaz 3 .8 0 3 .1 8 100 184 8.40 3
9. Rasht 3.k-7 2 .1 9 100 129 2 .9 0 910. Hamedan 3 .1 7 2 .5 0 100 161 6.10 7 .511 C Shemiran 2.41
1 2. Yazd 2 .3 2
13. Qom 2 .0 7
Ik-. Kerman 1 .83
15. Rezayieh 1 .7 016. Dezful 1 .62
17. Qazvin 1 .6018. Rey 1 .5 9
ON-o
TOTAL 99.95 99.92
Mean A n n u a l  R a t e  o f  G ro w th  = 6.87 ( i n  c i t i e s  w i t h  1 0 0 ,0 0 0  o r  m ore  p o p u l a t i o n
in 1956)
Per Cent of Total Population Urban : 1956 16.32
1966 2 5 .3 6
Absolute Rate of National Urban Growth 100 205 Annual Rate = 10.50
Overall Rate of Annual Urban Growth as a per cent of total population =




SOURCE; Same as Table 1
TABLE 5
"PATTERNS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN URBAN CENTRES OF TURKEY
(C IT IE S  OF 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  AND MORE)
1955-1956
Per Cent of Total Absolute Rate Per Cent Annual Rank in
City Urban Ponulation of Growth Rate of Growth Growth
195% 1965 1955 1965
24. Istanbul 51.02 37.73 100 144 4.40 4
25. Ankara 19.03 19.44 100 199 9.90 126. Ismir 12.02 7.23 100 117 1.70 6
27. Adana 7.24 6.26 100 168 6.80 2
28. Bursa 5.51 4.58 100 161 6.10 3










Mean A n n u a l  R a t e  o f  G ro w th  o f  C i t i e s  w i t h  1 0 0 ,0 0 0  o r  m ore  p o p u l a t i o n  = 6 . 6 2
A b s o l u t e R a t e  o f  N a t i o n a l  U rb a n  G ro w th : 1955 100
1965 194
P e r  c e n t o f  T o t a l  P o p u l a t i o n  U r b a n : 1955 9.97
1965 14.89
Absolute Annual Rate of Urban Growth = 19*+-100 = 9**+0
65-55
Overall Rate of Annual Urban Growth as a per cent of total population:
1*+.89-9.97 = .*+92 
65-55
SOURCE: Same as Table 2.
TABLE 6
PATTERNS OE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN IRAQI URBAN CENTRES 
(CITIES OF 100,000 AND MORE)
1957-1965
P e r  C e n t  o f  T o t a l A b s o l u t e  R a t e P e r  C e n t  A n n u a l R ank  i n
C i t v U rb a n  P o n u l a t i o n o f  G row th R a t e  o f  G row th G row th
ia5z 1.965 1957 19.65
19 * B aghdad 65*59 67*19 100 265 20.62 120. M osul 17*95 9*36 100 135 8-.37 321. B a s r a 16.1+5 12.08 100 190 1 1 .2 5 2
22. K i r k u k 6.1+1+
23* N a j a f 4*93
TOTAL 99*99 100.00
Mean Annual Rate of Growth in Cities with 100,000 or more population = 12.08
Absolute Rate of National Urban Growth: 1957 100
1965 259
Per Cent of Total Population Urban: 1957 15*88
1965 31*75
Annual Rate of Absolute Urban Growth: 259-100 = 10.98
8
I Overall Rate of Annual Urban Growth as a per cent of total population 
SOURCE : Same as Table 3.




In 1957 Iran was comparatively more urban than Iraq.
If we assume that the urban population of Iran during 1956-
1 757 grew at the average annual rate of .904 per cent of the 
total population, in 1957 the urban population of Iran would 
be 17 .22 per cent as compared to the Iraqi urban population 
for the same year which was 15*88 per cent of the total popu­
lation. However, from 1957 onward the Iraqi urban population
18began to grow at the rate of 1.97 per cent of the total 
population per year, or more than twice as fast as Iran, 
and over four times more rapidly than Turkey whose rate of 
urban growth for the decade 1955-1965 was only .492.^^
In comparing the overall level of urbanization in 
Iran, Iraq and Turkey, one finds that in 1965-66 period 
Iraq is the most urban (31*75) and Turkey (l4.89) the least, 
with Iran (25*36) which is in between— yet much closer to 
Iraq.
Urban Dispersion and Concentration 
One measure of qualitative appraisal of urban growth 
may be the level of dispersion or concentration of the urban 
population. The larger the number of the urban centres and 
the more dispersed they are geographically, the more of an
^^8ee Table 4. 
^^See Table 6. 
^^See Table 5*
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impact they would make on the polity as a whole. Larger 
number of urban centres could raach larger sectors of non- 
urban population and bring to their proximity the advantages 
of urban life. One quick measure of this would be to divide 
the per cent of population urban by the number of urban 
centres :
index Of urban Concentration = ^ g C ' ^ Z r : " "
0^, DO = I
Using the above formula, the index of urban concentration 
for the following countries would be;
Country Year Uc




Turkey 1955 1 .661
• 1965 1.063
From the above indexes, one can see that the level of 
urban concentration in Iraq is larger than either in Iran 
or Turkey throughout the decade under study. On the average, 
it is almost four times as great as Iran and four to six 
times as large as that of Turkey. While in Iran and Turkey 
the trend has been towards dispersion, in Iraq concentration 
has increased. A look at the major cities of the three
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20countries is instructive. In Iran Tehran's population, 
despite a seventy-nine per cent increase over the decade, 
has begun to diminish with respect to the total urban popu­
lation. This is also true of Istanbul. However, Baghdad, 
which to begin with had two-thirds of the urban population 
of the country, has increased its share as a percentage of 
the total urban population of Iraq. Even in absolute terms, 
the increase of Baghdad's population (165 per cent over 
eight years) is phenomenal.
However, it must be noted that the index of urban 
concentration developed above is not an absolute, but rather 
a relative qualitative measure. Because although it is 
desirable to have the urban population dispersed enough so 
that they would have an impact on the population in all areas 
of the country, the urban centres must be large enough to 
make the impact possible. As an absolute measure the index 
shows that the urban population of Iran is less dispersed 
than that of Turkey. Yet, in Iran there were eighteen 
such centres as opposed to thirteen in Turkey. Further, 
the mean of such centres for Iran were larger than the mean
pifor urban centres of Turkey. Consequently, they could be
^^See Tables 1, 2 and 3•
P1Measures of central tendency used in tables were the 
mean (X) and the median (Md.). The formula used for calcu­
lating the mean was : ^ _ _X . For the median the middleX - u
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expected to make stronger impact on the country as a whole.
During the period under study, the mean for the population
size of Iran and Iraq had risen while that of Turkey had
diminished in size due to the appearance of newer and
smaller centres in the urban category.
In discussing the pattern of growth of urban centres
one should also pay attention to the semi-urban population,
or areas with population of 20,000 to 100,000. In Iran there
are sixty such towns embracing 10.51 per cent of the total
population and with the mean population of over forty-four 
22thousand. These are fairly important population centres
case (N/2)+ was adopted when N was odd. In the event that 
N was even the mean between the two median cases served as 
median. On Table 7, however, the formula for grouped data 
was used: ^  ̂+ S Z 2 ^  1
Measures of dispersion used in the Tables were:
a)Standard Deviation (s): the formula used for comput­
ing s for Tables 1 , 2 and 3 was :
s -V N
The formula for Table 7, where the computation was done by 
grouping the data, was H
di^ f  fi di '
s = i \ A ^ V ~  " ^ 'N -




For a discussion of the above measures see: Hubert M. Bla­
lock. Social Statistics. (New York: McGraw-Hill, I960),
chapters 5 and 6. W. A. Wallis and H. V. Roberts, Statistics : 




IRANIAN CITIES WITH INHABITANTS BETWEEN 20,000 TO 100,000 (SEMI-URBAN)
1966
Citx Ponulation
1 . Arak 72 087
2c Kashan 81 654
3. Karaj 47 819
h. Bandar Pahlavl 41 745
5c Zanjan 82 530
6e Lahijan 42 566
7c Langrood 20 696
8. Amol 44 018
9. Babol 80 38710. Benshahr 300
11 c Dasht-e-Gorgan 40 777
12. Sari 44 457
13. Shahi 51 01914. Gorgan 88 016
15. No-Shahr 23 88716. Ardabil 83 548
17c Arasbaran 24 045
1 8. Marand 23 841
19. Miaheh 28 23720. Maragheh 88 204
21 . Khoi 47 719
22. Shahpur 21 694
23. Mehabad 37 64624. Miandoab 31
2 5. Qasr-e-Shirin 23 98826. Bandar-e-Mah-Shahr 26 470
2 7. Behbahan 65 085
2 8. Khoramshahr 95 100
2 9. Dasht-d- Meeshan 21 270
3 0 . Shooshtar 27 032
City Ponulation
31 • Masjed-e-Soleiman 76 096
3 2 . Abadeh 37 934
33. Jahrom 38 419
3 4 . Kazeroon 39 902
3 5 . Laar 37 198
3 6 . Bam 21 871
3 7 . Rafsanjan 28 791
3 8 . Bojnord 31 291
3 9 . Beerjand 32 405
40. Torbat-e-Heydarieh 35 150
4l. Sabzevaar 42 364
42. Qoochan 29 090
4 3. Neyshabur 39 900
44. Shahreza 44 502
45c Golpaygan 36 359
46. Najafabad 59 084
4 7 . Zahedan 44 502
48. Sanandaj 54 412
4 9 . Tooyserkan 20 705
5 0. Malayer 28 402
51. Nahavand 880
5 2. Boroojerd 88 893
53 c Khoramabad 66 241
5 4, Bandar-Aba s 34 588
55* Boroojen 20 793
56. Shahr-e-Kurd 71 492
5 7. Bandar-booshehr 49 652
5 8. Borazjan 20 360
59 • Semnan 44 427
60. Shahrood 30 551
o\
a )  T o t a l  S e m i- U r b a n  P o p u l a t i o n  2 681 155
b )  S e m i- U r b a n  P o p u l a t i o n  a s  P e r  C e n t  o f  T o t a l  P o p u l a t i o n  1 0 .5 1
c )  T o t a l  U rb a n  P o p u l a t i o n  6 4 6 6  ? 1 5
d )  U rb a n  P o p u l a t i o n  a s  P e r  C e n t  o f  T o t a l  P o p u l a t i o n  2 5 * 3 6
e )  T o t a l  R u r a l  P o p u l a t i o n  ( T o t .  P o p .  -  ( a + c ) )  15  652  130
f ) R u r a l  P o p u l a t i o n  a s  P e r  C e n t  o f  T o t a l  P o p u l a t i o n  6 1 . 3 4
X = 4 4  686  Md. = 4 l  261 s  = 20  87O S k e w n e ss  = 0 .4 9 2 3  V = 0 .4 6 7 0
SOURCES; U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ' D e m o g ra p h ic  Y e a r b o o k , 1966  (New Y o rk ,  1 9 6 7 ) .
P r e l i m i n a r y  R e p o r t  o n  I r a n i a n  P o p u l a t i o n : N a t i o n a l  C e n s u s  o f  Aban
1345/N o v e m b e r . 1966, ( T e h r a n :  C e n t r a l  B u r e a u  o f  S t a t i s t i c s ,
J a n u a r y ,  19671.
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since they present the future crop of urban centres if the 
process of urbanization is to take place in a dispersed 
fashion. Unfortunately at present there is not enough infor­
mation available to permit closer examination of the pattern 
of growth in these areas and a comparison of them with the 
pattern and nature of growth in the already established 
urban centres.
The Rural-Urban Migration 
Some have maintained that in most underdeveloped coun­
tires, there is not much flow of population from rural to 
urban areas, that the increase in population is mainly due to 
better health facilities in the cities which reduce infant
mortality and mortality in general, as opposed to that in the 
23countryside. However, if we take the average annual rate 
of population increase as about 2.8 per cent for the period 
in Iran, the rate of natural increase for cities could not be 
more than twice this amount or 5*62. Even by this measure, 
eight of the ten population centres seem to have absorbed 
population from the outside. And the two cities which have 
not, Abadan and Tasht, have been suffering mainly due to the 
diversion of economic resources from them. In Iraq, on the 
other hand, where the average rate of annual population in­
crease for the period is 3“15 if we make the same assumption
23Kingsley Davis, op.. cit.
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(6.3# rate of natural urban population growth), of the three 
largest centres only Mosul fits the pattern described by
plxDavis. Baghdad and Basra, with the average population
growths of 20.62 and 11.25 respectively, definitely point to
migration from the outside.
Applying the same test to Turkey which had an average
annual population growth of 2.63 for the period, however, we
find that half of the urban centres fall above and half below
the figure of 5«26, or assumed rate of natural population
growth in cities. Thus, it may be assumed that the rate of
25migration to urban areas is strongest in Iraq, being fol­
lowed closely by Iran— with Turkey being slowest in this . 
respect. The speed and the direction of this kind of migra­
tion has a great deal to do with the communication network 
as well as the economic forces at work in each country, some­
thing which shall be explored more in depth in subsequent 
chapters.
2k-Ibid.
-̂̂ Several studies have been done in the area of popula­
tion movement in Iraq, amongst these are: Doris G, Phillips,
"Rural-to-Urban Migration in Iraq," Economic Development and 
Cultural Change. Vol. VII (1958-59)? pp. 5-05-̂ 21. J. H. G. 
Lebon, "Population Distribution and the Agricultural Regions 
of Iraq," Geographical Review. Vol. XLIII (1953)? PP« 223- 
228. Faud Baali, "Social Factors in Iraqi Rural-Urban 
Migration," American Journal of Economics and Sociology.
Vol. XXV (1966), pp. 359-364.
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The Implications of Urban Growth 
The degree of urbanization by itself cannot be used as 
an absolute measure of modernization. It is very much a 
relative measure, particularly when one compares developed 
and underdeveloped areas of the world. For instance, a city 
of 300,000 population in Southwest Asia is not the equivalent 
of another city with the same population in North America.
In the latter the communication lines, the sewage and water 
systems, the electric and gas lines are much more developed 
and the sophisticated technology permits a richer life.
However, urban life has certain minimal pre-requisites 
which must be present before an urban area can function.
These have to do with education, health, communication, law 
enforcement, bureaucracies, the process of resource alloca­
tion, etc.. It is by the virtue of the existence of an 
organized life, cultural centres, industries, newspapers, 
cinemas, schools, paved roads, and finally the increased 
interaction among its citizens (which comes with having 
large numbers of people in close proximities) that cities 
become centres for change and modernization; and often come 
into clash with the traditional forces which have their roots 
in the countryside.
In fact, a close parallel may exist between the level 
and rate of urbanization, on the one hand, and occurrence
81
of political violence and instability of traditional or 
transitional structures, on the other hand. In fact, in 
Iraq during the 1950-62 period approximately 3^^ deaths per 
100,000 of the population resulted from domestic group 
violence. The figure for Iran was 36 and for Turkey .9* 
Iraq, Iran and Turkey ranked 5th, 1?th and 47th amongst the 
74 countries studied.This topic will be explored in 
more detail in the concluding chapter.
Thus, geographically, we find a sharp contrast in 
the region between the mountainous areas and the plains.
The climate, except in a few coastal areas, is basically 
arid. The style of life is still predominantly rural—  
although urban population centres are growing very rapidly 
in size and number. This increase is not only due to a 
higher level of births and lower level of mortality in 
cities but also due to rural-urban migration. On the whole, 
the level and the rate of growth of urban living is much 
higher in Iraq and Iran than in Turkey. So far as Iran is 
concerned, we have also noted the semi-urban population 
centres, whose impact on the polities of the region is, at 
present, not very significant. However, if the future pat­
tern of urbanization is to be uniformly distributed
See Bruce M. Russett et. al.'s World Handbook of 
Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1964), pp. 97-100.
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geographically— rather than an unhealthy overcrowding of the 
presently over-populated cities like Baghdad, Istanbul or 
Tehran-these centres which are at present semi-urban would 
hopefully provide healthy urban environments, particularly 
if a degree of planning and control is exercized in their 
growth.
IV. HUMAN RESOURCES
Population And Politics 
The fact that the most valuable resource of a polity 
is its population, is a truism which bears repetition. In 
the field of political science, particularly in comparative 
politics, where often attentions seem to be predominantly 
focused upon institutions and events, the need for the study 
of human resources is still more important. Since the human 
element is the most dynamic aspect of any polity, it often is 
an integral part in considering political questions. What 
was the reason for the rapid recovery of Germany and Japan 
following the Second World War? Why has Israel been able to 
successfully challenge the Arab armies for the last twenty 
years while expanding economically and technologically at 
home? Why do people in the more advanced countries work 
hard while people in the less developed countries, who 
ought to in fact be working much harder, are often idle, 
lazy, or in more compassionate terms, 'happy-go-lucky'? In 
answering these questions one must invariably consider the 
magnitude as well as the level of development of human resources 
in respective societies— that is, if the answer sought is to be 
comprehensive, rather than being purely based on the kind of
83
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1social Darwinism of Summner or geographic determinism of 
2Montesquieu.
To modernize rapidly, the population must be large 
enough to allow expansion and growth. Industrialization, 
rapid and efficient modes of transport, and comprehensive 
newspapers require a large enough population to serve in order 
to enjoy the advantages of economies of large scale.^ Without 
the large consumer market of the United States, General Motors, 
United States Steel, or Boeing Aircraft would not exist. Nor 
would it have been possible for the New York Times or the 
variety of national broadcasting companies to come into exis­
tence. A large population would also have more diverse needs 
to be fulfilled. Therefore, in answer to these needs, the 
variety of professions and specializations develop which 
further help to raise the level of differentiation of the 
population. This, in turn, causes development of more asso­
ciations and organizations to promote the interests (economic, 
scientific, cultural, etc.) of the groups involved.
^8ee W. G. Summner Social Statics.
^See Montequieu's Spirit of the Laws.
3por notes on economies of scale see Delbert A. Snider's 
Introduction to International Economics (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard Irwin, Inc., 1963), pp. 424-447, 35-36.
LSee S. No Eisenstadt's Modernization: Protest and
Change (Prentice-Hall, N. J., 1960).
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It Is for these reasons that the prospects for development 
of small isolationist polities in our day seems so grim. Con­
sidering the advantages of belonging to larger communities, 
some countries have begun to think in terms of regional develop­
ment. The foremost, and perhaps the most successful, example 
of this is the European Economic Community. So far as the less 
developed areas of the world are concerned, despite the fact 
that such areas are undergoing a period of intense nationalism, 
the need for regional cooperation among the smaller countries 
is growing.
However, the large size of a population is not always a 
blessing since what is also important is whether the human 
resources present are sufficiently developed physically and 
intellectually, and possess the necessary skills to bring about 
modernization. A large population with a low lev̂ l̂ of skills 
and literacy, with ill health and malnutrition, is often a 
detriment in the process of modernization, as countries with 
large underdeveloped human resources such as India, China, 
and Indonesia are well aware.
What is considered by some to be ideal for rapid modern­
ization (or recovery, as in the cases of Japan and Germany 
following the Second World War) is a highly skilled and literate 
population with fairly large markets to serve. However, to talk 
about the necessity of developed human resources is in a sense 
begging the question, since it does not show the possible
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direction for development, but rather merely reports that the 
level of the development of the human resources are higher in 
the more advanced countries. Yet, this is precisely the route 
many Western political and social scientists take in analyzing 
the dynamics of development.
Population Growth
Despite the advantages of large economies, obviously it
is much easier for smaller countries to develop rapidly since
they are not faced with the enormous problems of having to deal
with over-population. Southwest Asia as a whole is sparcely
populated. Among the three countries under study, Iran has
the least population density and Turkey the most with Iraq in 
5between.
A look at the pace of population growth shows that during 
the period 19^7 to 1966 the population of Iraq has grown, faster 
than either Iran or Turkey, at the mean rate of 3*03 per cent 
per year.^ While Iran's and Turkey's populations have been 
expanding at fairly comparable rates of 2.66 and 2.62 respect-
7ively. The changes in population over the nineteen year 
period in all three countries shows that the mean rate of
^The density of the population within the respective 
countries in 1966, in persons per square kilometers, were: 
Iran-15} Iraq=19 and Turkey=*+1. See United Nations ' Demogra­
phic Yearbook. 1966 (New York, 1967)*
'̂ See Tables 8, 9 and 10.
?Ibid.
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8growth has steadily increased. This increase in the growth 
rate is due to a variety of causes, the most important of which 
are the improvement in public health systems and more easily 
available medical facilities. For example, the introduction 
of effective drugs, such as D.D.T., have virtually eliminated 
malaria and certain other diseases from the area. Further, 
aside from an increase in the total as well as the relative 
number of doctors, hospitals and the variety of drugs avail­
able, with an increase in the percentage of the population 
which now resides in the urban areas, more people can enjoy 
the advantages of better health facilities.
Of course, another aspect of the increase is purely
statistical. With more efficient census methods, more
experienced personnel, and increased mobility of the census
takers, more births are recorded which might have otherwise
gone unrecorded. Even in the national census of Iran in
1956 a large number of the population which was migratory
(in the Southwest region) or lived in inaccessible mountain
villages were missed. With improved facilities, the 1966
census was able to reach^hopefully, much of this population
9and account for them.
Gibid.
9See The Preliminary Report on Iranian Population: 
General Census of Aban, 13*+5/November, 1966 (Tehran: Central
Bureau of Statistics, January 1967), Introduction.
88
TABLE 8
ESTIMATES OF MIDYEAR POPULATION 
(in thousands)
SOURCE: United Nations' Demographic Yearbook. 1966
(New York: United Nations, 19^7).
Year/Countrv Iran Iraa Turkey Japan
19^7 1 5 486 4 770 19 625 77 490
19‘+8 15 802 4 900 20 056 79 500
19>+9 16 131 5 040 20 497 79 500
1950 16 276 5 180 20 800 82 900
1951 16 667 5 320 21 634 84 200
1952 17 067 5 470 22 219 85 500
1953 17 476 5 620 22 8l8 86 700
195^ 17 896 5 780 23 433 88 000
1955 18 325 5 940 23 860 89 000
1956 19 325 6 110 24 771 89 950
1957 19 900 6 300 25 498 90 730
1958 20 400 6 510 26 247 91 540
1959 21 000 6 720 27 017 92 430
I960 21 500 6 945 27 510 93 210
1961 22 100 7 175 28 450 94 0501962 22 700 7 410 29 160 94 930
1963 23 300 7 660 29 890 95 8991964 23 900 7 910 30 635 96 906
1965 24 800 8 180 31 150 97 960
1966 25 500 8 338 32 120 98 865
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TABLE 9
THE RATE OF ABSOLUTE POPULATION GROWTH (1958=100)
Year/Country Iran Iraq Turkey Janan
19^7 75 73 74 84194-8 77 75 76 86
19^9 79 77 78 88
1950 79 79 79 90
1951 81 81 82 91
1952 83 84 84 93
1953 85 86 86 94
1954- 87 88 89 96
1955 89 91 90 97
1956 9^ 83 94 98
1957 97 96 97 991958 100 100 100 100
1959 102 103 102 101
I960 105 106 104 102
1961 108 110 108 102
1962 111 113 111 1031963 114- 117 113 1041964- 117 121 116 105
1965 121 125 118 1071966 125 128 122 108
SOURCE; Based on Table 8
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TABLE 10
THE ANNUAL HATE OF POPULATION INCREASE 
(per cent of previous year’s population)
Year/Country Iran Iraa Turkey JananI9I+7 _ 2.04 2.72 2 .1 9 2 .59
19^8 - 191+9 2 .08 2.85 2 .19 2.26
1949 - 1950 .89 2 .77 1 .47 1.96
1950 - 1951 2.4-0 2 .70 4.00 1.56
1951 - 1952 2 .39 2.81 2 .7 0 1.54
1952 - 1953 2 .39 3.69 2.69 1.40
1953 - 1954 2.40 2.84 2.69 1.49
1954 - 1955 2.39 2 .76 1 .82 1.13
1955 - 1956 5 .45 2.86 3.81 1.06
1956 - 1957 2 .97 3 .1 0 2 .93 .86
1957 - 1958 2.51 3 .33 2 .93 .89
1958 - 1959 2 .94 3 .22 2 .93 .97
1959 - I960 2 .3 8 - " 3 .3 4 1 .82 .84
I960 - 1961 2 .79 3.31 3.41 .90
1961 - 1962 2.71 3 .2 7 2 .4 9 .931962 - 1963 2.64 3 .37 2 .50 1 .02
1963 - 1964- 2 .57 3 .2 6 2 .49 1 .05
1964 - 1965 3 .7 6 3.41 1.68 1.08
1965 - 1966 2 .82 1.93 3.11 .91
X = 2.66 3 .0 3 2.62 1 .29
SOURCE: Based on Table 8
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In the same vein, more deaths are also recorded than
before. The reason why mortality rates have remained fairly 
10constant despite a sharp decrease in the actual number of 
deaths (particularly those due to infant mortality, epidemics, 
and malaria) seems to be that such actual decreases in mortal­
ity rates were offset by better statistical facilities which 
account for those which did occur. In fact, a comparison of 
the figures for the rates of general mortality in Iran and 
Iraq (X=7*96 and X=^.3 respectively), on the one hand, and the
mean rate of mortality for the United States during the same 
— 11period (X=9.^6) would confirm the belief that the only 
reason in disparity between facts and figures is statistical. 
Especially since the health facilities in the United States 
are better and life expectancy longer, and one would expect 
for mortality rates to be also lower in comparison with the 
countries of Southwest Asia. The statistical data concerning 
mortality in Turkey (X=12.62) which have been gathered in pro­
vince capitals, where proper records are easier to maintain, as 
opposed to the rural areas, seem to represent a more realistic 
picture of things as they are (see Table 11).
In comparison with the countries of the region, Japan 
has a much slower rate of population growth during the period






(Number of Deaths per 1 ,000 Population)
Iran Iraq Janan Turkey* United States
1951 8.7 3.5 10.0 9 .71952 7.4 3.2 8.9 9 .6
1953 7.0 5.2 8.9 9 .6
195^ 8.4 5.0 8.2 9 .2
1955 8.7 4.7 7.8 13.2 9.31956 7.5 4.0 8.1 9 .3
1957 8.3 4.0 8.3 9 .61958 8.6 4.1 7.5 12.9 9.5
1959 8.1 4.2 7.5 13 .5 9 .4I960 4.3 7.6 10.9 9.51961 7.6 4.0 7.4 9.31962 7.0 3.9 7.5 9.5
1963 8.2 3.5 7.0 9 .61964 4.2 6.9 9 .4
1965 4.1 7.1 9 .4
1966 6.8 9 .5
Iran: N = 12 X = 7*96 Iraq: N = 15 X = 1+.13
Japan: N = 16 X = 7 «84- Turkey: N = 4- X = 12.62
United States: N = 16 X = 9.k6
*Provincial Cities which are province or district capitals.
SOURCE: United Nations' Demoeranhic Yearbook. 1966
(New York: United Nations, 1967).
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(X=1.29). Between 19^7 to 1956 the annual rate of population
12growth fell sharply from 2.59 to .86 per cent. From 1956 to 
1966 the mean rate of growth has been less than 1.00 per cent 
per year. The increased economic affluence of the population 
coupled with the serious minded measures taken by the govern­
ment in educating the public about the necessity of birth 
control and in birth control measures seem to account for this 
phenomenon. During the same period, the general mortality
rates have also fallen from 10.0 to 6.8 per one thousand pop-
13ulation in a year.
However, it is not possible to foresee similar measures 
of population control in Iran, Turkey or Iraq since the neces­
sary socio-economic pre-requisites present in Japan, as well 
as over-population, are not present. In the next decade, 
health facilities will probably continue to improve. Births 
are not likely to decline. Thus, the implication is that the 
growth rate in population is bound to increase at faster rates.
For example, the annual rate of growth for Iran during the next
1 ̂decade may even become as high as about 3-0 to 3.5 per cent.
^̂ Ibid. 
^̂ ibid.
^^See Nasser Maroufi-Bozorgi's "Population Projection 
for Iran, 1956-1976," Asian Economic Review. Vol. 6, No. 2 
(February, 196^) pp. 257-264-.
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Economie Activity 
While laissez-faire economists emphasize the importance 
of the level of consumption of the population, those who are 
oriented towards central planning pay more attention to the 
productive economic activity, which coupled with less consump­
tion would make possible larger savings and consequently more 
investment in capital goods. However, since very few laissez- 
faire economists have survived the trials of modern economics 
and tendency toward central planning, the degree and the level 
of productive economic activity have become important indices 
of modernization
The more developed societies, like the United States and 
Japan seem to have a larger proportion of the population of 
the working age (59*7 and 6M-.2 per cent respectively).^^ This 
is predominantly due to low rates of natality and mortality 
which accompanies modernization. In contrast, in the less 
developed societies a sharp decrease in rates of infant 
•mortality, along with comparatively short life expectancy, 
have placed a large proportion of the population under the 
age of 1 5*"'̂
Aside from the percentage of the population in the 














Iran 53.8 3 2.0(1956)
Egypt 5Î8.6 30.1(1960)





Iraq 49.9 2 8.3 (1957)
Jordan 4 9 .3 22 .9
Japan 64.2 47.1
United States 59.7 3 9 .0
♦Working Age : 15-65
SOURCES: United Nations' Demographic Yearbooks. 1961 and
1962 (New York, 1962 and 1963 respectivelyT.
ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 1966 
(Geneva : International Labour Organization, 1967)*
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that population is economically active. Again, the more modern
societies generally tend to have a larger proportion of their
17population economically active. Of course, just because a
country has a large number of its population economically
active does not mean that it is modern. Turkey, for example,
has almost the same percentage of its population economically
18active as Japan. Yet, Japan is a much more developed 
society. Thus, what is also important is the nature of eco­
nomic activity in which the population is involved. An 
agrarian economy may have to use all its human resources in 
order to feed itself. Whereas the highly industrial societies 
only use a relatively small portion of their labour force in 
agriculture. Further, even the need in the industrial sector 
for labour decreases due to constant advancements in technol­
ogy and automation. However, in the underdeveloped societies 
which are still distant from automation what can be said with 
certainty is that to have all the population of working age 
involved in economically productive activity (regardless of 
the degree of technological sophistication) is better than 
having large parts of the population remaining inactive. The 
Chinese effort in mobilizing all the available human resources, 
in the so-called Great Leap Forward, is considered by many 




be said with certainty is that the essential idea behind it in 
trying to make every man economically useful is basically 
sound.
Thus, due to the kinds of reservations and qualifications 
which must be used in studying the economic activity of a popu­
lation, simple, overall comparisons are not possible. The 
picture becomes clearer and comparisons possible only when 
other aspects of the polity have been studied.
So far as the structure of economically active population 
19in Iran is concerned, the main reason for the low level of 
economic activity is the disparity in the figures for men and 
women. While the mean for economically active males is 56.9 
per cent, for women it is only 6.20, Thus, the main reason 
why the figures for economically active population are larger 
in Turkey than in Iran (>+6.80 to 32.0 respectively) is that 
women participate more fully in Turkish economic activity 
(5^-3 males to 39.0 females)
Nuitrition and Health
Statistics about the per capita consumption of food can 
be as deceiving, in trying to understand the implication of 
such for the social and political processes, as those concern­
ing per capita income. While it is important that a country
1967).
^^See Table 13-
^®See ILO's Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 1966 (Geneva,
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TABLE 13
PER CENT OF TOTAL AND ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION 
BY SEX AND AGE GROUP IN IRAN 
(1956)
Economically Active
Groun Tot. Pon. Males Females Males Females Total
-15 42 21 21 7 .1 0 1.80 4 .5 0
15-19 7.49 3 .7 4 3 .7 5 80 .70 12.10 46.40
20-2̂ - 7.89 3.69 4.20 94 .20 9.30 4 8 .9 0
25-3^ 15.32 7.60 7 .7 2 J98.3O 8.60 53.10
35-4^ 10.27 5.57 4 .7 0 98 .90 9.70 58.10
45-54 7.63 3 .9 2 3.71 -97 .80 10.10 55.10
55-64 5 .20 2 .7 6 2.44 93.70 8 .7 0 53.80
65+ 3 .9 6 2 .0 7 1.89 74 .10 5 .80 4l .40
TOTAL 99.76 50.88 4 9 .1 2
X for economically active males in all ages 56.90
X for economically active females in all ages 6.20
X for economically active population as a whole 32.00
SOURCE: Based on the ILO Book of Labour Statistics, 1966
(Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1967)
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secure enough food to feed its own population, it is not at all 
certain if the available food supply is evenly distributed. It 
is with this reservation in mind that one can proceed to com­
pare the consumption patterns of various polities.
The three countries under study, with the exception of a 
few food items, are basically self-sufficient in food supply
and produce what they consume. This is by and large true of
21Iran and Turkey. Iraq has to import half of her needs in
22rice and almost all of her needs in sugar. On the whole,
Turkey which has the largest cross-section of her population
in rural, areas, and basically agricultural activity, has the
23largest calorie consumption of the three (3110 per day).
Iraq is well behind with 21 >+0 calories per day. The figure
 ̂ 2kfor Iran is lowest of the three (2050).
Protein consumption of the three countries follow the 
same pattern of magnitude. However, what can be seen clearly 
from available figures is that the reason for the relatively 
high level of calorie consumption in Turkey is the readily 
available supply of cereals and potatoes, or starches which 
generally form the staple base for sustenance in that region.
^^8ee Table 14.
22Ibid.
























































































A 181 25 273 713
A: Total Supply in Thousands of Metric
Tons.
B: Domestic Production as a per cent of
Total Supply.





(Net Food Supplies Per Capita)
Food Sunnlies/Country Iran Iraa Turkey Janan
I960 60-62 60-61 60-62
Kilogrammes per Year
Cereals (as flour) 14-4 130 223 149
Potatoes, etc. 4 5 38 69
Sugar (refined) 19 30 17 16
Pulses and Nuts 4 6 13 16
Meat 16 20 14 8
Milk:
Fat 2 4 . 4 1
Protein 2 3 4 1
Fats and Oil 7 4 8 5
Calories per Day
Total 2050 2140 3110 2230
Per Cent Animal Origin 12 14 10 9
Protein (grammes) 60 62 98 69
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New York.
i w t : ---------------------------------
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There are also certain figures available with regard to
25the area of health and medicine. In this respect, figures 
speak for themselves and as it can be seen there is not really 
much difference among the three countries. The enormous con­
trast is readily seen when such figures are compared with those 
of Japan. The per capita number of physicians in Japan, for 
example, are about 2 to 5 times as large as those in the region.
At the same time, so far as the countries of the region 
are concerned, it must be noted that professionals in the medi­
cal sciences and health facilities are mainly concentrated in 
urban areas where still a minority of the population lives.
For instance, in 196*+ there were 17,256 hospital beds in Iran 
of which 16,389 were in urban regions,where about six million 
people lived, whereas in the rural areas where close to sixteen 
million lived, there were only 867 hospital beds. Thus, to 
talk about one bed per 1,267 persons nationally does not 
explain the reality of the dualistic pattern of distribution 
of resources (in this case, hospital beds). In fact, in urban 
regions there were 38*+ persons per bed, whereas in the rural
27areas 17,962— or over forty-four times as much.
^^See Table 16.
26About one half ot the hospital beds listed as being in 
urban areas were in Tehran.
^^8ee Iran Almanac. 196*+ (Tehran, 1965) »
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TABLE 16

















































per physician 3 220 ^ 380 3 220 920
SOURCE: Based on United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 196*+
(New York: United Nations, 196^) Table 198.
10M-
The Health Corps which was formed in 196̂ - has been an 
attempt to extend the benefits of better health facilities into 
the rural areas of Iran. In 1964 there were over 400 doctors 
serving in the Corps, instead of Military Service. However, 
what is needed are more permanent solutions to the closing of 
the gap between urban and rural life : a decentralization of
dicision-making, as well as a more even distribution of econo­
mic resources in the rural areas which could make it possible 
for them to sustain such health facilities on a permanent 
basis. At present the opportunities, economic as well as 
cultural and scientific, that rural areas can offer a physi­
cian, who is a product of an urban environment, are not worth 
while to draw him into the countryside.
Modern Skills
The most valuable human resources of a country are those 
with modern skills--such skills as are necessary for the opera­
tion of a modern society. Members of this group are the 
bureaucrats, the scientists, the managers, the technicians, the 
engineers, the accountants, the physicians, the operators and 
builders of transportation systems, the social scientists, the 
artists, the writers, the entertainers, the entrepreneurs, the 
workers in crafts and industries, and finally those who are 
involved in the services.
The larger the number of people with these skills, the 
faster- the process of modernization will be. What is also
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important for a polity is to plan the training of such persons 
and their proper use to the best advantage of society. The 
latter is as important as the former. For example, to assign 
a physician or an engineer to an administrative position, 
which is, by the way, a common practice in the countries 
under study, is an improper allocation of resources.
Due to the pioneering stages of statistical data within 
the region, comparative data in this respect are not available. 
The National Manpower Resources and Requirements Survey car-
28ried out in Iran in 1958 resulted in some valuable data which
unfortunately cannot be compared with anything else due to the
lack of prior or subsequent data. On the whole, the survey
reflects a low level of skill amongst females (5 per cent of
the force); an overwhelming preponderance of those in crafts
and production processes (55-5 per cent); a fairly high number
of entrepreneurs (18.3 per cent) and those in services (10.1
per cent)— with the managerial-administrative ; professional-
technical; transport operations ; and finally mining, in order
of diminishing magnitude.
The more important amongst the above categories in the
29process of modernization are the professional and technical 
elements, on the one hand, and the skilled workers, on the
2^See Table. 1?. 
29see Table I8 .
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Physical sciences and related 
Biological a.nd agricultural sciences 
and related
Medical and health sciences and 
related
Social sciences and related 
















Managerial, administrative, clerical 
and related
Managerial and administrative, staff 
Managerial and administrative, line 
Clerical and related 













Sales and related 
Retail selling










Per cent Per cent 
ILO of of own
code______Title___________  Number______total________group
5 Mining, quarrying and well drilling 16 87O 1.2
50 Mining and .quarrying  .. 9 ^50 56’. 0
52 Well drilling, petroleum and gas ?0 O'.3
59 Laborers 7 370 43.7100.0
6 Operating transport 44 940 3•3
60 Ships and boats 2 940 6.6
61 Aircraft 60 0.1
62 Railways 2 400 5*3
63 Road vehicles 39 540 88.0
1 0 0 .0
7-8 Crafts, production processes, and
related 718 110 52.4
70 Textile making 71 120 9»9
71 Textile finishing (except printing) 3 3^0 0.5
72 Garment and related textile and
leather products making . 100 890 14.0
73 Basketry, broom and brushmaking 4 I80 0.6
74 Woodworking and related 30 180 4.2
75 Metal making and treating 19 7^0 2.7
76 Metal machining, fitting, assembling 48 330 6.8
77 Metal working miscellaneous 3̂  990 4.5
78 Electrical and electronics 15 190 2.1
79-80 Construction and related 135 730 I8 .9
61 Stationary engine, lifting equipment,
machinery operation 13 500 1*9
82 Printing, bookbinding, and paper











83 Ceramic and related 64 930 9 .084 Chemicals and related processes 3 610 0 .5
85 Felt and hide treating 5 080 0 .787 Miscellaneous crafts 9 880 1.489 Laborers in crafts, production, and
related 75 330 1 0 .5
100.0
9 Services 138 850 10.1
90 Protective service 13 940 10.0
91 Domestic (institutional), personal
and related 122 950 8 9 .0
99 Laborers 1 960 1 .0100.0
Total covered : 1 370 600 100.0 100.0
Female 68 320 5 .0
Foremen 8 820 0.6
Leadmen 14 400 1 .1
Skilled 342 180 2 5 .0
Semi-skilled 116 530 8 .5
Unskilled 238 470 1 7 .̂
o
00
SOURCE; T a b l e  T. National Manpower Resources & Requirements Survey, pp. 1-2.
- Eigurès rdùndèd to nearest 10 or 100 (as quoted in George Baldwin's 
Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1967)).
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10-11 Physical sciences and related 9 870 11.5100 Architects 113 1.1101 Engineers, civil 2 536 2 5 .7
102 Engineers, electrical 1 M-m- 14.3
103 Engineers, mechanical 1 914 1 9 .4lOif ESigirieers, metallurgical 2 —  —
105 Engineers, mining 1 .3
- 106 Engineers, chemical 547
107 Engineers, miscellaneous 964 9 .8
108 Chemists 610 6.2
109 Physicists 17 0.2
110 Geophysicists 100 1.1
111 Geologists 98 1.0
112 Geographers 5 0.1
113 Physical scientists, miscellaneous 7 0.1114 Draughsmen and cartographers 997 10.1
115 Surveyors 402 100.0
12 Biological and agricultural sciences
and related 1 9^3 2.3120 Biologists 166 8 .5
121 Agronomists 1 252 64.3
122 Horticultural scientists 36 1 .8
123 Foresters 405 20.6
124- Soil scientists 27 1.4-
125 Animal scientists 67 3 .4
o\o
1 0 0 .0
TABLE 18— Continued
ILO.






























iiedicai and ĥ ealtft sciences and 
related 21 730
Physicians and surgeons 4 3^8
Médical-allied scientists 267
Dentists 842
Pharmaceutical specialists 3 904
Veterinarians 424
Nurses, professional 610
Midwives and nonprofessional nurses 6 334
Therapy technicians 16
Medical and health technicians 4 975
Social sciences and related 47 631
Economists 47
Accountants 8l4
Statisticians and technicians 135
Political scientists 243






Teachers, nontechnical subjects 40 862
Librarians and archivists 301
Social welfare workers 3
Jurists, lawyers 4 213



























16-17 Artistic, writing, entertaining
and related 4 539 ^ .3160 Painters, drawers, and engravers 465 10.0
161 Decor designers 42 0 .9
162 Sculptors and modellers 134 3-0
164 Photographers 2 380 52 .6
165 Authors, journalists 396 8 .7
170 Theatrical directors 49 1.1
171 Actors, entertainers 186 4.1
172 Musicians 586 1 3 .0
173 Dancers 90 1 .0
174 Professional athletes 161 3 . 5
179 Artistic, writing, miscellaneous 50 1.1
Total 87 723 100.0 10 0 .0
SOURCE: Same as Table 16.
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other hand. This is particularly true since these are the build­
ers of modern societies.
Education
The development of modern skills within a population is 
impossible without the proper educational institutions. Of 
course, all education need not be, and is not always, institu­
tional. But in underdeveloped societies, due to the lack of 
technological and scientific milieu as well as the limited im­
pact of the communication media, institutions become all the more 
important. A young American may learn about the mechanical intri­
cacies of automobiles by watching his father repair his car in 
their garage. But a young Turk must learn about automobiles by 
going to a vocational school since the probabilities are that 
his father does not own one.
Aside from the importance of the above mentioned techno­
logical milieu and the informal processes of education in the 
more advanced countries, the percentage of the population which 
go to school is also much higher in the high industrial socie­
ties than those in the underdeveloped countries. With rapid 
modernization, it not only becomes possible for the more devel­
oped societies to realize universal education; but the process 
of education itself becomes perpetual, in the sense that people 
who have graduated from schools keep going back to school in 
order to keep pace with rapid changes of the time.
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Within the region, Iraq has the largest percentage of its
total population (15*3) in school, as opposed to Turkey (with
30 31
1*+.53) and Iran (10.76)» These figures compare with 23-96
32per cent of Japanese in schools. In all of the countries 
within the region, the largest hulk of the students are in the 
primary schools with the second largest number in secondary 
schools. Technical education in Turkey is by far ahead of Iraq 
and Iran. In this respect, Turkey is building a much firmer 
base for future industrialization. Another key area is teacher 
training. In this area also the same pattern prevailswith 
Turkey far ahead, and Iran far behind Iraq. Since teacher 
training is of vital importance to the future supply of teachers 
for primary and secondary education, the impact of such dis­
parities ought to be readily observable in all sectors of 
education in the very near future.
In the area of higher education, also, in proportion to 
the size of the respective countries, the same pattern prevails-' 
with Turkey far ahead and Iran far behind Iraq. However, a
comparison would show that Iran, Turkey, and Iraq have all
33paid more attention to higher education than Japan. The
^°8ee Table 19- 





A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF NUMBER OF STUDENTS 
IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
(1964)
Institution/Country Iraa Turkey Jan an
Pre-primary 14 665 3 018 1 060 968
Primary 957 841 3 735 512 10 030 990
Secondary 221 834 478 595 9 209 494
Technical 7 179 99 281 1 891 373
Teacher training 10 300 42 276 985 077
Higher (1963)19 811 91 198 42 747
Total 1 211 819 4 449 880 23 220 649
Per cent of total
population 15.32 14.53 23.96
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (NewYork: United Nations, 1967).
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TABLE 20
NIMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
OF IRAN
Institutions/Year 1953-54 1956- 57 1959-60 1965-66
Pre-primary 5 344 9 300 17 058 14 000
Primary 746 473 910 336 1 327 376 2 130 000
Secondary
General 121 772 163 570 253 000 480 000
Vocational 887 3 795 7 000 14 500
Teacher Training 1 751 2 879 4 476 4 500
Agricultural —  — 2 000 --- -
Higher 9 430 11 830 18 085 26 000
Total 885 657 1 101 710 1 628 995 2 669 000
% of total population 5*07 5 .7 7.76 10.76















X of the annual rate of student growth as a function of total 
population during 1953-1966 period = O.M-75-1 per cent
SOURCES: Iran Almanac. 196^ (Tehran, 1965) United Nations'
Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New York: United Nations,
1967)• World Survey of Education. Ill & IV (New 
York: UNESCO, I961 & 1966 respectively).
NOTE: The information in the above table was accumulated from
a variety of sources. In order to keep the data uniform and 
thus comparative, wherever there were conflicts in the statis­
tics reported, the data" supplied by the United Nations was 
adopted.
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overwhelming emphasis of the Japanese education seems to he in 
the area of technical education which serves her enormous 
industrial complex. In this sense, the Japanese educational 
system closely resembles that of West Germany which is also 
geared to producing technicians and specialists.
A look at the development of educational institutions in 
Iran over the period 1954-1966 shows that the over-all growth
34has been about 201 per cent. Rate of growth of vocational 
schools although tremendous is not very impressive, especially 
if we compare the number of actual students to those of other 
countries. The rates of growth have been highest in secondary 
and primary schools. But, on the whole, the numbers of 
students enrolled in Iranian educational institutions are not 
very impressive, even when compared regionally. The educational 
system is particularly vulnerable since it is lacking in teach­
er training and higher education which are its main sources of 
feedback.
In evaluating the figures of students in higher education, 
it must also be noted that there are about 20,000 Iranian
3 5students abroad, of which approximately l4«,0OO study in 
Europe and the remainder in America. However, one cannot al­
ways count on the return of these students upon the completion
3^8ee Table 20.
3^8ee Iran Almanac, 0£.. cit.
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of their education. Therefore, their inclusion in the total 
balance of Iranian manpower resources is somewhat open to 
question. The reasons for the lack of inclination on the part 
of Iranian students to return are involved and will hopefully 
become clearer in the course of this study. However, the 
major reasons may be said to be the lack of civil liberties 
in Iran, corrupt bureaucratic structures with which they 
would invariably have to deal, and finally inadequate jobs 
and financial rewards.
Hence, the development of the human resources of any 
polity is critical to the process of its modernization. As 
we have seen, the population of the three polities under study 
is comparatively small and consequently they must form or join 
a larger regional community before they can benefit from the 
advantages of the economies of large scale. The rate of the 
population growth in the region is increasing rapidly and, 
although the population density is still sparse, some measure 
of population control would in the long-run benefit the devel­
opment programs. Due to the low level of skill and industrial­
ization, as well as the poor nutrition of the working classes, 
within the region, productive economic activity generally remains 
at a fairly low level of efficiency. In the area of general, 
technical and higher education, Iraq seems to be ahead of 
Turkey and Iran.
V. THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESSES
The Stages of Integration
In the context of political modernization, the problem
of integration deals with the extent to which the entire polity
1is organized as a system of interacting relationshipso In a 
traditional system interaction also takes place but at a com­
paratively slow pace due to the limitation of the communication 
facilities. In a traditional political system lines of communi­
cation are also very much dependent on patterns of trade and 
distance. The closer the distance between two population 
centres, or the more need two population centres have for each 
others’ goods the more they will interact. (See Figure la).
As the political system moves into a transitional stage 
where the centre assumes certain technological superiority in 
the means of communication, the system becomes very much centre 
oriented since all the lines of communication lead to, and dis­
perse from, the centre. This pattern of communication is often 
one way in the form of messages from the centre to the periphery,
For notes on political integration see: Karl W. Deutsch,
Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge,. Technology Press, 
and New York, Wiley, 1.953); Lucian Pye, Politics. Personality and 
Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Also,
Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.) The Integration of 




(See Figure It). For example, the radio station broadcasts 
from the capital, major newspapers are published in the major 
city which often is also the seat of the bureaucracy, etc.. 
Although the transitional system is not totally without feed­
back— in the sense that the centre has to respond to the 
demands made upon it— the nature of these feedbacks are too 
small to make any substantial difference to the operation of 
the centre. The centre continues to reshape the periphery after 
its own modernistic designs. In this sense, the fight for the 
control of the system by rival groups is often decided in the 
capital. To whichever side the centre falls the rest of the 
polity is bound to follow.
As the polity moves into a more modern phase which would 
require increasing communication and mobility on the part of 
the periphery and its population, the lines of interaction 
become increasingly numerous, not only between the centre and 
the periphery, but also between and amongst all sectors. (See 
Figure Ic).
In a transitional system, such as that of Iran, the 
centre proceeds to lead the integration process, for example, 
by producing a unity of language not only through broadcasting 
in Persian, but also making it the language of instruction at 
the educational institutions. In a modernist environment such 
as that of the United States, on the other hand, these measures 
are no longer necessary in the sense that the unity of language
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has been achievedo Further, the process of political integra­
tion has assumed such a proportion that every point in the 
system could be a potential centre due to the enormous facility 
in communication and transportation. Furthermore, in the United 
States every year large numbers of the population move from one 
part of the country to another. In this sense, the difference 
which once existed between a Californian and a New Yorker, for 
instance, is disappearing very fast since the physical mobility 
of the population is so great.
The Popular Media 
An integral part of the process of modernization is an 
increase in communication and consequently increased integration. 
Yet, it must be noted that the process of integration does not 
constitute more of the same kind of interactions that took place 
in the traditional setting. The nature of the messages and the 
interaction is different due to the changes in the socio-politi­
cal milieu as well as demands of the time and nature of the 
media itself. As Marshall McLuhan points out the use of modern
media totally changes man's conception of himself and the world 
2around him.
In such transitional societies such as Iran, Iraq or 
Turkey such media as the radio, cinema, television, and the
^See Marshall McLuhan's Understanding Media (New York:
New American Library, ^%h).
122
telephone have only recently (in the last twenty-five years) 
begun to bring a substantial impact. Of the above probably 
the most important is the radio. Radio as a means of communi­
cation is particularly important since it also provides 
entertainment. The use of radio is beginning to have a far 
reaching effect upon the behavior, the thought processes, and 
the habits of millions of people who may otherwise be considered 
to be in the traditional sector. Transistor radios can now be 
found in the most desolate places of Southwest Asia.
There are approximately ten times as many radios as there 
are telephones in the region--and this is perhaps still a con­
servative estimate. There seems to be a direct relationship 
between technological level of the polity and the number of 
radios per capita. In Japan, for example, there are 106.7 
radios per one thousand population whereas in Turkey, Iran and
Iraq, there are only 52.5, 65*3 and 21.2 radios per 1,000 popula-
M-
tion respectively.
So far as per capita number of telephones are concerned,
5Japan by far outstrips the region. Regionally, Turkey, Iran 
and Iraq follow one another in order of decreasing per capita 
number of telephones in use. However, at the present level of











Japan 106.7 1961 .9 1948-61
Egypt 65.8 1961 4.5 1949-61
Iran 65.3 1961 4.6 1948-61
Lebanon 60.8 I960 — — — —  —  —
Syria 57.3 1959 4.5 1949-59
Turkey 52.5 1961 3.1 1948-61
Jordan 37.7 I960 3.2 1949-61
Iraq 21 .2 I960 1.6 1950-59
X 58.4 3.2




NUMBER OF TELEPHONES IN USE 
(in thousands)
Country/Year 1948 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Iran 15 139 ' 155 160 -180 208
Telephones per 
1,000 Population 0.95 6.29 6.83 6.87 7 .53 8.39
Iraq 14 54 57 60 62 65
Telephones per 
1,000 Population 2.86 7.53 7.69 7.83 7.84 7 .9 5
Turkey 52 255 264 286 334 351
Telephones per 
1,000 Population . 2.59 8.96 9.05 9.57 10.90 11.27
Japan 1310 6345 7356 10682 10251 13999
Telephones per 
1,000 Population 16.48 67.46 77.49 111.39 126.42 142.91
SOURCE; Based on United Nations' Statistical Yearhook. 1966
(New York, 1967).
12^
diffusion, telephones are not playing an important role in the
overall communication patterns since their use is fairly limited
to the government offices, business concerns, and upper and upper-
middle classes in the urban areas.
Since cinema is a popular means of entertainment, next to
radio, it is the most important media. The number of cinema
attendance per capita in the region has grown very rapidly
6during the past two decades. Despite the growth in the popular­
ity of movies, the movie industry of the region has been
7relatively stagnant. Hence, most of the movies shown are West­
ern in origin. Thus, the messages conveyed from the movie 
screens do not necessarily promote national integration. They 
only do so when the values they project coincide with the modern­
istic value system of the modern sector. Western movies do tend 
to play an important role in integration on an international 
basis. A useful note of caution about the role of Western 
movies in the underdeveloped areas would be that it is not always 
functional in the sense that carefully prepared domestic movies, 
which deal with concrete problems of society, might be. Thus, 
many Western movies tend to undermine the traditional pattern 
of behavior without setting up new substitutes which are workable
^See Table 23. 
7,For figures concerning movie production in various 
countries of the region see United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 





Country Number of Cinemas Total Per Canita
Iran 280̂ 52 000^ 2.5
Iraq 8 300^ 1.2
 ̂4- 4
Turkey 28^ 30 000 1.1
Japan 4 649^ 372 676^ 3.8





Total numbers of attendance are in thousands.
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New York,
1967).
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within the given environment. Thus, so long as domestic movie 
industries have not developed, figures relating to movie atten­
dance, as well as its relation to the process of national 
integration, should be dealt with carefully, especially if they 
are used as indicators for modernization.
g
Television is growing as a medium of communication but 
is not yet very important. First, because its number is 
limited and only at the disposal of the upper and upper-middle 
classes in large urban centres. Second, because television is 
suffering from the same limitations as the movies : a shortage
of home-grown products whose messages relate to the life 
experiences of the populace.
The Literate Media
In order to participate in the popular media one does not
need to be literate. But there are certain modes of communication
— such as newspapers, books, or letter writing— which necessitate
some degree of literacy. The more literate a society is the
more it will participate in this kind of communication. In fact,
Karl Deutsch uses figures concerning mail flow as a test of
9functional literacy.
g
In Iran there are three television stations, two in Tehran 
and one in Abadan. In addition, there is also an American tele­
vision station broadcasting from Tehran for the resident Americans. 
A substantial proportion of all television programs shown on the 
Iranian television are American in origin.
^See Karl W. Deutsch, "Shifts in the Balance of International 
Communication Plows." Public Oninion Quarterly. Vol. 20(Snrine. 
1956) pp. 143-160.
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With regards to the circulation of newspapers, we find a
10great disparity between Japan and the countries of the region. 
Although the total circulation of newspapers rises with increas­
ing literacy and modernization, in the more advanced countries
11the number of daily newspapers is generally on the decline.
This is mainly due to the demands of large scale, economies
which in Western countries have produced press-lords and chain-
12store journalism. A further reason is perhaps due to the 
fact that in the more industrial societies the economic inter­
est groups and the political groups are much more crystalized 
than are those in the transitional societies, where the gene­
sis of the large scale organizations (politically or economically 
based) have not been formed.
In a transitional society the number as well as the total 
circulation of papers vary. On the one hand, where there is 
relative freedom for various groups to compete for the atten­
tion of public opinion the number and the circulation of 
newspapers swells. Literate people are also encouraged to 
read publications of different political groups. This was
1°8ee Table 2̂+.
11See Paul Block, Jr.'s "Facing Up to the 'Monopoly' 
Charge," Nieman Reports; Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1955, pp. 3-7.
1 ?See Louis M. Lyons, "Chain-Store Journalism," The 
Reporter. Vol. 23, No. 10, Dec. 8, I960, pp. 60-63. Also 
see Adlai Stevenson's "The One-Party Press," a speech delivered 











Japan 1965 451 172 44 134
Turkey 1961 1+5 472 1 299
Iran 1961 15 27 312
Iraq 1963 12 8 85
Egypt 1963 15 9 409
SOURCE; United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New
York, 1967).
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the case in Iran in early 1900s as well as between 19*+6 to 1953
when there was a measure of political freedom. The number of
newspapers published during the latter era was more than ten
13times the present figures. With increasing government con­
trol of the press and the suppression of the opposition within 
the country, the opposition press has had to go underground or 
abroad, and consequently reach fewer people. Today, since news­
papers are heavily ridden with government propaganda, the 
reading public is hesitant to buy newspapers since they reflect 
more of the same as the public hears from radio and television.
A similar reason could be ascribed to the low level of news- 
paper circulation in Egypt.
However, a note of caution is warranted in that the fig­
ures for newspaper circulation in transitional societies and 
Western countries are not quite comparable. This is because in 
the Western or the more developed societies newspapers bought 
are very much a private property of the individual who buys 
them and discards them after he is finished reading the paper. 
Whereas in Iran, for instance, newspapers and magazines are 
often read by as many as ten people per issue--in this sense 
newspapers are communal property of a family and their friends.
I^See Table 2M-. 
1M--1Ibid.
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Thus, the potential impact of newspapers is far beyond what the
15figures indicate.
The limitations to book reading in the underdeveloped
societies are basically twofold: one, lack of methods of cheap
production and distribution of books; two, a low level of
literacy. Although book reading as a habit is being challenged
by such media as television in the West, in the region where
such media has not yet begun to exercise a similar impact, the
book reading public is beginning to grow.
Aside from the number of books, the kinds of books pub-
16lished are also very important. In Iraq and Turkey the
largest category of books published is in the area of social 
17sciences. In Iran and Japan the major category is in litera­
ture. But, at least the figures concerning Iran are misleading 
in this respect since many of the books published in the areas 
of literature, history or philosophy are political and social 
in nature. Since the government wants to keep a strong con­
trol of the materials published, many political essays are 
often written in forms of poems, religious essays, philosophical 
discourses, etc.. where the author transmits his ideas through 
the use of symbols and euphemisms. This preoccupation with the
^^For example, see the relevant article in Tofio. Vol. 47, 








Generalities 37 4 ---- 499
Philosophy 53 9 94 757
Religion 96 53 277 470
Social Sciences 106 89 2 027 4 132
Philology 41 8 170 1 708
Pure Sciences 53 1 —  "■ 1 912
Applied Sciences 68 13 ---- 3 454
Arts 15 14 1 215 1 817
Literature 422 49 948 7 522
Geography-History 94 46 ^33 1 932
Unspecified -  — -  - 580 —  —
Total 985 286 5 744 24 203
1Year of data 1965
)
"Year of data 196^
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New
York, i W n
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social and political is expected in transitional societies where
the nature of the future order is of paramount importance and
subject to perpetual contests.
A further note concerning books is that an increase in
books in the areas of pure and applied sciences reflects the
needs and the demands, as well as the level of development, of
the polity as a whole. The more technologically advanced socie-
18
ties naturally produce many more books in these areas.
A look at the figures concerning the flow of foreign and 
domestic mail indicates that the world since 1913 has been get-
19ting more nationally minded and less internationally preoccupied. 
This pattern is an outcome of the increase in the cohesion of 
political communities, economically as well as socially and 
politically.
What Deutsch says about functional literacy--that it must
manifest itself in concrete forms such as letter writing—
clearly evinces itself if one compares the figures of literacy
for Japan, Turkey and Iran, on the one hand, with the figures
20of their domestic flow of mail, on the other.
18See, for instance, figures concerning books published in 
Japan in the area of pure and applied sciences in Table 5*
19See Karl Deucsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of 
Political Cohesion," in Philip Jacob and James Toscano (eds.) 
op.. cit., pp. 75-97.
20gources: Rossett's World Handbook of Social and Poli-
Indicators & United Nations' Statistical Yearbook.,1966.
13^
Per cent of Domestic Mail




The number of letters sent domestically seem to vary in
direct proportion to the level of literacy.
On the whole, Iran and Turkey seem to be somewhat of an
exporter of mail since they send out more mail than they 
21receive. Whereas Japan receives somewhat more letters than 
she sends out. This pattern is contrary to what Deutsch sug­
gests; i.e., that the more developed and industrial societies
22are exporters of mail.
~In the area of foreign mail the same pattern of direct 
relationship does not exist between literacy and letter writ­
ing. Turkey which has a lower level of literacy than Japan
23has more letters sent and received per capita.
The Transportation System 
Aside from the vicarious or intellectual mobility pro­
vided by the communication media, what is also important with
^^See Table 26.





ITEMS OF FOREIGN MAIL SENT AND RECEIVED
SENT
Country
Total in Thousands 
19M-Ô 1965
Per Canita 
1 ^  1965
Iran 1*+ 300* 12 416 0.74 0.55
Turkey 5 192 32 963 1.58
Japan >65-8 74 099 0.76
RECEIVED
Iran 11 361^ 0.50
Turkey M- 25^ 33 014 0.21 1.06
Japan 4 211 84 958 0.05 0.87
Notes: - Year of data a=1956
b=1962
- Figures for Iraq were not available.
- Figures for Iran are not comparable since they are 
from a different source and of different years.
SOURCES: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook, 1966 (New
York, 1967) Iran Almanac. 1 fS^TTTehran, 1965)*
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regard to the process of political integration within a 
polity is physical mobility— the ease with which the popula­
tion can actually move around, internally as well as 
internationallyo
Figures in this respect are not easy to come by since 
the population moves by a variety of means which are not 
always subject to measurement. One important indicator of
mobility is that of railway traffic about which definite
2*+figures are available. In this respect, crude figures are
not very meaningful. For it is not only important to know
how many passengers travel how far, but also what it means
25on a per capita basis. Further, another important factor 
is the size of the polity. In a country whose size is com­
paratively small shorter distances have to be travelled by 
its population to achieve the same degree of integration as 
in another country whose size is much larger. Thus, the size 
of the polity must also be taken into account.Having 
taken all of these factors into consideration, regionally,
the level of mobility is highest in Turkey and Iraq, being
27followed far behind by Iran. In fact, since 1959 the
2^8ee Table 27.
25See rows B, Table 27. 




TRANSPORT : RAILWAY TRAFFIC
Country/Year 19^8 1957 1228 1 9 2 9 i960
Iran A* 32^ 860 1 535 1 997 1 644
B* 20 43 75 95 76
C* 5.^ 11.6 20.3 25 .7 2 0 .5
Iraq A ^73 658 574 656 554B 97 104 88 98 80C 97 104 88 98 80
Turkey A 2 5*+6 5 041 5 105 4 589 4 396
B 127 198 194 170 160
C 73.4 114.5 112.1 98.3 9 2 .5
Janan A 121 514 150 867 157 547 168 725 180 893
B 1 528 1 663 1 721 1 824 1 941
C 1 841 2 004 2 073 2 198 2 339
1961 1962 ,1261 1964 1962
Iran A 1 510. 1 494 1 440 1 368 1 092
B 68 ’ 66 62 57 44
C 18.4 17.84 16.8 15 .4 11.9
A 590 530 — — —
B 82 72 — — — — — —
C 82 72 — ̂  — “ — — — — —
Turkey A 3 810 3 720 3 631 3 722 4 075B 134 128 121 122 131C . 7 7 .5 : 7 4 .0 70 .0 7 0 .5 72.7
Janan A 194 591 207 305 221 408 238 701 250 875B 2 069 ; 2 184 2 309 2 464 2 561
C 2 493 2 631 2 782 2 967 3 086
A* Passenger-Kilometers (millions)
B* Passenger-Kilometers per capita 
C* Comparative Index of Mobility
NOTES: 1. Passenger-Kilometers per capita was derived by




2. Comparative index of mobility was arrived at by 
dividing the figures in rows B by the ratio of 
the area of the country to the area of the small­
est of the three countries in the region, i. e., 
Iraq. Thus, the areas of the respective coun­
tries are represented by: Iraq=l Iran=3°7
Japan=0.83 Turkey=1.73* . Then rows B divided 
by the respective proportions would result in 
row C.
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (United
Nations, 1967)'
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the level of mobility by rail has been falling off in Iran.
On the other hand, the level of mobility of the Japanese by 
rail is more than forty times that of an Iraqi or a Turk 
and close to three hundred times that of an Iranian.
The number of motor vehicles in use forms another indi­
cator of mobility. However, since the extent of their use is 
not known, not much can be said about their total contribu­
tion to the mobility of the population. Due to the lack of 
good roads in the region, it can safely be assumed that the 
use of motor vehicles, particularly passenger cars is mostly 
restricted to travel in cities and surrounding areas.
Regionally, passenger cars are highest, in per capita
terms, in Iraq, being followed by Iran and Turkey respec- 
28tively. In Iraq and Iran the number of passenger cars is
about twice as large as the number of commercial vehicles.
Whereas in Turkey the number of commercial vehicles is sub-
29stantially higher in proportion. In this sense, motor 
vehicles tend to play a much larger role in the economy of 
Turkey. In 1960-61 there were three times as many commercial 
vehicles in Japan as there were, passenger carSo By 1965 
the number of commercial vehicles was only twice as large as 





TRANSPORT: MOTOR VEHICLES IN USE
(thousand units)
Country/ Year l Ü Z 1958 12Ü 1960 1961
Iran A 49 .3 63.4 78.3 9 1.8 96.4
B 31 .8 34.8 39.3 44.2 42.2
Iraa A 25.9 30.1 31.9 40.1 48.5B 14.4 15 .8 17.2 20.0 22.2
Turkey A 3 6 .8 34.2 37.6 45.8 52 .4B 4 5 .2 47.8 57.0 68.4 78.7
Janan A 219.1 262.7 330.7 456.4 664.4
B 949 .8 1 0 5 7 .4 1 192.0 1 382.7 1 740.0
1963 1964 1965
Iran A 102.9 107.8 105.9 WBB 42.0 4318 44.1 — — -
Iraa A 49.2 50 .9 50.2 62.9
B 24.8 24.5 24.2 26.0
Turkey A 60.7 7 2 .0 79.4 86.3
B 89.8 100 .0 95.8 101 .2
Janan A 889 .0 1 234 .0 1 673.0 2 188 .0
B 2 120.0 2 845.0 3 555.0 4 283.0
NOTES: 1. A. Passenger Cars.
B. Commercial Vehicles.
2. Figures for Iran exclude government vehicles
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New
York, 1967)•
1*+1
30of production by Japan of the latter category. Hence, 
one may assume the the consumer role of motor vehicles
is preferred to its distributive or productive role in Iran
and Iraq, whereas in Turkey and Japan the reverse is true.
In the area of civil aviation, domestic flights do not
constitute a major mode of travel as yet. In international
scheduled services Iraq (X=5«15) leads the region on per
capita basis during the period under study, being followed
far behind by Iran (2=1.02) and Turkey (X=0.93)* Japan, on
the other hand is far ahead of all the three countries of 
31the region.
The absolute rate of growth in travel in the inter­
national scheduled services in the region seem to be
32parallel with each other in their level of magnitude. How­
ever, on the overall basis travel on international flights 
seems to have grown much faster in Iraq than in Japan between
19‘+8-1965.
On the whole the level of physical mobility and the 
transportation system of the region is very low compared to 
the advanced countries of Europe and North America. The 
difficulty with the growth of the transportation systems of
30lbid.




CIVIL AVIATION: INTERNATIONAL SCHEDULED SERVICES
Year
Km.* Flown Passenger-Km. Absolute Rate Per Cauita
(Thousands- of Growth Passenger-Km.
IRAN
1948 1 431 11 258 100 0.71 X
1959 2 500 4 835 43 0 .43I960 2 545 23 191 206 1.08
1961 2 701 38 611 343 1 .751962 1 130 17 355 154 0 .76
1963 789 12 084 107 0 .5 21964 910 17 698 157 0 .7 4
1965 1 634 46 575 414 1.88
1.02
m a  „ '1948 878 7 673 100 1.57
1959 2 015 30 990 404 4.61
I960 1 999 39 398 513 5.671961 1 946 35 666 465 4 .9 71962 2 326 44 969 586 6 .07
1963 2 349 44 680 582 5.831964 2 361 51 596 672 6 .52
1965 2 151 48 416 631 5.92
5 .15
TURKEY
1948 —  — — —  w  — «m »
1959 1 119 19 091 100 0.71I960 1 668 29 935 157 1 .091961 2 212 32. 744 172 1 .151962 1 524 19 182 100 0.66
1963 1 234 18 756 98 0.631964 11 528 28 275 148 0 .92
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SOURCE: Based on United Nations'
1966 (New York, 1967).
Statistical Yearbook.
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the region is not only the overall underdevelopment of the 
area, hut also due to the difficult terrain and the natural 
barriers which have to be overcome if political, economic as 
well as cultural integration is to be realized on a broader 
basis.
VI. ECONOMIC GROWTH
A major aspect of the process of modernization is that 
of economic growth. A variety of approaches could be taken 
in the study of economic growth. But in the final analysis, 
the success of any approach depends on the consideration of 
the topic in conjunction with other aspects of the develop­
mental process such as the demographic changes, communication 
patterns, human resources, etc., which are also the subjects 
of this study. In this chapter an attempt shall be made to 
determine the extent of growth in agricultural and industrial 
sectors of the economy, the level of energy production and 
consumption, shifts in prices, as well as to evaluate the 
meaning of international trade to the process of moderniza­
tion in Iran.
The Agricultural Sector 
Despite oil, the economy of Iran, as well as that of 
the whole region, is basically agricultural. Even the limited 
industrial sector is primarily involved in the processing of 
primary agricultural products, such as sugar beet, raisins, 
tea, cotton, wool, tobacco, etc., into consumer goods. How­
ever, the total land under cultivation embraces only 12.53 
per cent of the country of which only 3*10 per cent are
145
l46
1actually under crops and 7*33 per cent are left fallow.
The yield of agricultural outputs in Iran is also com­
paratively low. For example, according to a report by the 
United Nations, the wheat output in Iran was 930 kilogrammes 
per hectare as compared to 2090 for Japan and 2270 for Austra­
lia. The output in rice was also low; 1570 kilogrammes per
hectare for Iran as opposed to 3890 for Japan, and M-1 50 for
2Portugal. Yet, these crops are two of the most important 
in the agricultural sector as well as the economy as a whole. 
The main reasons for low yields in agriculture generally seem 
to be the following: First, an out-moded landlord-peasant
system which is ill suited to the modes of modern agricul­
ture. In the Western experience, productivity has been 
highest in farms owned and operated by families whose mem­
bers were comparatively literate and skilled in the use of 
modern technology in agriculture. Absentee landlordism is
still fairly prevalent and tends to keep the peasant exploit-
3ed, under-employed, uneducated, and in ill health. As we 
shall see later, despite certain moves in recent years by
0.57# fruits and nuts; 10.0# pasture; 0.67# woodlands; 
0.76# villages, village roads, wasteland and other land. See 
Review of the Second Seven Year Plan Program m e of Iran (Teh­
ran, March 10, I960).
2See Agricultural Products Statistics. Food and Agri­
cultural Organization, United Nations (New York, 1958).
3see Ann K. Lambton's Landlord and Peasant in Persia
(London, 195^)*
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the government in the direction of land reform, this tradi­
tional landlord-peasant relationship continues to persist in 
Iran. On the whole, land reform campaigns seem to be intend­
ed more as a propaganda venture by the government rather 
than a serious minded effort which would demand substantial 
outlays of funds and resources in the countryside.
A further reason for low agricultural productivity is 
the primitive methods of farming, lack of mechanization of 
agriculture, and insufficient use of chemical fertilizers. 
This second reason is fairly closely tied to the first—  
namely the social structure of agrarian life. So long as 
the present system of share-cropping and landlordism pre­
vails and the human resources of the farmlands remain 
underdeveloped, labour will continue to remain fairly cheap. 
Hence, even from a purely economic point of view, for the 
landlords who are mainly interested in short-range profits, 
it is more feasible to use cheap labour than to invest 
large sums in farm machinery which they may stand a good 
chance to loose should a revolutionary ferment take over the 
countryside.
Finally, as we have seen already, there is the climatic 
conditions and aridity of most of the country. This, again, 
is something that the forces of technology may overcome.
The building of certain dams in the country in recent years 
has been a move in this general direction. However, in
1if8
cases— such as that of Karaj Dam— the need for water in 
urban areas has become so urgent that the dam which was 
originally planned for the agricultural sector is now to 
serve exclusively as a reservoir for the urban population
li.of Tehran.
Some have suggested that it is a mistake to build the 
kind of huge dams that the government seems to prefer. Ad­
mittedly, due to their conspicuous nature they serve as good 
propaganda for the government. However, the opposition argu­
ment is that by building smaller dams over many of the 
tributory rivers larger areas of the country can be brought 
under cultivation with much lower costs.
On the whole, during 1952-1962 decade, the agricultural 
production of Iran has been growing at a rate of 2 to 3 per
cent annually. Figures for 1960/1961-196'+/1965 period
7reflect the same pattern. The growth rate for Turkey seems 
to be higher, and for Iraq to be lower, than Iran. The rate 
of growth of agricultural production in Japan, although some-
O
what below Turkey has been rather steady— an indication of
^See George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 19677*
%ee, for instance, Ettela'at issues of April 12 and 
June 21 , 1962.





INDEX NUMBERS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
1 9 5 2 /5 3 -1 9 5 6 /5 7 = 1 0 0
Country/Year 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1 9 6 4 /6 5
F 0 0 d
Iran 115 130 131 135 120
Iraq 100 109 121 97 104
Turkey 131 123 130 144 136
Japan 120 121 131 128 133
A l l C 0 m m 0 d 1 t i e s
Iran 119 13^ 133 139 124
Iraq 101 109 120 99 105
Turkey 130 123 129 143 142
Japan 119 120 129 127 132
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New
York, 1967).
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a fair degree of control over the forces of agricultural 
production. This kind of control is symptomatic of Japan 
as a highly industrialized and technologically advanced 
country.
A look at the mode of population growth of Iran during 
the last decade shows that the rate of growth in agricultural 
production has bearly been able to keep up with the increase 
in population. Hence, from this vantage point, no appreciable 
improvement has occured in the overall per capita food supply 
of the country.
However, growth in livestocks, during the same period,
10
9has been somewhat greater in Iran. Especially if we com
pare this growth with figures concerning Iraq and Turkey. 
However, figures on livestocks could be very misleading in 
the countries of Southwest Asia. Since animal husbandry and 
care is not at a very sophisticated level, livestock figures 
can fluctuate very much from year to year depending on the 
severities of droughts, winters, or epidemics. Thus, any 








Countrv/Klnd Cattle Sheen Horses & Mules Asses
Iran
1947/48-1951/52 3 225 14 069 485 1 000
1962/63 6 023 31 832 630 2 034
% Increase 86.8 126.3 2 9 .9 103 .4
Iraa
1947/48-1951/52 1 510 10 000 800 1 000
1964/65 1 455 11 040 194 542
io Increase -3 .6 10.4 -7 5 .7 -4 5 .8
Turkey
1947/48-1951/52 10 121 24 282 1 240 1 696
1964/65 13 211 32 654 1 425 1 918
% Increase 3 0 .5 3 4 .5 14.9 30.1
SOURCES: Iran Almanac. 196»+ (Tehran. 1965). United Nations
Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New York, 1967),
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The Industrial Sector 
Modern Industry of Iran has its origins in the middle 
of. the nineteenth century. But it was not really until 1929 
when a notable measure of industrialization— especially in 
the areas of textiles, food processing, and cement manufac- 
turing--began to take place. Most of the investment was 
made by the government. It was only after the Second World 
War that the private sector began to play an increasingly 
important role in the industrialization process.
11In 195^) there were in Iran 1,300 industrial units
12employing about 75,000. By 1963 the industrial units had
increased to 10,060 employing some 139,000 persons. At this
time, the oil industry, tobacco monopoly, railways and
13fisheries employed another 85,000 persons. Thus, an over­
all total of 224,000 persons were employed by the industrial 
sector of the economy.
Although the size of the industrial sector has changed 
during this period, its nature has basically remained the 
same; light and primarily geared to the production of con­
sumer goods, such as food, textiles, paper, chemicals,
14construction materials, leather products, etc.. Further,
 ̂̂ Excluding oil, tobacco monopoly and state fisheries. 




the definition of a ’factory' used by the Iranian census
authorities is any manufacturing shop employing ten or more 
1 5workers. This is a far cry from the kind of industrializa­
tion which is crucial to the process of development— namely 
a process which would involve substantial technological 
change. Due to the fact that the products of the industrial 
sector are primarily consumer goods its impact upon the 
economy as a whole, as yet, have not been revolutionary. On
the whole the industrial share of the Gross National Product
16is probably no more than 20 per cent.
17The available indices of industrial growth in Iran 
indicate that the number of mechanized units during the per­
iod 1955/1956 to 1959/1960 have grown more than twice as 
fast as the number of the employees, which point out to the 
fact that despite the prevalence of cheap labour, the ten­
dency has been in the direction of increased automation and 
consequently more sophisticated technology— even though its 
function has been basically to produce consumer goods.
The greatest increase in the number of factories has 
been in the area of metal goods and repair shops, being 
followed by food processing, wood and paper, printing,
 ̂̂ Iran Almanac. 1964. on. cit.
^^Richard E. Benedick, Industrial Finance in Iran 




INDICES OF. INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN IRAN: 
1955-1956 TO 1959-1960
(measured by number of mechanized units and employees)
(1955-1956=100)
Industrial groun .. Factories Employees
FOOD PROCESSING 422 1_82
Flour milling 524 169
Sugar refining 150 115
Dried fruit 116 152
Vegetable oil extraction 209 279
Ice manufacturing 175 107
TEXTILES 222 126
Cotton ginning, spinning and
weaving 171 192
Wool spinning and weaving 141 63
WOOD AND PAPER 422 122
PRINTING 262 164
LEATHER PRODUCTS 16Z IO3.
CHEMICALS 220 122
Plastics 560 460
Drug manufacturing 244 382
Rubber 311 244
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 162 192
Cement 200 119
Mosaic tiles 233 352
Bricks 63 209
METAL GOODS AND REPAIR SHOPS 2Q2 395
POWER PLANTS 22Z lâZ
155
TABLE 3 2— Continued 
Industrial group Factories Employees
MISCELLANEOUS 126 120
Total 357 162
SOURCE; Ministry of Industry and Mines.
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textiles, chemicals, paper plants, construction materials,
18and leather products respectively. So far as the expan­
sion in the actual volume of industrial outputs is concerned,
however, textiles seem to be in the forefront, followed by
19cement and sugar industries respectively.
It is only recently that greater emphasis has begun to 
be placed upon such key industries as petro-chemicals or 
steel. As it has been noted already the impact that such 
key industries have upon the economy is tremendous. They 
create various demands upon the economy the fulfillment of 
which may result in the creation of a series of new industries 
which would tend to revolutionize the economic, the social, 
as well as the political and cultural life of a nation as a 
whole.
In late 1930's Iran ordered a steel mill with the capa­
city of 100,000 tons a year from Krupp-Demag of Germany. But 
this coincided with the start of the Second World War. Some 
of the machinery fell into the Allied hands and others stayed 
in German warehouses and rusted away. After the War, the 
Iranian Government invited various teams of experts from Bel­
gium, France, Sweden, United States and Germany to investigate 





PRODUCTION OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Per cent
Product/Year 1955-56 1959-60 1962-63 Increase
Cement
(thousand tons) 131 810 750 ^73
Sugar
(thousand tons) 75 110 270 260
Vegetable oil 
(thousand tons) 0.0 20 ^5 -
Soaps
(thousand tons) 15 35 50 233
Cotton textiles 
(million meters)* 3M- 160 260 665
Woolen textiles 
(million meters) 2 2.1 6 200
Glass
(thousand tons) 4 5 n • cl • — —
*Does not include hand-woven textiles, which amounted to k-0
million meters in each year.
SOURCE: Plan Organization for first two years; Industrial and
Mining Development Bank of Iran for the last year.
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of the reports said that a steel mill would not be economic­
ally feasible for Iran primarily due to the low level of 
known deposits of coal and iron, as well as the shortage of 
available water and the long distances across which raw 
materials must be carried. They argued that the limited 
Iranian needs of steel can be cheaper provided for through 
imports. Nationalists in Iran, of course, don't want to 
hear such discouraging reports, especially from Westerners 
whose intentions they have historically learned to question.
True, Iranian consumption of steel may be limited at pre- 
20sent, but if the country is to industrialize rapidly the 
need will grow enormously. A comparison of per capita con­
sumption of steel in Iran and Japan shows that during the 
period 1961-1965 the figures for Japan were over 12 times as 
high as those for Iran, on the average. Not only there is 
great deal of disparity in the quantity of steel consumed, 
but also in the modes of consumption. In Iran, Turkey and 
Iraq steel is primarily used for building construction whereas 
in Japan much of it is used to produce sophisticated machinery 
and producer goods.
Western companies were correct in that the supply of 




(Apparent consumption express;ed in terms of crude steel)
Countrv/Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
T o t a 1
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
Iran 351 353 467 524 710
Iraq 265 267 169 198 213
Turkey 5^9 560 817 819 857
Japan 25 763 22 945 24 726 31 417 28 841
P e r C a p i t a
(Kilogrammes) X
Iran : 17 17 21 23 30 21 .60
Iraq 36 40 25 28 26 31 .00
Turkey 20 19 27 26 27 23 .80
Japan 274 242 258 324 294 278.40
VAvO
SOURCE: United Nations* Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New York, 1967).
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21has been insignificant during the last twenty years. But 
as most laissez-faire economists would tell us supply is 
also a function of demand. With an increased demand for 
basic industry, raw materials could be discovered or imported. 
After all, Japan and Britain both import raw materials for 
their steel industry.
In 1966 an agreement was concluded between the Govern­
ment of Iran and the Government of the Soviet Union whereby 
the Soviet Union would build a steel mill with the capacity 
of 600,000 tons a year— which may be expanded to produce as 
much as 1,200,000 tons of steel a year. The Soviet Union 
would provide all the necessary machinery and credit in the
form of a twelve year loan to the amount of 286 million dol-
22lars at 2.5 per cent interest. Iran is to repay the loan 
partially by exporting natural gas to the Soviet Union. The 
main outlay of funds for Iran is for the building of a gas 
pipeline from the oilfields of the South. The steel mill 
which is to be situated near Esfahan, in central Iran, would 
be fed by a dam built on the Zayandeh Rud. Recently deposits 
of high quality iron ore (50-55 per cent iron) were discovered 
in central Iran with an estimated reserve of 100 million
See Table 35-




(Thousands of metric tons)
Year/Country Iran Turkey Iran Turkey
Coal Iron Ore
1948 150 2 669 - 121
1957 176 3 969 5 722
1958 194 4 075 74 609
1959 237 3 941 29 486
I960 230 3 653 29 444
1961 198 3 772 21 428
1962 160 3 893 5 458
1963 193 3 153 10 444
1964 274 4 449 - 545
1965 275 4 390 30 876
SOURCE: United Nations' Statistics Yearbook, 1966 (New
York, 1967)°
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23tons. Meanwhile, the search for other deposits of Iron Is
continuing. Recent reports on the availability of coal are
also promising. With the readily available raw materials,
the authorities estimate the cost of steel production In Iran
2kto be as low as half of that In Europe or North America.
In the area of International politics the building of the 
steel mill by the Soviet Union has gained her popularity In 
Iran where a dream which has been nurtured for over thirty 
years Is being fulfilled.
Energy Production and Consumption 
One measure of the level of modernization may be taken 
as the amount of energy produced and consumed. The more mod­
ern a society Is the more successful It Is In harnessing the 
natural energies. In such societies machines free men from 
unskilled manual labour and give him an opportunity to devel- 
ope skills and thus enhance the level of differentiation 
throughout the society as a whole.
A comparison In the disparity of the per capita quantity 
of energy consumed In Japan, on the one hand, and the coun­
tries of Southwest Asia, on the other. Indicates that such 






ENER.GY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
(Quantities in million metric tons of coal equivalent 














mi mi mi mi i
Production - Total 
86.51 96.68 111.10 123.^^ 104.^3
65 .30 74.64 81.13 84.84 76.48
5.46 6.23 6.84 7.67 6.55
65 .59 64.31 63.59 62 .20 63.92
Consumption - Total
7 .5 4 7.84 8.92 9 .1 5 8.36
3 .7 5 4.40 4.67 4.80 4.40
8 ,1 8 9 .07 10.44 10.91 9.65
132.06 146.87 161 .15 174.67 153.69




1 391 1 783
SOURCE : United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New
York, 1967).
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in 1965, Iraq had the largest per capita consumption— being 
followed by Iran and Turkey respectively.^^
The total production in Iran is higher than Iraq, Tur­
key or Japan.. But this is primarily due to the enormous 
production of oil. In fact, when total consumption is taken 
into consideration, Iran consumes only about one-thirteenth 
of the energy it produces. This is in contrast to Japan 
which consumes almost two and one-half times as much energy
than she produces, or Turkey which consumes one and one-half
27times the amount of her domestic energy production.
In the production of electricity Turkey is well ahead
p Q
of Iran, even on a per capita basis. However, the absolute 
rate of growth of electric energy shows that during 1958-1964- 
period the installed capacity of Iran has expanded by 4-06 per 
cent as opposed to Turkey and Japan with 4-7 and 123 per cent, 
respectively.
Economic Activity and Consumer Prices 
The mean annual rate of change in the index of consumer 







TOTAL ELECTRIC ENERGY: INSTALLED CAPACITY
(Thousands kilowatts)
Year/Countrv Iran Turkey Jauan
1957 142 940 16 846
1958 156 1 031 18 366
1959 171 1 161 21 243
I960 275 1 272 23 657
1961 543 1 324 25 954
1962 727 1 369 29 153
1963 773 1 381 34 295
1964 790 1 434 38 072
1965 - 1 516 4l 009
Absolute Growth 
( 1958=100)
1957 91 91 92
1958 100 100 100
1959 110 113 116
I960 176 123 129
1961 3^8 128 141
1962 466 132 159
1963 496 134 187
1964 506 139 207
1965 - 147 223
SOURCE:United Nations* Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New
York, 1967)o
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3.6 per cent, much less when compared with Turkey (9.44) or
30Japan (4^91) hut somewhat more than Iraq (2.l4).
Iran's economy during the early periods of the decade 
experienced a boom primarily due to the high level of expen­
diture by the Plan Organization and the government, as well
31as liberal bank credit and easy access to foreign exchange. 
The boom created much activity in small industry and urban 
housing. Since the government had come into large amounts 
of oil revenue all sorts of means had to be devised for its 
expenditure. Much corruption and graft was involved in the 
granting of contracts as well as other allocation of funds. 
The well publicized trials of Mr. Nafisi, mayor of Tehran, 
and General Hedayat on the charges of corruption were only 
cases where there were conflicts of interest with higher 
authorities. Otherwise corruption and graft is universal 
and tolerated if the person involved does not step on the 
toes, or violate the hunting grounds of those higher and more 
powerful than oneself.
This somewhat chaotic and at times absurdly high level 
of expenditure--most of which went to construction companies, 
the import of luxury goods and high rise buildings--generated
30gee Table 3 8.
^^Baldwin, op,, cit.. p. 40.
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TABLE 38
CONSUMER PRICES - GENERAL INDICES
1958=100
Year/Country Iran Iraa Turkey Janan
1956 94 .0 9 8 .4 79 .0 9 7 .4
1958 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1959 111.0 9 8 .7 126.0 101 ,0
I960 121.9 102.1 133.0 104.7
1961 125.8 103.8 128.0 110.3
1962 126.7 104,4 143.0 117.8
1963 127.3 108 .5 153.0 126.7
1964 132.1 108.4 157.0 131.5
1965 134.9 107.9 164.0 14l „ 6
1966 134.3 113.9 173.0 149,4
Annual X of 
Change in Index 3 .6 2,14 9 .44 4 .9
Annual X of 
Increase in Index 3.48 1.9 9 .4 4 4 .9
SOURCE: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 1966 (Geneva,
1967T:
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32a rise in prices and a corresponding fall in foreign ex­
change reserves. The sharp increase in the index of consumer 
prices between 1956 to I960 (9^»0 - 121.9) is indicative of 
the trend.
When the government finally was out of foreign exchange
in 1961 and asked for help from the International Monetary
Fund, it had to embark on a stabilization programme (fiscal
and monetary restraint) as a condition for such help. This
in turn resulted in a recession that lasted until 1964- and
33caused thousands of businessmen to declare bankruptcy.
Fairly steady prices during 1961-1963 are indicative of this
34recession.
International Trade
Underdeveloped regions of the world, no matter how much
they are concerned with their internal economic development,
cannot ignore their international trade, especially with the
contemporary economic giants of the world, i.e., the United
States, the Soviet Union, Japan and the European Economic
3 5Community as well as the United Kingdom. No country is 
self sufficient. The nature and the size of trade carried
3^866 Table 38.
^^Baldwin, 0£_. cit.. p. 41.




DISTRIBUTION OF IRANIAN IMPORTS ACCORDING TO THE 




(1963) (19%^) (1^ )
Common Market 35.80 3 6 .0 0 33 .50 36.10
United Kingdom 18.60 14.40 13.70 13.30
Japan 5 .50 7 .2 0 6 .30 8.20
Eastern Bloc Countries 5 .10 8 .5 0 7 .7 0 6 .80
United States 16 .70 16.00 17.50 17.80
Turkey and Pakistan .70 .20 1 .70 .30
Unallocated 1 5 .60 17 .70 19.60 17.50
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total Volume
(in millions of US $)
5*+7.80 513.50 742.30 869.50
♦Iranian year begins on 21st. of 
of March of the following year..
March and ends on ■the 20th
SOURCE: Yearbook of the Central Bank of Iran, 13^5 (1965-
1966); Tehran, Iran.
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out is of vital significance» In this sense the pattern of 
international trade becomes a key to the understanding of 
the modernization process.
Iranian economy is basically geared to the production 
of primary goods. Consequently, the largest items-on the 
Iranian import list are machinery, chemicals, electro-tech­
nical machines and appliances, passenger cars, iron, steel and
36other commodities basically produced from iron. However, it
must be borne in mind that sugar, wheat, and tea, as well as
fats and oil, together also constitute a relatively large item
37in the import picture.
With the exception of heavy machinery, and electro-tech­
nical appliances and machines, other products which constitute 
the bulk of Iranian imports do not require a high level of 
technological sophistication for production. In fact, many 
such as woolens, yarns, fats and oils, tanning and dying 
extracts, as well as paper and glass require relatively little 
technical skill and industrial capability. The pattern of 
industrial development in Iran during the last decade shows 
that the attempt, consciously or unconsciously, has been basi­
cally to fulfill the consumer needs. The steel mill is, of 
course, an exception. This is a different approach to modern­















Machinery 98.7 18.0 79.8 1 5 .5Iron & Ironware 59.5 10.9 54.7 10.6
Chemicals $0.2 9.2 46.7 9.1
Sugar 14.9 2.7 16.8 3 .3
Wheat 15.5 2.8 11.6 2 .3
Electro“technical 
machines & app. 39.3 7.2 3 0 .6 6.0Passenger cars It.9 »9 12.7 2 . 5
Fats & oils 11.9 2.2 11.6 2 .3Paper products 13 .8 2.5 14.5 2.8
Tanning & dyeing 
extracts, polish 9.8 1.8 11.3 2.2
Woolens, yarns 9.1 1.7 9.2 1.8
Tires & tubes 15.1 2.7 14.5 2.8
Tea 9.8 . 1.8 10.0 1 .9
Vehicle parts 8.6 1.6 7.5 1 .5
Glass & glassware '+.5 .8 4.4 .8
Fabrics & art. silk 17.6 3.2 9.8 1 .9
Miscellaneous 164.4 3 0 .0 167.8 3 2 .7
Total 5^7.6 100.0 513.5 100.0
^Iranian year begins on 21st of March and, ends on the 20th












Machinery 118.8 16.0 184.5 21.2
iron & ironware 78.9 10.6 110.0 12.6
Chemicals 62.5 8.4 70.4 8,1
Sugar 9̂.1 8.0 26.3 3.0
Wheat 40.9 5.5 14.1 1.6
Electro“technical 
machines & app. 39.8 5.4 ^3.7 6.2
Passenger cars 22.2 3.0 18.1 2.1
Fats & oils 18.3 2.5 27.5 3.2
Paper prod. 18.6 2.5 20.7 2.4
Tanning & dyeing 
extracts, polish 14.7 2.0 16.1 1.9
Woolens, yarns 12.5 1.7 14.7 1.7
Tires & tubes 12.4 1.7 14.7 1.7
Tea 9.9 1.3 16.9 1.9Vehicle parts 8.6 1.2 11.2 1.3Glass & glassware 6.3 ,8 5.2 .6Fabrics & art. silk 3.0 .4 1.2 .1
Miscellaneous 215.8 29.0 264.2 30.4
Total 742.3 100.0 869.5 100.0
SOUR,CE: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran; Tehran, 1966.
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instance, whose emphasis has been on heavy industry which has 
enormous returns in the long run while, of course, on the 
short run it makes life a little harder for the consumer.
The European Economic Community (EEC) has been the
n Q
largest exporting bloc to Iran--making up on the average, in 
recent years, about 35 per cent of the total Iranian imports. 
Next in importance is the United States with approximately 17 
per cent. Closely following the United States is the United 
Kingdom, with about 15 per cent. However, in recent years the 
Japanese and the Socialist bloc exports to Iran have been ex­
panding rapidly and are bound to overtake the United States 
and British exports in the next decade, if the present trends 
continue.
In the export sector, the Socialist countries consti­
tute the largest bloc of customers for Iranian goods. The
countries in this category have been responsible for the pur-
39chase of, on the average, 26,4- per cent of Iranian goods.
The European Economic Community follows second with the pur­
chase of on the average slightly over 25 per cent. The United 
States and the United Kingdom respectively follow— so far as






DISTRIBUTION OF IRANIAN EXPORTS OTHER THAN PETROLEUM 









Common Market 2 5 .7 0 25 .7 0 22.30 27 .00
United Kingdom 11.60 12.40 8 .30 8.10
Japan 1 o40 3 .3 0 1.60 2.10
Eastern Bloc Countries 27 .5 0 26.20 29.20 22.80
United States 9 .5 0 12.60 13.20 11.00
Turkey and Pakistan 1 .30 1 .10 1 .30 1.20
Unallocated 23:00- 18 .70 24.10 21.80
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total Volume
(in Millions of US $) 114 .70 128.20 153.10 180.80
*Iranian calender begins on March 21 and ends on March 20th 
of the following year. For example the year 1341 begins on 
March 21, 1962, and ends on March 20, 1963-
SOURCE: Yearbook of the Central Bank of Iran. 1345 (1965-
1966), Tehran, Iran.
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The non-petroleum exports of Iran are being increasingly
1+1
dwarfed by the petroleum exports « In 19&3 only 128,2 million
dollars out of a total export of 933 million dollars was attri-
1+2buted to the export of non-petroleum goods. This is only 
13.7 per cent of the total export. This heavy reliance on a 
single export product has one danger and that is should any­
thing happen to prevent the further, or even temporary, 
export of this commodity— as happened in Iran in 1951— the 
total economy of the country would collapse. The reliance 
on oil revenues is much more now than ever was prior to 1951» 
The only wa> out of this dilemma would be diversification in 
exports.
Amongst the non-petroleum exports of Iran woolen car­
pets, cotton and fresh dried fruits constitute the major bulk 
1+3of exports. Next in importance are hides and leather, min-
44eral ores, wool and caviar. Exports of fresh and dried 
fruits, as well as cotton, have been on the decrease in the 
years under study. Amongst the more important export com­
modities , only the volume of carpet exports has shown a 
tremendous increase. This has been primarily due to a phe­
nomenal increase of sales in Germany and the United States,















Woolen carpets 22.1 19.3 26.4 20,6
Cotton
Dried & fresh
26.8 23.4 37.6 29 .3
fruits 24,8 21.6 19.2 15 .0
Hides & leather 5o9 5.2 9.7 7 .6
Mineral ores 
Wool, soft wool & 
hair
3.6 3.1 4.8 3 .7
4.4 3.8 5.8 4 . 5
Gum tragacanth 2.8 2.4 3.7 2 .9
Caviar 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.0Oil cakes 
Caraway & Cummin
3.1 2,7 2.1 1.6
seeds 1.8 1,6 1.7 1.3




rial herbs & seeds1 ,4 .4 .7 ,6
Other 14,6 12.7 11.6 9 .1
Total iWT? 100,0 1 2 0 1ÔÔ7ÏÏ
*Iranian calender year begins on 21st of March and ends on 












Woolen carpets 3 6 .4 23 .8 4 5 .4 25.1
Cotton 34^9 2 2 .5 50.1 27 .7
Dried & fresh
fruits 19»8 12.9 2 3 .0 12.7
Hides & leather 12.9 8.4 10.1 5»6
Mineral ores 8 ,7 5 .7 10 .7 5.9Wool, soft wool
& hair 5.1 3»3 2 .7 1 .5Gum tragacanth ^»7 3.1 3 . 8 2.1Caviar 3 »4 2.2 3 . 7 2.0
Oil cakes 2 .7 1.8 2.8 1 .5
Caraway & Cummin
seeds 1»7 1.1 1 .9 1.1
Casings lo5 1.0 1.4 .8
Cement 1»3 . 8 1.6 .9
Medicinal & indust­
rial herbs & seeds 1.0 .7 1 .0 . 6
Other 19.0 12.4 22.6 12 .5
Total 153.1 100.0 I8O08 100.0
SOUBCE: Foreign Trade Statistics of Iran; Tehran, 1966»
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TABLE 1+3
IRAN'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS FOR EIGHT YEARS, 
BEGINNING IN 1964&
(million
1951+ 1 Ü 5 1156 1251
A„ Imports (nongovt.) 138.2 206.7 229 .6 280 .2








Co Other foreign exchange pay­
ments (excluding debt 
service)
10 Plan Organization 
2o Net services 





30 .3  








D. Trade deficit plus other 
nondebt payments 37.4 167.9 210.1 266.2
Eo Oil earnings 
10 Earned tax revenues 
2. Rial purchases by 
foreign companies 














F. Foreign exchange deficit 
from earnings (D-C) 7 .0 41.4 29 .4 10.2
Go Debt repayments (govt, loans 
only ) 8.8 3 . 2 -
Ho "Earned" exchange deficit 
plus debt repayments (F+G),, 7 .0 50.2 3 2 .6 10.2
I. Foreign aid and loans 50.0 7 1.8 86.8 116.3




1958 1959 I960 1961%
A. Imports (nongovt.) 370.7 440.5 473 .7 484.1
B. Exports (non-oil) 86.3 96.8 9 5 .7 106.0
C. Other foreign exchange pay­






















D. Trade deficit plus other 
nondebt payments 372.5 433.6 4 5 7 .5 448.7
E. Oil earnings
1. Earned tax revenues
2. Rial purchases by 
foreign companies 














F. Foreign exchange deficit 
from earnings (D-C) 32.5 114.5 122.0 9 3 .0
Go Debt repayments (govt, 
loans only) 77.2 39.8 53.3 29.6
H. "Earned" exchange deficit 
plus debt repayments (F+G)109.7 154.3 175.3 132.6
I. Foreign aid and loans 57.2 80.0 9 1.8 76.2
Jo Increase in reserves 
Four-vear totals -52.5 -74.3 -8 3 .5276.7
—66.4
a. Excludes military imports, loans to the Ministry of De­
fense, and U. S. military aid. Year begins March 21.
b. Estimated
c. Includes small exports by National Iranian Oil Company.
d. Includes $25 million bonus for concessions granted to 
Pan American Oil Company.
e. Finances by borrowing from IMF, increases in short term 
indebtedness, and exporting gold.
SOURCE: George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran
(JohnsHopkins University Press, 1967).
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This increase in demand for Persian carpets could perhaps he 
understood in the light of the increased prosperity of the 
Germans and the resultant demand for luxury goods and conspi­
cuous consumption.
The recurring fluctuations in the amount of major non- 
petroleum export commodities for Iran can he attributed to 
a variety of factors. So far as fruits are concerned, due 
to the variable climatic conditions of Northern Iran, espe­
cially during early Spring, it is not always possible to have 
the expected harvests. One unseasonable frost or snow could 
damage a large portion of the harvest. Cotton is also sus­
ceptible to natural disasters and pests. For example, during 
1967, the cotton harvest of Iran was estimated to be 20 per 
cent below the original expected level due to pests. Thus, 
three of the most important non-petroleum exports are depen­
dent on pests and climatic conditions. Another factor, also 
contributing to the fluctuation of the export of dry and 
fresh fruits is the frequent variation of demand for such 
goods on the world market.
So far as the export of carpets are concerned, fluc­
tuations are not so severe. On the whole, the amount of 
carpets exported by Iran to Western Europe and Worth America 
will closely follow, and be directly proportional to, the 
level of economic prosperity in the respective importing
^^8ee Table 42,
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countrieso Iran's ability to-produce carpets, on the other 
hand, seems to be inversely proportional to the level of 
economic prosperity in Iran— since the purely human costs 
(child labour, subsistent wage levels, inhuman working con­
ditions), which make the carpet trade highly profitable, 
might become less tolerable, or more avoidable, as a result 
of increased prosperity»
The role of petroleum in the Iranian exports has been 
steadily growing during the past decade. What is also impor­
tant in the pattern of petroleum exports is that the ratio of 
crude oil exports to the export of petroleum products has been 
increasing. This tendency basically means that Iran, by plac­
ing an increased emphasis on the export of crude oil, has put 
herself in a comparatively disadvantageous position. Between 
1956 to 1962 the wholesale price of crude oil dropped by 8 per 
cent. This is not only true in case of crude oil but also 
with regard to other primary commodities. Just to take sev­
eral other export items of Iran would show that during the 
same period, the wholesale price of tobacco dropped by 31 
per cent; wool by 19 per cent; and cotton by 20 per cent.
However, the wholesale prices of produced commodities 





SHIFTS IN WHOLESALE PRICES OF CERTAIN 
PRIMARY COMMODITIES*
1Year/Commodity Tobacco Wool Cotton Crude Oil
1956 72.00 63 .40 4 5 .9 0 1.97
1957 7 3 .3 0 69 .90 51.20 ~ "
1958 7 0 .9 0 4 7 .8 0 46.00 2.08
1959 64.20 4 9 .0 0 44.60 1 .92
I960 52.70 4 9 .1 0 46.00 1.87
1961 4 9 .5 0 50.50 4 3 .4 0 1.80
1962 4 9 .0 0 51.10 36 .60 1.80
Price Shift -23.00 -12.30 -9 30 -.17
% Price Shift -3 1 .00 -19.00 -20.00 -8
4
1 Turkish Export Prices
2Australian Export Prices
^Egyptian Export Prices 
1+Saudi Arabian Export Prices
SOURCE : General Statistics. Statistical Bulletins, OECD,
January 1964, pp. 61-66»
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commodities, but also absolutely. For example, fuel oil and
gasoline, which are both petroleum products, had increased in
M-8value by 26 and 8 per cent respectively. Along the same
lines, the. wholesale price of steel had increased by 14 per
cent and that of pig iron by 15 per cent.
If the observed pattern of the decline in prices of
primary commodities and the relative increase in prices of
produced commodities be a continuous one, as they seem to
49have been historically, in the long run Iran which produces
primary products for export will be in a serious disadvantage.
This trend can be readily observed in the relative shifts in
50Iranian Import-Export prices during the years 1958-1965° 
Iranian Import-Export prices have both declined during this 
period. However, while import prices have only dropped by 
4 per cent, the drop in export prices has been 11 per cent. 
Another way of looking at it is that in 1965 Iran received 
for an average unit of export 7 per cent (11-4) less than
51she received in 1956.
^^See Tables 45, 46 and Chart 1 „
^^See Raul Prebisch's "The Economic Development of 
Latin America and Its Principal Problems," Economic Bulletin 
for Latin America. (February, 1962), pp. 1 , 4-6. Also see 
"Post War Price Relations in Trade Between Underdeveloped and 
Industrial Countries," U.N. document E/CN. 1 Sub. 3/W5, 23 
(February, 1949).




A COMPARISON OF SHIFTS IN WHOLESALE PRICES 
OF CRTEiE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
(base year 1956)
Year/Commodity Crude Oil Fuel Oil Gasoline
1956 100.00 100.00 100.00
1957 - 120.00 111.00
1958 105.00 101.00 100.00
1959 - 9 7 .0 0 103.00 101.00
I960 94 .0 0 106.00 101.00
1961 9 1 .0 0 122.00 104.00
1962 91 .0 0 126.00 108.00
SOURCE: Same as Tables 44 and 46o
Computed on the basis of Tables 44 and 46»
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TABLE 46
SHIFTS IN WHOLESALE PRICES OF CERTAIN 
PRODUCED COMMODITIES*
Year/Commoditv Fuel Oil̂ pGasoline Steel^ 1+Pig Iron
1956 4.29 18.46 9 6 .9 0 50.40
1957 5 .1 5 20 .59 101.90 55 .20
1958 4 .3 5 18.50 105.90 56.60
1959 4o45 , 18 .75 105.90 56.30
I960 4 .5 9 18 ,75 105.90 56.30
1961 5 .2 5 19.37 110 ,30 56.80
1962 5.43 19.98 111.20 58.40
Price Shift +1.12 +1 .52 +14 ,3 0 +8.00
% Price Shift +26.00 +8.00 +14.00 +15.00
1United Kingdom Export Prices
United Kingdom Export Prices
^German (Federal Republic) Export Prices 
4United Kingdom Export Prices
♦SOURCE; General Statistics. Statistical Bulletins, OECD, 
January, 1964, pp. 6I-660
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SHIFTS IN IRANIAN IMPORT-EXPORT PRICES* 
(base year 1956)











Total Shift -4 -11
SOURCE; International Financial Statistics. The Statistics 
Division, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
D.C. The above chart was computed and drawn from 
various issues basing their price indices on the 
years 1953 and 1958 respectively.
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One answer to the above problem would seem to be a union 
among those countries which produce similar primary products 
for export. The aim of such a union would be, through joint 
effort, to regulate the prices of primary products on the 
world market in order to insure a fairly stable source of 
income to the producers. However, since this must necessarily 
involve agreement among a large number of countries of the 
world, at the present time it does not seem to be a likely 
prospect in the near future. An attempt in this direction, 
OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), has 
basically failed to accomplish its purpose due to the lack 
of agreement amongst the members as well as its manipulation 
by the large oil companies of Europe and North America which 
like to see OPEC remain impotent.
A more realistic approach on the part of Iran would be 
to place a large emphasis on industrialization and the event­
ual export of produced commodities.
VII. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MODERNIZATION
Any consideration of the role of government in the pro­
cess of modernization must be in conjunction with an 
examination of the prevalent socio-political structure in 
IranJ Until and unless one has a clear picture of the exist­
ing power structure and the processes rooted in such power 
relationships, the cursory study of the Iranian government 
would net nothing but confusion. It is because of this that 
a lot of observers and students of Iranian politics, who have 
not examined the conditions in concrete power terms, simply 
give up when it comes to fundamental observations: As the
London Economist once observed about Iranian politics,
"Anyone who really knows what is going on in Iran must be 
grossly misinformed."
As we have seen in the study of socio-political struc­
ture in Iran, the really revolutionary elements entering the 
Iranian scene are the new working and middle classes. These 
elements by virtue of their composition and skills make up 
the modern sector. Although the government is by definition 
a modern structure in underdeveloped settings, any discrepancy 
which might exist between its modern role and traditional per­




tendencies and controls which are exercised upon and within 
such a structure.
The Dimensions of the Public Sector 
Although few bureaucracies in the world are as old as 
the Iranian bureaucracy, the modern administrative structure 
of Iran is only about 0̂ years old. In this period, the 
activities of the government have expanded to become the 
biggest business in the country. The government is now the 
largest owner of cultivated land and forests. All important 
subterranean resources belong to the government. The largest 
insurance company and most of the major banks are state enter­
prises. The major communication media (post, telegraph, 
television and radio) are primarily state owned and operated. 
The controls exercised by the government on foreign trade, as 
well as government monopoly in certain areas of domestic 
trade such as tobacco, the ownership of the railways, the 
airlines, and the oil industry, all go hand in hand to make
the role of the government vital to all aspects of economic
2life in Iran.
Reliable statistics are not available about the number 
of government employees. In fact. Dr. Goudarzi, the head of
pFor some of the problems emanating from the large size 
of the governmental sector in Iran see Jahangir Amuzegar, 
"Administrative Barriers to Economic Development in Iran," 
Middle East Economic Papers (Economic Research Institute, 
American University of Beirut, 1958)
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High Administrative Council said: "If you ask the govern­
ment how many employees it has and how many receive their
salaries from the government, they will be unable to give
3you any information..." The closest thing to reliable 
figures are the result of 1956 National Census figures which 
placed the number of government employees at 207,1^0. By May, 
1962, the number of government employees was estimated at 
3005000. If we consider that the above figures represent 
the true picture of the situation, then between 1956 and 1962 
the governmental bureaucracy has been expanding approximately^ 
at the annual rate of 7-5 per cent.
Assuming that the structure of the governmental bureau­
cracy has been expanding at the same rate (7*5 per centum) 
continuously, taking May, 1962, figure (300,000) as a base, 
the total number of government employees in May, 1968, 
would be H-35,000. Of course, in all of the above calcula­
tions the employees of the Ministry of War and the armed 
forces generally have not been included. If we assume the 
size of the Iranian armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Gendarmery) and the Ministry of War personnel be about 
2000,000,^ then the total number of government employees by
^Ettela'at. May 31, 1962.
^Kavhan. May 26, 1962,
^A 196*+ estimate of the Armed Forces alone places their 
number at 170,000. See Statesman's Yearbook. 1967 (New York, 
1968).
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May, 1968, would be 635,000. That is, one out of every forty- 
two Iranian is a government employee.
Another indicator to the size of the government is the 
amount of money it spends. In 1960's the government expendi­
tures, on the average, have accounted for about 18 per cent 
of the annual national income.^
Government As A Bureaucracy
The 1956 Census provides an interesting insight into the
7educational background of the government employees. The bulk 
of them have little or no education. This fact makes any in­
terpretation of the role of the government in the process of 
modernization more difficult; since the government which is 
supposed to be a modern institution itself embodies individ­
uals whom by virtue of their education can be considered 
traditional or parochial in outlook.
In Iran, recruitment to government jobs is often un­
related to need. It has been estimated that 50 per cent of
8the employees are superfluous in their present jobs. Thus, 
many government employees only report for pay. The rest of 
the time they work elsewhere. Next to the ownership of land, 
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1998 — 4-0 -
1999 296 289 4-8 • 19
I960 281 381 93 19
1961 302 34-0 99 18
1963 333 376 96 17
1964- 362 407 64 17
1969 396 446 79 19
1966 - — 102 -
1967 UM 123 w.
*A11 the figures are to the closest billion.
SOURCES ; United Nations ' Statistical Yearbooks. 1964-. 1969 
& 19^6 (New York: United Nations' 1969, 1966 &
1967 respectively). Also, Economic Survey of Asia 
and the Far East 1962 & 1967 (Bangkok; United 
Nations', 1963 & 1968 respectively).
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TABLE 1+9
THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES*
Cumulative
Level Number Per Cent Per Cent
Illiterate 38 811 21.2 21 .2
Literate, but no formal 
education 30 000 "16.4 37.6
Three years of primary 
school 11 000 6.0 43 0 6
Four to six years of school 40 000 21.8 65.4
Nine years of education 30 000 16.4 81.8
High School graduates 22 000 12.0 9 3 .8
Bachelor’s Degree or 
equivalent 8 000 4.4 9 8 .2
Master's degree or 
equivalent 1 000 0.5 98 .7
With doctorate degree 2 500 1.3 100.0
Total of employees 
included 183 311 100.0
*The above table was based on the findings of the 1956 
National Census. The total number of government employees, 
excluding the military, was 207,1^0.
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9to have the best security as one source of steady income. 
After the land reforms the value of government jobs could 
have only gone up.
The lack of necessary planning for government man­
power needs, as we have seen, is indicated by the attitude 
exhibited by the government towards education. Since people 
in the centre of the power structure have always eyed educa­
tion with suspicion, they have not yet begun to consider the 
educational system as an instrument for manpower training. 
Thus, for example, while government ranks are swelling with 
civil servants whose level of skill and productivity is low, 
due to the lack of attention to teacher training programmes,
the Iranian educational system is desparately under-staffed,
10Although according to Civil Service Law the minimum
salary of the civil servant is 4,900 and the maximum 9,500
rials (75 rials = 1 dollar), the law is interpreted very
liberally. Some civil servants only receive a third of the 
1 1minimum, while some others get more than fifty times as 
much as the maximum. For example, the twelve members of 
the National Iranian Oil Company's Board of Directors have 
each a salary which is not less than 120,000 rials per month.
^Ibido, p. 80,
^^Civil Service and Personnel Codes of Iran, edited and 
compiled by Ahmad Kamangar, (Tehran, 1964 in Persian),
 ̂̂ Iran Almanac. 1964 (Tehran, 1965), P» 560,
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In 1964, some of the ambassadors received as much as 500,000
12rials per month.
Despite the low level of government salaries, in com­
parison to the cost of living, in 1958 about 48 per cent of 
government employees owned the houses in which they lived.
This could be explained either by the fact that the employees 
had other legal sources of income, or used their governmental 
posts to acquire illegal income. In other words, many of 
them engaged in corrupt practices: "on lower levels, the
common practice is to take sums for expediating the legiti­
mate business of private individuals, and on the higher
levels, of taking cuts on contracts between agencies of the
13government and local and foreign concerns."
Despite the expansion in civil services, for several 
years Iranian civil servants have not had a period of pro­
motion and corresponding salary increases. In 1964, a
magazine reported that the government owed about 12 billion
14rials in back-pay for these annual increases. However, due 
to the peculiar socio-political conditions, those who most 
suffer economically are the lower middle classes which occupy 
the bulk of minor positions in the governmental bureaucracy.
IZibid.
^^Masoud Heidari, "The Present Civil Service of Iran," 
research paper (University of Pittsburgh, 1965), P» 8l.
1 u*Iran Almanac. 1964, op. cit., p. 562.
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As the bureaucracy becomes inflated, it becomes easier 
to hide inefficiency. Particularly since decision making is 
very hierarchical, it is wiser for civil servants, minor or 
major, not to make any decisions. The "buck" is passed, hori­
zontally and vertically in the bureaucratic structure, as far 
as it can go. Thus, the citizen who has the misfortune of 
dealing with the bureaucracy becomes totally frustrated, if 
not devastated. That is, unless one is able to get through 
the bureaucratic red tape by the pull of bribery or the people 
he knows,
The inefficiencies and injustices of the system are most
evidenced in the judicial system where long and unnecessary
formalities are particularly harsh on the poorer people who
can neither afford to bribe the authorities nor know anyone
of influence who can intervene on their behalf. Consequently,
the defendents remain in prison for a long time before their
case can be heard. In 19&3, for example, an old man was
tried by a Tehran court for a case which had been pending for 
1 522 years.
Between 1952 and 1959, a back-log of 255,8?^ cases had
16been accumulated in the Iranian courts. If we assume that 
of all the prior cases in the courts' history an equal number




TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES IN IRANIAN COURTS 
(Civil, Criminal, etc.)
Year Cases Ooened Cases Closed Back-log
1952-1953 316 000 301 368 14 632
1953-1954 376 060 307 220 68 840
1954-1955 346 959 320 886 26 073
1955-1956 574 025 535 781 38 244
1956-1957 647 653 610 043 37 610
1957-1958 746 811 727 991 18 820
1958-1959 ■ 892 851 859 191 33 655
1959-1960 850 000 829 000 21 000
Total 258 874
SOURCE ; Based on figures in Iran Almanac. 196^ (Tehran,
1965), p. 116.
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had remained unresolved, by 1959 there would have been over 
half a million unfinished cases In the Iranian courts. In 
addition to these, there were 850,000 new cases opened that 
year. All of this means that In that year, close to 1,400,000 
cases had been tied-up In the court system. Further, If we 
assume that there were only two people Involved In every case, 
then that year at least 2,800,000 people or one out of every 
eight Iranians, were caught In the bureaucratic web of the 
Ministry of Justice.
It Is this kind of bureaucracy, aimless. Inefficient 
and corrupt, which forms the machinery of the government.
The primary motive of the establishment Is survival. Thus, 
on the whole, the power elite Is willing to live with all the 
shortcomings of the bureaucracy with the provlslo that the 
bureaucracy would remain loyal. It Is not that all the mem­
bers of the bureaucracy are corrupt or Inefficient. But the 
weight of the traditional bureaucratic patterns— I.e., where 
bureaucrats are the personal representatives of a personal 
ruler and operate at his whim— strongly militates against 
any kind of Initiative, efficiency or honesty on the part of 
the civil servant. The government has no larger purpose than
stabilizing political fortunes by rewarding Its friends and
17placating Its enemies through governmenrt^-empioyment.
I^Gee Manfred Halpern's The Politics of Social Change 
in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton. New Jersey; 
Princeton University Press, 19^3), p. 341.
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Thus, the prevailing condition is that of an ambiguous 
political regime maintaining itself in power "despite its 
apparent rejection by most of the educated younger generation 
and despite frequent predictions, over several years, of its 
imminent fall» There is not little corruption in public life, 
at all levels» Chronic instability marks the holding of pub­
lic office» Ministers shuffle on and off the stage in a sort 
of perpetual musical chairs of personal inefficiencies, the 
low salaries, the low morale of a badly inflated bureaucracy»
Everything, throughout the country turns on Tehran» Local
18government may also be said not to exist."
Some Western scholars attribute the lack of emergence 
of modern and efficient bureaucracies in the underdeveloped 
countries mainly to the absence of know-how in administrative 
science. However, the problem is much more fundamental than 
that» It has to do with who holds the balance of power in 
any given country. Obviously, the creation of a talented, 
honest and independent civil service, dedicated to contrac­
tual, rather than familial, impersonal, rather than personal 
service would undermine the power structure of the traditional 
elite» Thus, it will not be permitted. Such a new civil ser­
vice, in Halpern's words, can come into its own only with the 
achievement of political power by the new middle class.
^^George B» Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) p. M-.
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Sharing the latter's interest in national mobilization and
transformation because it is a very part of that class, its
values make it a partisan of that class as veil as its instru-
19ment of government.
In most Middle Eastern countries the new middle class 
has attained power only since the Second World War. Excep­
tions are in Turkey, where the middle class came to power 
much earlier, and Iran, where its fortunes were reversed in 
1953.^°
The Government As A Planner 
The effects of the bureaucratic shortcomings are 
strongly felt in the area of planning. Following the Second ■ 
World War, in order to side-step the bureaucratic ineffi­
ciencies of the regular government agencies, the Plan 
Organization was formed. Its role originally was to be a 
planning and coordinating body: supervising the execution
of the Seven Year Plan.
However, in practice, under both the First and the 
Second Plans (19*+8-5̂  and 1955-62) Plan Organization executed
most of the plans on its own, with little participation by
21the government ministries. The First Plan coincided with
1 9Baldwin, o£.. cit., p. 3*+7* 
ZOlbid.. pp. 3^7-3^8.
-  21lbid.. p. 23.
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the nationalization of the oil industries and thus the re­
lated funds were cut due to a sharp decline in oil exports.
But this shortage of funds was not the only stumbling 
block. In May, 1950, even prior to the nationalization, Mr. 
Max Weston Thornburg, an American consultant, wrote in his 
private diary;
Today Plan Organization is so nearly com­
pletely dominated or victimized by either 
political or personal interests...that... 
there probably is little to choose between 
the Plan Organization and any governmentorganization.22
To be sure, the Plan Organization has accomplished cer­
tain things. Several dams have been built, elaborate plans 
have been made about improvement in the communication and 
transportation facilities of the country. However, its 
accomplishments have been much less than the level of expecta­
tions from it. Aside from the basic bureaucratic problems 
ailing the Organization, there is the lack of purpose and 
defined objectives. This is particularly true of the first 
two plans which were merely allocation of funds to be spent 
in various areas of the economy. A comprehensive planning 
had been lacking. By the time the Third Plan was being 
drafted, however, a more sophisticated staff had been gath­
ered and definitions and objectives had become clearer. The 
planners were also more aware of some of the problems involved
22As quoted by Baldwin, Ibid.. p. 33'
20»+
¥ith the drawing and the implementation of a plan. Thus,
the objectives of the Third Plan were expressed as follows:
We want the greatest possible increase in 
national income which the deployment of our 
initial resources permits, subject perhaps 
to the qualification that particularly poor 
regions of the country would receive extra 
help. The "greatest possible increase in 
national income" leaves too much in the air 
however. Since the increase is non-consumable 
output, in inventories and in work-in-progress 
are counted as increases in national income, 
relatively high growth rates may be obtained 
without concurrent improvements in consump­
tion. Under present circumstances it seems 
best to aim at roughly equi-proportional 23 
_advances in production and consumption...
However, when it comes to actually carrying out the 
plans, the lack of dedication and compatibility of the whole 
power elite to the ideals of planning has made any kind of 
progress very difficult. The problem is not so much scarcity 
of skill or know-how, "there are many able, well intentioned 
men scattered through public and private life in Iran," but 
they are not "where it counts, at the centre of political
plxand social power."
Mr. George Baldwin, a member of Harvard Advisory Group 
in Iran, after three years of study (from 1958 to I96I) came 
to the following conclusion concerning the future of planning 
in Iran:
"Notes on the Third Plan," August, 1959» 
Baldwin, op.. cit.. p. 203»
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. ouThe past decade strongly suggests that 
the growth of constructive social values 
and new institutions will be disappointing 
until there are fundamental changes in the 
distribution of political power in I r a n .2?
Governmental Priorities 
Between 1958 and 1967 the government expenditure had 
almost increased by threefold.The allocation of funds in 
the budget is perhaps one good indication of the government's 
order of priorities. During the last decade the major prior­
ities, in this respect, have been alloted to the area of 
defence. In the years under examination, about 23 per cent
of the government expenditures, on the average, have been in
27the area of defence.
Iran has no outstanding territorial disputes with her 
neighbours and the relations are generally friendly. Despite 
claims in 1950's about the necessity of meeting the military 
challenge of Communism, it is generally understood that Iran, 
by herself, will never be able to resist any invasion from the 
Soviet Union.
^^Baldwin, 0£. cit.. p. 20̂ .
2&8ee Table 51»
^^Ibid. According to the figures in Table *+, in the 
years 1958? 1961, 1963, 1965, 1966 & 1967 the defence expen­
diture constituted 21, 24, 25, 23, 22 and 25 per centum of the 
total government expenditures, respectively.
TABLE 51
GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURE IN IRAN* 
(million rials)
Exnenditure/Year......... 19̂ 58 m i 1963 1964 196,5, 5966 1967
Interest on Public debtc 249 1 632 1 419 1 636 1 40 6 1 350 1 327
Defence* . . » , , . , . 8 3 7 ^ 13 08 4 14 06 4 14 604 17 163 22 41 0 30 219
Grants and shared taxes. 629 4 2 8 4 2 8 — "• “ — —  —
Subsidies for price and
608 347 328income stability , . , . 4 6 4 344 917 43 105
Contribution to govern­
347 2 543ment enterprises . , , . 1 563 819 292 1 307
Other current expend­
20 8 6 5 33 334itures = = , c , , o a .11 642 20 316 21 100 39 337
Capital expenditure :
Capital outlay of
14 966 286 14 323Plan Organization, = ,12 263 12 502 12 27 929
Other direct capital
46 8outlays a c o . o o c a 3 181 1 759 2 048 337 202
48 208Grants for capital
1 614 714purposes 1 160 1 969 723 1 102 6
Loans for capital
purposes 130 1 908 21 —  — 3 657 3 690
Total 39 660 54 761 55 743 64 i5i 74 725 102 266 1 2 2 ,8 5 9
♦Years ending 10 March. Data refer to general budget, Plan Organization Account 
and extrabudgetary accounts. Defence: 1967 including security services. Sub­
sidies for price and income stability: cereal administration deficit. Grants 
and loans for capital purposes : to government enterprises and nationalized
industries. 75 rials = U. S. $1.




Thus, considering the composition of the traditional
28ruling classes in Iran, the heavy emphasis on defence may 
only be attributed to the internal insecurity felt by the 
power elite. Even in agriculture, where the government has 
allegedly assumed its most ambitious reform programmes, the 
allocation of funds has been insignificant: about one-twenty-
ninth of that allocated to the Ministry of War in 1963 when
29the land-reform was supposed to be moving full speed.
Fears of internal subversion and revolution has also
made the United States pour a large amount of military and 
economic aid in the coffers of the Iranian government. The 
pace of aid, during the period under study, particularly 
quickened following the military coup d-etate in Iraq in 
1958, When, during the same year, the late Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles arrived in Tehran, before he departed 
he had promised Iranian government ^50 late model tanks, and 
more than 150 new model canons without bothering to advise the 
U, S„ military men who complained again and again that the 
Iranian Army was being drowned in hardware that they could
30not handle and could not afford.
It is apparent that the need felt by the government in
the area of defence is immediate. Of course, another way of
^®See Chapter 2.
■̂̂ See Table 52,




FROM THE BUDGET OF 1963*
Sector Amount Of Allocation
The Ministry of War . . . % « « . « . . . u . .13 771
The Gendarmery. . . . . . .  ...........  . . . 2  555
The Police Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 588
The Customs and Customs Polices . . . . . . . .  785
Total 19 699
The Ministry of Education . . . . . . . . . . .  1 6M-9
The Ministry of Agriculture . . . . . . . . . .  M-68
The Ministry of Health. . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 383
*The fiscal year begins on March 21.
SOURCE; Ettela'at. March 17, 1963
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eliminating opposition would be to eliminate their basic com­
plaints by spending more and more on health, education, 
permitting greater political freedoms, and reforming the cor­
rupt bureaucratic structures.. The elite cannot take these 
longer term solutions to the existing problems concerned with 
instability, since doing so would mean a greater democratiza­
tion of the distribution of political power and the eventual 
loss of monopoly over its exercise by the elite. A closer 
look at the government budget and a comparison of the alloca­
tions to defence, on the one hand, and education, agriculture
and health, on the other, would further clarify the order of 
31priorities.
Reformism in Government Circles 
The level of government performance being what it is, 
every cabinet and every minister who comes into office car­
ries with it, or with him, even for propaganda’s sake, the 
banner of reform. Of course, there have been, in the ruling 
circles of Tehran, certain men of ability and imagination like 
Dr. Ali Amini, Mr.. Abolhassan Ebtehaj, or Dr. Hassan Arsanjani, 
who had wanted to emphasize the more long range road to the 
stability of the Establishment. But any kind of stability of 
the system has to be accompanied with a decentralization and
See Tables 51 and 52.
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dispersion of power, which itself is the anti-thesis of 
the system.
Mr. Ehtehaj, the head of the Plan Organization in 1950's, 
who was described by The New York Times as "a leading econo­
mist, a banker of international reputation and one of Iran's
32most distinguished servants," was dismissed because in 
speeches and to visitors he had openly criticized "the cor­
ruption, graft and suppression of freedom in the highest 
levels of the Iranian government, even within the Shah's 
court."̂ 3 After his dismissal, Mr. Ebtehaj was summarily
arrested on charges of having "exceeded his authority and 
34wasted funds."
Dr. Ali Amini, the Prime Minister, and Dr. Hassan 
Arsanjani, the Minister of Agriculture, followed the same 
fate. Dr. Arsanjani had criticized the allocation of in­
sufficient funds for the land reform program. Dr. Amini
had also gone as far as saying that he had "no doubt about
35the integrity, honesty and virtues of Mr. Ebtehaj," a
man who by this time was most dispised within the power elite.
^^The New York Times. (January 19, 1962) 
^^Time. (January 26, 1962).
^^The New York Times (January 10, 1962). 
3^The New York Times' (January 4, 1962).
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The basic reason for the failure of such reform move­
ments seems to be that, even though the individuals who led 
them were from within the power elite, they were becoming 
too powerful and threatened the existing distribution of power 
within the ruling elite.
Thus, the apparent contradiction within the existing 
system is, on the one hand, its authoritarian-totalitarian 
nature demanding an obedient, stable polity, loyal to the 
existing power structure. On the other hand, there are the 
tremendous pressures for modernization, demanding a disper­
sion of economic and political power, and a total change in 
existing structural patterns. What is working for the latter 
forces are the increased level of aspirations created,by the 
expansion of communications within as well as without the 
polity. In turn, these escalating expectations are frustra­
ted by the power elite which wants to maintain its privileges. 
What is working for the power elite are the security forces 
and the governmental bureaucracy which are at the same time 
subject to the above-mentioned frustrations. The ensuing con­
dition resulting from the above contradictions embodies the 
dynamics of political and social change, which is the subject 
of the concluding chapter.
3 The New Statesman, on September 20, 1963? stated that 
the reason for the dismissal of Premier Amini and Dr. Arsan-r, 
jani was that "they were becoming too powerful."
VIII. THE DYNAMICS OF THE REGION
Li mi ta tions of Current Studies of Political Change 
Since this is a study of modernization— and moderniza­
tion inherently implies change— the focus of this study has 
been an examination of the nature of changes in the human 
resources as well as the changes in the environment within 
whicb men live. Since the nature of change from a traditional 
to a more modern setting is so often cataclysmic, the process 
under study is frequently referred to as 'revolutionary 
change.'
We have already clarified the notions of modernization 
which underlies this study in the first chapter. In recent 
times, a large number of articles and essays have been writ-
"Iten about the circumstances and causes of revolutions. Many 
of these studies place a great deal of emphasis upon the acts 
which symbolize or dramatize revolutionary change such as dis­
order and bloodshed. Consequently they lose sight of the
See for instance Carl J. Friedrich (ed.). Revolution; 
Nomos VIII (New York: Atherton Press, 1966); Harold D. Lass-
well and Daniel Lerner (eds.). World Revolutionary Elites : 
Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge. Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1965*); Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and 
Communist Power : The Emergence of Revolutionary China,
19^7-194~?( Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Press) ;
James N. Rosenau (ed.). International Aspects of Civil Strife 
(Princeton University Press, 1964); and Jerome Ch'en, Mao and 
the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford University Press,1965)
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important connections which exist between the various socio­
economic, cultural and political forces which have been at 
work for many years in transforming the order. Due to these 
shortcomings, the resultant studies exhibit mechanistic char­
acteristics and often lack the rigor as well as the necessary 
flexibility in explaining these fundamental changes. Due to 
this focus on outward manifestations of the polity, it is 
often difficult to tell the difference between a coup d'etat, 
a riot, a rebellion, or a genuine revolution.
However, it must be noted that comparative politics is 
not the only area of political science hampered by mechanis­
tic outlooks. A large number of recent studies in judicial 
behavior, for instance, have adopted similar mechanistic 
approaches by focusing attention primarily on role playing 
within the court room, at the expense of ignoring the larger 
significance of the role of the judiciary in the larger social 
context.^
Thus, too much emphasis and concentration on the act 
(or acts) of rebellion ^  itself cannot tell us much about 
the real forces at work. The conditions precedent and
pFor examples of this approach see: Glendon Schubert,
"A Solution to the Indeterminate Factorial Resolution of 
Thurstone and Degan's Study of the Supreme Court," Behavioral 
Science. Vol. 7 (1962), pp. 4>+8-'+58 and Samuel Krislov,
"Power and Coalition in a Nine-Man Body," American Behavioral 
Scientist 6. 8 (April, 1963), pp. 24-26.
21>+
antecedent to a revolution must also be studied carefully»
As we have previously pointed out, modernization, or 
revolutionary movements which accompany the process, are 
multi-faceted phenomena which don't easily lend themselves 
to single factor examinations. However, it has been popular 
in recent years in the West to attribute all such revolution­
ary movements to single factors such as nationalism. Chalmers 
Johnson, for instance, argues that it was Chinese nationalism, 
not the Communist ideology, that culminated in the Chinese 
Revolution. He argues that the same thing happened in Yugo-
I4slavia after the close of the Second World War. Even if we 
accept similar explanations of revolutions and civil strife, 
such acceptance would place a tremendous historical as well 
as geographic limitation upon its applicability. It is his­
torically limited since nationalism itself is something quite 
new in human history and may not even survive the twentieth 
century. The geographic limitation upon the applicability 
of such a theory is that all revolutionary movements have 
not occurred subsequent to the occupation by foreign troops
^Crane Brinton in his Anatomy of Revolution (New York, 
1965) does an excellent job of comparing the various stages 
of the American, the French, the English, and the Russian * 
Revolutions.
1+See Chalmers Johnson's Peasant Nationalism and Com­
munist Power, o£,. cit.
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like the cases of the German occupation of Yugoslavia and the 
Japanese occupation of China. Modernization is a historically 
continuous process within the world wide context.
In the studies concerning revolutions which have appear­
ed in American social science journals, there is an absence 
of references to Marx. This is particularly noticeable and 
surprising since Marx's writings have had, and continue to 
have, a tremendous impact upon the revolutionary elite through­
out the world.
Another major shortcoming of a large number of studies
which have come out recently is their preoccupation with the 
5elite. This approach also has a great deal of liabilities 
connected with it. First, most of the studies of this kind 
have focused on the power elite--i.e., the government lea­
ders. Whereas in such polities, undergoing change, often the 
potential power elite, who represent the newly arising polit­
ical forces, but are not as yet in the control of political 
power, are ignored. This lack of attention to the dualistic 
nature of the elite (actual versus potential), robs any study 
of much insight and dynamism. Furthermore, a major problem 
with the elite-oriented studies is that they distract much 
attention from the fundamental socio-political processes 
going on throughout the polity. These revolutionary
%ee Las swell and Lerner, o£,. cit.
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processes involve the totality of the human resources of the 
polity. The role assumed by the elite is, to a large extent, 
in response to the aforementioned popular forces.
This chapter in its analysis of the dynamics of the 
region will be concerned with basically two types of theories 
which consider the totality of society before coming to any 
specific conclusions concerning patterns of change. In this 
sense they are not elite oriented. The first approach is 
based on Professor Oliver Benson's theory of escalating
expectations which views the condition of a polity as being 
that of a balance between pressure and power.^ The second 
approach is based on a modification of the concept of the new 
middle c 
Halpern.
lass as developed and presented by Professor Manfred 
7
Escalating Expectations 
As the title of Professor Benson's article suggests, it 
is in the same spirit as the communication theories of Deutsch, 
Pye and Lerner to which we have occasionally referred previ­
ously. In this respect it is concerned with such factors 
which contribute to an increase in one's consciousness such
Oliver Benson, "Escalating Expectations, "Symposium on 
Great World Problems of the Next Decade, Department of State, 
April 25-27, 1966. 35 pages, unpublished.
?8ee Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in 
North Africa and the Middle East (Princeton University Press,
Î W T .
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as as newspapers, cinemas, literacy, radios, books, school
8population, etc. However, the article is not only concerned 
with the awareness factors, which may categorize 'in­
puts '--since it produces an increase in demands placed upon 
the system--but also with the value distribution or the 'out­
put* of the political system. The indicators for the latter 
are Gross National Product per capita, energy consumption 
per capita, the number of social services, daily caloric
intake, steel consumption per capita, as well as the number
9of doctors and teachers.
Thus, the study is concerned with the totality of
the political processes, inputs and outputs, or what Daniel
10Lerner describes as the want/get ratio. The want/get 
ratio has often been used as a theoretical proposition for 
social and political unrest and discontent. However, Pro­
fessor Benson's study is concerned with translating such a 
theoretical scheme into concrete mathematical terms.
®See Table $4.
m
See Tables 53 and 55- The number of teachers per 
100,000 population has been added here because of the tremen-f 
dous demand for education within the region. For example, in 
Iran every year close to 100,000 high school graduates com­
petes in university entrance examinations. Yet only a few 
thousand are admitted. The same high demands are observed in 
all other levels of education since high educational levels 
are universally identified with higher status and income.
lOgee Daniel Lerner, The Passing of the Traditional 




GNP per Energy Con­ 1965
capita sumption (eaul. #Soclal
Country . (US dollars) kg/capita coal) Services
Iran 224 391 4
Iraq 250 581 4
Turkey 236 348 3
•Japan 711 1 783 4
Lebanon 218 747 4
Syria (SAR) 188 303 2
Egypt (UAR) 110 301 2
Jordan 117 291 1
Israel 1 084 2 239 4
Regional MEAN 303 650 3
Daily Doctors Teachers
Caloric Steel Con­ Ser ger
Intake sumption 100.000 100.000
Country uer canita ke/per capita Population Population
Iran 2 050 30 30 290
Iraq 2 140 26 19 468
Turkey 3 110 27 32 225
Japan 2 320 294 107 779
Lebanon 2 170 111 74 598
Syria (SAR) 2 340 16 20 511
Egypt (UAR) 2 930 26 42 455Jordan 2 280 33 19 595Israel 2 830 187 237 1 270
Regional
MEAN 2 481 57 ' 59 555
SOURCES! United Nations' Statistical Yearbook. 1966 (New York, 
196777 The Middle East and North Africa. 1966-67 
(London: Europa Publications, 19667!Britannica
Book of the Year 1967 (London, 1968). Yearbook of 




Newsoarer Annual Cinema Radio
Circulation Attendance Per Cent Receivers
Countrv oer 1.000 ner canita Literate ner 1.000
Iran 15 2,5 22.8 91
Iraq 12 1.2 52.0 121
Turkey 45 1.1 39.6 83
Japan 451 3-8 97.8 209Lebanon 97 13.8 4 7 .5 143
Syria (SAR) 21 2.0 38.4 195
Egypt (UAR) 15 2,1 26.7 166Jordan 8 3-1 3 2 ,4 189Israel 143 19.6 8 5 .0 136












& Imp. in i 
ner canita)
Iran 12 986 88 89
Iraq 7 286 129 160
Turkey 372 5 744 142 30
Japan 172 2h 203 217 17
Lebanon 34 373 144 222
Syria (SAR) 3 458 166 70Egypt (UAR) 10 3 478 151 52Jordan 6 184 189 91Israel 21 1 001 228 469
Regional MEAN 58 1 564 155 148
*In arriving at the regional mean for this table and ta­
ble 53 figures for Japan were excluded from the calculations.
SOURCES! Same as Table 53-
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TABLE 55
RELATIVE VALUE DISTRIBUTION MATRIX
GNP ner Social h QCaloric
Countrv canita Energy Services Intake
Iran 73 .9 60.2 80 2 7 .5
Iraq 8 2 .5 89 .4 80 3 2 .0
Turkey 7 7 .9 5 7 .5 60 8 0 .5
Japan 234 .7 247.3 80 41.0
Lebanon 71 .9 114.9 80 3 3 .5
Syria (SAR) 62.0 46.6 40 42.0
Egypt (UAR) 3 6 .3 46.3 40 7 1 .5Jordan 3 8 .6 44.8 20 3 9 .0
Israel 357 .8 3 4 4 .5 80 66.5
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(a) per cent of regional mean.
(b) the 5 types of services reported were taken as 1
(c) scaled from 15OO to 3500 calories.
(d) maximum impact of an item limited to 1
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Yet Professor Benson has gone beyond the purely want/
get ratio by introducing the military power as a further fac- 
11tor. In order to arrive at comparable indices, the absolute
value distribution and awareness and military matrices have
12been translated into relative regional matrices. In calcu­
lating relative matrices here, we have used the regional mean 
(X) since the world mean for the same indices were not avail­
able.^^ The resultant Value Satisfaction Quotient (VSQ)
indicates that regionally Iran and Iraq have the lowest and
1Turkey the highest VSQ — with Japan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Egypt and Syria falling in between in the order of increasing
VSQ, However, as we have pointed out previously, the ultimate
measure of 'action' or 'inaction' in the polity is not the
VSQ, but rather the pressure and power scales which are the
mean of the relative military scale with the relative VSQ and
1Index of Value Distribution, respectively. Finally, through
a Markov Matrix and a Fixed Point Vector, the probability for
the polity remaining in the state of action or inaction in the
16more or less distant future is ascertained.
See Table 57- 
I^See Tables 4̂, 56 and 57-










Newsnaners Books Radios School
Newsnauer
Circulation
Iran 20.7 63.0 66 .9 56.8 33 .3
Iraq 12.1 18.3 8 9 .0 8 3 .2 26.7
Turkey 641.4 367.3 61.0 9 1 .6 100.0Japan 296.6 1 547.5 153.7 140.0 1 002.2
Lebanon 58.6 23 .8 105.1 9 2 .9 215 .6
Syria (SAR) 5.2 29 .3 143.4 107.1 46.7Egypt (UAR) 17.2 222.4 122.1 9 7 .4 33 .3
Jordan 10.3 11.8 3 8 .2 121 .9 1 7 .8
Israel 36.2 64.0 172.8 147.1 317 .8
Country Cinema Literacy Trade Mean Value
Iran 4 3 .9 52.9 60.1 4 9 .7Iraq 21.1 120.6 108.1 56.3Turkey 19.3 91 .9 20 .3 7 3 .0
Japan 66 .7 226.9 1 1 .5 84.8
Lebanon 242.1 110.2 150 .0 84.4
Syria (SAR) 35.1 89.1 4 7 .3 56.6Egypt (UAR) 36.8 61 .9 35.1 60.2
Jordan 54 .4 75 .2 61.5 46.2Israel 343 .9 197.2 316.9 8 7 .5
(a) per cent of the regional mean.


















Iran 180 25 500 7.1 74 44
Iraq 70 8 338 8.4 88 52
Turkey hk-2 32 120 13.7 143 85
Japan 246 98 865 2.5 26 15
Lebanon 10.6 2 250 4.7 49 29
Syria (SAR) 55.0 5 450 10,1 105 62
Egypt (UAR) 176.0 29 673 5.9 61 36
Jordan 33 2 040 16.2 169 100
Israel 27 2 629 10.3 107 63
Regional Mean* 9.6
IV)roLU
+the figure for Japan was excluded in calculating the regional mean
22k-
TABLE 58
VALUE SATISFACTION QUOTIENT 











Iran 49.7/56.8 = ,87 72 58 50
Iraq 56.3/63.7 = .88 73 62 58
Turkey 73.0/60.5 = 1,21 100 92 73
Japan 8408/88 ,7 = .96 79 47 52
Lebanon 8 4.4/8 3 ,6 = 1 ,01 83 . 56 56
Syria(SAR) 5 6.6/59,1 = 1 ,1 5 95 78 55
Egypt(UAR) 60.2/56.1 = 1.07 88 62 ’ 46
Jordan 46.2/47.5 = ,97 80 90 74
Israel 8 7.5/9 2 ,4 = .9 5 79 71 78
(a) Scaled with the highest VSQ = 100,
(b) Mean of Relative VSQ and Relative Military Scale,
(c) Mean of Relative Military Scale and Index of Value 
Distribution.
22^
_ 17Hypothesis of Table 9̂








ing in state of 
inaction at next stage 
if there now, presumed 
influenced by low pres­
sure for change and low 
military resources 
(complement of pres­
sure scale of Table 6)
Probability of moving 
from action state to 
inaction state at next 
stage, presumed influ­
enced by low military 
resources and low gen­
eral resources ( 
(complement of power 
scale of Table 6)
Condition 2 
(Action)
Probability of moving 
from inaction state to 
action state at next 
stage, presumed in­
fluenced by high 
pressure for change 
and high military re­
sources (pressure scale 
of Table 6)
Probability of remain­
ing in action state at 
next stage if there now, 
presumed influenced by 
high military resources 
and high general resour­
ces (power scale of 
Table 6)
B) Meaning of the Fixed Point Vector
Probability of being in 
inaction state at any 
time in the more or 
less distant future.
Probability of being 
in action state at any 
time in the more or 
less distant future.
17'Oliver Benson, op,, cit, p. 27'
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227
Using the Fixed Point Vector as a measure of action-
inaction, Turkey and Jordan rank highest (.82 each) being
followed by Israel, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran and
Japan, respectively in the order of diminishing probability
18of action in the more or less distant future.
Adopting the mean value of the Relative Value Distri­
bution and Awareness Indices as an index of modernization, 
Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation yields no apparent
19relationship between action orientation and the level of
20modernization (r = .3 )» This finding lends support to the
previous contention of this study that modernization does not
21necessarily result in stability. Modernization, by defini­
tion, implies change and in more traditional contexts, which 
often present resistance to pressures for structural change, 
stability is still harder to maintain.
The shortcomings of the above approach are not in its 
mathematical scheme but rather inherent in the complexity of 
the subject matter,.as well as the limited availability of 
data. In this study we have had to use a limited number of 
indices concerning which the related data were available
iGgee Table 59- 
 ̂9lbid.




with respect to all the nine aforementioned polities. Aside
from the availability of data, the designation of certain
indices to either awareness or value distribution categories
has to be somewhat arbitrary. For example, one could use
the index of school population which has been included as
an awareness indicator under value distribution, particularly
considering the tremendous demand for education. In fact, we
have used the index of the teacher population as a measure of
22value distribution. The same argument could be applied to 
many other indices such as trade, radios, technology, etc..
The point here, aside from the complexity of the subject 
matter, is that much of the choice in the allocation of in­
dices is left at the, hopefully judicious, discretion of the 
researcher.
Professor Benson points out that the 'aspirations' 
ingredient of the above computations should be ideally derived 
from informed attitudinal survey research. It is only in the 
absence of such survey research that he substitutes a "crude 
'information index' based on the assumption that the aspira­
tion level of a society will vary with its access to
21knowledge about the outside world."
ZZgee Table 53'
^^Oliver Benson, 0£.. cit.. p. 13
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A further shortcoming of the above approach, which might 
be overcome in due time with the availability of more sophis­
ticated data, has to do with its lack of accountability of 
dualism. As it was pointed out in the first chapter, much 
of the available per capita statistics do not reflect the 
dualistic nature of polities which is to a large extent res­
ponsible for the dynamic changes that take place. For example,
2i+the per capita income for Iran has been listed as 224 dollars. 
Whereas, geographically, the per capita income is about 600 
dollars in cities and less than 50 dollars in the countryside. 
Even within the cities, as well as in the countryside, there 
is a large degree of disparity in income. Thus, while one 
talks about value distribution, one must always note that it 
is unequal; and to the degree that there'is inequity there is 
frustration or gratification. From this vantage point the 
dynamics of social change has been referred to, in simple 
terms in the present worldwide context, as the struggle 
between the 'haves' and the 'have nots.' But it is not purely 
a question of 'having.' 'Wanting' and the ability of 'taking' 
on the part of the 'have-nots' are also very important. It 
is perhaps with the consideration of these points in mind 
that most students of revolutionary movements— Marx, Brin­
ton, Halpern, to name only a few— ultimately tend to focus -
^̂ See Table 53-
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on the 'alienation of the modernists' as the basic cause of 
revolutionary movements-
The New Middle Class As A Revolutionary Force
Professor Halpern's approach is much less empirical, 
but to a certain extent lends itself to the consideration of 
the dualistic nature of the problem- The trouble, or perhaps 
the advantage, with the dualistic approach and class analysis 
in the area of comparative politics is that it would require 
an intimate knowledge of the various polities involved, be­
fore one could embark upon a comparative study. Fortunately 
for us. Professor Halpern is a competent scholar in the area 
under consideration here.
Professor Halpern's main contention is that the genesis 
of social change in the countries of North Africa and the 
Middle East is within the new middle classes who, contrary 
to the old middle classes, are salaried rather than proper­
tied- Due to the fact that such a salaried middle class is 
composed of individuals with the highest level of skills 
necessary for modernization (amongst the groups composing the 
new middle class are doctors, journalists, artists, professors, 
teachers, writers, poets, students, middle ranking bureau­
crats and engineers), they are the hard-core modernists whose 
cooperation is indispensible for the successful operation of 
any modern society. It is in the interaction between such
231
new political forces, on the one hand, and the traditional 
classes which are associated with a low level of skill and 
differentiation,.as well as the old institutional structures, 
on the other hand, that Halpern begins to analyze the pro­
cess of social changeo
The traditional forces and structures either must 
adapt themselves to this new middle class by modifying the 
socio-political structures and the cultural and economic 
patterns, or have to face the challenges of this revolution­
ary class » The new middle class has the following 
characteristics :
1o Its members possess a modern higher education.
2. Most of their power resides in their skills or 
talents or in the function they perform.
3. They have been exposed in varying degrees to 
outside philosophies and ideas.
k. They are free of rigidrreligious dogmatism 
and obeisance to past history.
255» They possess energy and the will to act.
With the above characteristics it can readily be seen that the 
new middle class poses a substantial threat to the traditional 
structures. In this mode of analysis there is a great deal
oK^8ee James A. Bill, "Iranian Middle Class Emerges as 
a Catalyst of National Reform" The Christian Science Monitor. 
(June 5) 1968), p. 10.
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of merit since it deals with the more concrete socio-political- ■
relations amongst various groups in societyo Yet, as we
pointed out in the discussion of socio-political structures 
26in Iran, at times this approach also tends to share cer­
tain shortcomings of the elitist theories.
The fervor and significance of the peasants and the new 
working classes are too often forgotten in the analysis of 
socio-political change coming about through revolution or 
evolution in the Afro-Asian polities. The reality dictates 
otherwise. The creation of political consciousness amongst 
the workers and peasants in the less developed parts of the 
world, such as China, India, Algeria, Vietnam, has served 
as a tremendously dynamic force in the process of social 
change. In the more advanced countries, such as France and 
the United States, continued political socialization and 
consciousness of the farmers and workers is still producing 
shock waves which at recent times have brought the respective 
polities to very critical stages. In our discussion of the 
socio-political structure and the dynamics of the human re­
sources in Iran, we have already pointed out the significant 
role that the new middle class has to play in the modernization 
process. The approaches adopted by Professors Benson and Hal­
pern offer two different ways of looking at the polity and in 
this sense they are complimentary.
^̂ See Chapter II.
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